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Introduction and Background 
of the Reemployment 
Bonus Experiments
 
Walter A. Corson and Robert G. Spiegelman
 
MOTIVATION FOR A BONUS OFFER PROGRAM: 
WORK INCENTIVES IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE SYSTEM
 
In the 1980s, the federal government sponsored several field exper-
iments to evaluate alternative approaches to reducing voluntary unem-
ployment and improving the functioning of the unemployment
insurance (UI) system.  Four of these experiments involved the offer of
bonuses to encourage more rapid return to work by UI recipients.
Other experiments to enhance work search and to encourage self-
employment were also implemented.  Some of these experiments
emphasized the offer of “carrots” to encourage desired behavior, while
other proffered “sticks.”  These two approaches are described more
fully in later sections.  
Theoretical and non-experimental empirical work had consistently
found that the availability of unemployment benefits led to voluntary
and unproductive reduction in work effort, thereby leading to unneces-
sarily high costs to the UI system.  The three experiments that we
describe in this study were designed to test whether offering bonuses to
UI claimants would reduce voluntary unemployment.  As we will
show, the bonus experiments were successful in reducing the length of
insured unemployment spells (see Chapter 4) and thus in reducing ben-
efit payment costs to the UI system.  They accomplished this reduction
without any observed adverse effect on the quality of jobs obtained
from job search (see Chapter 5), indicating that the bonus offer did not
reduce effective job search activities.   
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The majority of the 11 alternative programs tested in the experi-
ments, and all of the hypothetical programs using the combined data
from the three experiments, generated positive net benefits to society
(see Chapter 7).  This result reflects the low costs of administering a
bonus program, accompanied by the generally positive effects on
claimants’ earnings.  However, only a few of the designs provided net
benefits to government in general, or the UI system in particular,
because the costs of paying bonuses usually exceeded the UI payment
reductions.  As discussed in Chapter 7, however, if one sector benefits
from the program but other sectors do not, then the program can be
implemented by transferring funds from the winners to the losers.  For
instance, if society benefits but the UI system does not, an option is to
pay the bonuses out of general revenues. 
These experiments were conducted over a decade ago.  Why
should we still be interested in them?  The policy issue raised by the
experiments, though temporarily in abeyance, is not a dead issue.  The
possibility of using bonuses or similar mechanisms (such as wage sup-
plements) to encourage more active job search is still one under con-
sideration.  The Reemployment Act of 1994 (submitted by President
Clinton, but not enacted by Congress) emphasized “UI flexibility” as
an integral part of employment and training policy.  The concept was
that a series of interventions would include short-term compensation,
reemployment services, self-employment assistance, and reemploy-
ment bonuses.  The intent of the act was to turn the UI program toward
reemployment assistance.  When the Workforce Investment Act was
passed by Congress five years later, the emphasis on UI flexibility was
gone, but when the concept is again of political interest at some future
time, consideration of bonuses can be expected to return. 
This book also contains several features not often found in social
policy research: 1) multiple experiments with very similar designs,
enabling the comparison of results of experiments conducted in differ-
ent locations and different social contexts; and 2) the transference from
experiment to policy by considering impacts on nonparticipants and
through explicit benefit-cost analysis.  
The remainder of this chapter discusses the motivation for the
experiments in more detail and their theoretical and historical under-
pinnings.  An overview of the book is presented in the final section of
this chapter.
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THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
 
As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, a national UI system
was introduced to the country for the first time.  After slowly building
in the late 1930s and through the war period, the UI system reached its
stride near the end of the 1940s, after the conversion from a wartime to
a peacetime economy had taken place.  By 1948, almost three-quarters
of the unemployed were covered by UI, and total benefit outlays in that
year were just under $800 million.  By 1992, although benefit outlays
had grown to $23 billion, coverage had declined to about one-third of
the unemployed.  In the remainder of the 1990s, outlays declined to
about $20 billion per year, or even less, and coverage remained about
one-third of the unemployed.
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As in any insurance program, UI has a mechanism to fund future
obligations, a mechanism to determine entitlement, and a procedure for
making payments.  Administrative costs are mostly covered by the fed-
eral government, while benefit payments are made out of a trust fund,
which is administered by the U.S. Treasury but funded through taxes
on employers.  Each state has an independently administered trust
fund.  If payments exceed the funds available in the trust, the state must
borrow from the Treasury and repay with interest.  Total state reserves
were a comfortable $8 billion in 1948, representing 8 percent of total
payroll.  Reserves rose to $38 billion in 1990 but represented less than
2 percent of payrolls in that relatively prosperous year.  After falling to
$26 billion in 1992, reserves recovered to $48 billion in 1998, but that
represented only 1.5 percent of payroll.
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  In 1948, the average
employer paid UI taxes amounting to 1.2 percent of taxable wages.  By
1992, that percentage had increased to 2.2 percent, about where it has
remained to date.   Interestingly, however, because of declining cover-
age, benefit outlays were 0.8 percent of taxable wages in 1948 and only
slightly higher in 1992.  By 1998, that percent had declined to only 0.6
percent.  For detailed discussions of UI financing, see Vroman (1990)
and Blaustein (1993).  
A worker who is in a firm covered by the UI system and becomes
unemployed because of lack of work (not because of voluntarily quit-
ting, or being fired for committing acts detrimental to the employer) is
entitled to receive unemployment compensation.  Entitlement to com-
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pensation, however, is conditional on the worker having sufficient earn-
ings in the 
 
base period
 
, usually the first four of the last five calendar
quarters prior to filing for benefits.  The dollar value of benefits payable
in a week in which the UI beneficiary is fully unemployed is usually 50
percent of previous weekly wages, subject to a minimum and a maxi-
mum.  Because of minimums and maximums, on the average, UI recip-
ients receive about 40 percent of previous weekly earnings.  The
beneficiary is entitled to these payments for a certain number of weeks
during the year after filing for benefits (called the 
 
benefit year
 
).  Twelve
states (including Illinois) pay benefits for a fixed number of unem-
ployed weeks, typically either 26 or 30.  However, most states (includ-
ing Washington and Pennsylvania) pay benefits for a variable number
of weeks, depending upon the claimant’s work history.  A beneficiary is
said to have “exhausted benefits” if the beneficiary remains unem-
ployed after having received all the benefits to which he or she is enti-
tled for the benefit year.  In some recession years, when unemployment
has remained high, the federal government has financed extended ben-
efit programs and benefits have been provided for up to 52 weeks.  
From the start, however, there has been some ambiguity as to
whether the system is primarily designed to “alleviate the hardships
that result from the loss of wage income during unemployment”
(Blaustein 1993, p. 43) or “to insure workers against the risks of earn-
ings loss from unemployment” (Burtless 1990, p. 75).  The system
today contains elements of both.  For instance, the replacement rates
are higher for low-wage workers.  On the other hand, the insurance
concept prevails in the requirement that the claimant must be involun-
tarily unemployed to collect benefits.  No one collects fire insurance
for burning down their own house; life insurance is not usually paid in
cases of known suicide.  Thus, the insurance principle is violated if the
insurance is paid for strictly voluntary periods of unemployment.  This
principle drove the requirements that unemployment beneficiaries be
“able and available” for work and be actively seeking employment.
Furthermore, benefits cease to be paid if the beneficiary refuses the
offer of “suitable” work.  That the work must be “suitable” implies that
simply minimizing the period of unemployment by requiring beneficia-
ries to take any job is not an objective of the program.  Extending the
search to find suitable work is acceptable and even encouraged—
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through, for instance, the requirements that the Employment Service
(ES) assist the beneficiary to find suitable work.  
Legislation in the second half of the 1990s has dramatically
changed the nature and functioning of the UI system.  The emphasis
overwhelmingly has become the return to work.  This emphasis, how-
ever, has been coupled with a vast simplification in the handling of
claims to reduce administrative costs, a process that may not be totally
compatible with the back-to-work goal.  Changes in the UI system are
foreshadowed in the reform of the nation’s welfare system.  The Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) established a system of bloc grants from the federal gov-
ernment to the states, with the fundamental requirement that states
have most recipients working within two years of first receiving assis-
tance benefits.  Today, all but four states have what is called 
 
work-
based welfare
 
 as their modus operandi.
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) signed into law in 1998
includes many of the characteristics of the PRWORA for the UI sys-
tem.  The emphasis is on speedy reemployment, with training provided
only if necessary to obtain employment; the philosophy is that the best
training is a job.  The new federal system under WIA provides reem-
ployment services under one roof—including payment of UI benefits,
job placement, counseling, and job skill training—unless initial claims
are taken by telephone, in which case there is no UI office as such.  
 
Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Unemployment
 
Starting in the early 1970s, Martin Feldstein, and then others,
argued that UI has contributed to increased unemployment by reducing
the incentive to become reemployed (see especially Feldstein 1973).
This problem can arise in any insurance scheme because of “moral
hazard,” whereby agents who are being insured against a state (e.g.,
unemployment) do not take all measures to avoid that state (Burtless
1990, pp. 78–79; Bailey 1977).  If a job seeker extends unemployment
in order to obtain a better job, society may be better off.  However, if
the additional unemployment is not used for effective job search, then
the additional unemployment may be considered voluntary and a net
cost to the system.
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It would be desirable to be able to determine the effect of UI on the
amount of voluntary unemployment and clearly distinguish it from the
involuntary kind.  But, as Burgess and Kingston (1990, p. 138) pointed
out, such a distinction is muddy.  There is an involuntary element in all
unemployment, in the sense that no one chooses bad luck over good;
there is also a voluntary element in all unemployment, in the sense that
however miserable one’s current work options, one could always
accept some job (p. 138).  Thus, in the end, the UI question is empiri-
cal—how much does UI increase unemployment and what is the result
of the increase in terms of job matches? 
A large body of research has estimated the effects of UI benefits on
the duration of unemployment.  Decker (1997) summarized estimates
of how the entitled duration of benefits and the rate of wage
replacement
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 affect the length of joblessness.  The studies showed that
lengthening the entitled duration of benefits by 1 week lengthens job-
lessness by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks, and a 10 percent increase in the
wage replacement rate is estimated to increase joblessness by between
0.3 and 1.5 weeks. 
However, these results might understate the effects on the popula-
tion of particular interest for the bonus experiments (i.e., those claim-
ants not expecting recall to their previous job).  The work by Topel and
Welch (1979) is informative on this issue.  Separating UI claimants on
temporary and permanent layoff, they found that UI effects on duration
were greater for the latter group.  A 10 percent rise in the benefit
replacement rate extended the average unemployment spell of insured
workers who change jobs by 1.2 weeks; the increase was much less for
those temporarily laid off.
A third group of studies measured the effects of UI compensation
on the wage rate of jobs accepted after receiving benefits.  Several stud-
ies found substantive effects of changes in the UI replacement rate,
especially on male wages, with smaller effects on female wages.
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Other researchers, however, have failed to find any earning effects (see
Classen 1979; Welch 1977).  Welch doubts there is one, because if all
unemployed are searching more, the wage can not be expected to rise
(Burtless 1990, pp. 96–97).  Overall, the evidence as to whether or not
there is an effect of UI on the reemployment wage rate is weak. 
As noted above, theory suggests, and the empirical work demon-
strates, that UI increases the duration of unemployment.  Both theory
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and empirical evidence, however, are imprecise in estimating the quan-
titative effects and are ambiguous as to the extent to which the addi-
tional unemployment leads to improved job matches.  Thus, the stage is
set to design and test programs with the goal of reducing voluntary
unemployment without adversely affecting the quality of job matches. 
 
Why a Bonus Offer Might Reduce Unemployment
 
The expectation that an offer of a bonus would lead to reduced
unemployment has theoretic roots in contemporary job-search theory,
which developed the concept of an optimal search strategy for unem-
ployed workers.
 
5
 
  McCall (1965) described an optimal search rule for
job seekers as involving a sequential process in which the worker
decides whether or not to continue searching after obtaining each wage
offer.  In this context, a bonus offer to find a job within a specified time
raises the cost of rejecting a given job offer, thereby reducing the reser-
vation wage and increasing the likelihood of accepting any particular
job offer (see Davidson 1990, pp. 15–17).  This theory, in conjunction
with job-matching theory, would hold that reducing the reservation
wage would not necessarily reduce the offered wage because the higher
reservation wage was unrealistic in terms of job offers available.  Thus,
the critical questions to be answered for a potential bonus offer pro-
gram are 1) will it reduce unemployment and 2) will the reduction
affect job matches?  
Before discussing the three bonus offer experiments that are the
main focus of this book, it is of value to briefly describe other experi-
mental approaches to unemployment reduction.  Experimental research
could take two alternative directions: 1) programs that increase the
requirements for job search and job acceptance and/or impose penalties
for failure to conduct active search (i.e., a “stick”), or 2) positive incen-
tives to increase the intensity of job search or more rapid acceptance of
job offers (i.e., a “carrot”).  The bonus offer is obviously of the latter
category. 
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THE “STICK”: UI WORK TEST REQUIREMENTS
Work Test Requirements and Their Implementation
 
State UI programs contain various work-test requirements to
ensure that UI benefits are paid only to claimants who show a continu-
ing attachment to the labor market.  In most states, the cornerstone of
these requirements is a set of provisions that require claimants to
search actively for work.  These requirements are integrated with work-
test rules pertaining to claimants’ ability to work, availability for work,
and refusal of suitable work.  By requiring active work search, these
rules are also intended to increase the level and intensity of search and
hence to promote rapid reemployment.  
Individual states have latitude in defining and applying work-
search rules according to their specific policy concerns, political cli-
mates, and economic conditions.  Consequently, work-search rules and
their application vary considerably among the states (Corson, Hershey,
and Kerachsky 1986).  Although a few states do not impose search
requirements, most do impose some work-search requirements on
claimants, exempting those with definite recall dates and those who use
union hiring halls to find jobs.  These search requirements typically
specify either the number of contacts to be made by claimants or a spe-
cific number of contacts according to the claimant’s occupation and
local labor-market conditions.  Most states with search requirements
ask claimants to list their job contacts on a biweekly claim form.
These forms are usually checked to determine whether job contacts are
filled in, but few states actually verify the contacts.  States that perform
verification tend to do so only for a sample of claimants. 
All states also expose claimants to job openings by requiring that
claimants register with the state Employment Service (ES).  However,
the degree to which states monitor compliance with ES registration
varies.  Some states require proof of registration before UI claims can
be completed, while others do no more than schedule a time for regis-
tration.  More recently, in states with initial claims processing by tele-
phone, ES registration is completed electronically.  Even when ES
registration was carefully monitored, fewer than half of the claimants
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who registered received job referrals or reemployment services from
the ES (Corson, Kerachsky, and Eliason-Kisker 1988).
Research by Burgess and Kingston (1987) indicated that many
claimants did not fully comply with their state’s work test rules, partic-
ularly those pertaining to active search.  In a five-state study, Burgess
and Kingston found that half of the dollars overpaid in each of the
states were due to work-search violations.  Fourteen percent of claim-
ants required to actively search for work failed to do so, and verifica-
tion procedures were unable to confirm 25 to 50 percent of the
employer contacts. 
Burgess and Kingston’s recommendation that computerized
screening profiles be used to target administrative resources on high-
risk claimants has been widely implemented.  Their recommendations
for increased penalties for noncompliance—presently, the main, if not
only, penalty is return of overpayments without added penalty—and
increased noncompliance detection have received much less support.  
In fact, the main result of these recommendations in the 1990s has
been a reduction in work-search requirements in order to reduce error
rates.  One major change in processing UI claims in the 1990s, which
many believe actually reduces the motivation of UI claimants to seek
work, is the adoption by most states of telephone processing of subse-
quent weekly claims.  Only the new initial claim is filed in person.
Other recent innovations center on the use of modern technology to
improve job search.  Automated job matching is starting up in Wash-
ington and other states.  However, it is not clear whether modern tech-
nology reduces or increases work-search accountability.  
 
The “Stick”: Recent Experimental Evidence
 
Alternative job search strategies were examined as part of experi-
ments in South Carolina, New Jersey, and Washington.
 
6
 
  Some of this
work was instrumental in the enactment by the federal government of
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) System in
1993.
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The two federally sponsored studies in Charleston, South Carolina,
and Tacoma, Washington, provided particularly strong evidence that
tightening work-search requirements can be effective in reducing
claimants’ duration on UI and promoting reemployment.
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  Charleston’s
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Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration, conducted in 1983
(Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985), made registration with the ES
mandatory for all treatment-assigned claimants who received a first UI
payment (except for those filing through mass layoff procedures).
Compliance with the registration requirement was carefully monitored
through a computer matching process, and claimants who failed to reg-
ister could no longer receive UI benefits until they could verify that
they were indeed available for work.  Claimants were assigned to one
of three treatment groups that represented three different levels of ser-
vice: 1) a basic placement interview, 2) a more intensive placement
interview with a second call-in for services, or 3) a more intensive
interview with a call-in for a short job-search workshop, as well as the
second placement interview.  A fourth group, the control group, was
not required to register with the ES.  
As expected, each of the treatments increased the use of the ES
among UI claimants.  The experimental treatments also reduced weeks
of UI benefits by 0.5 week for the group that received the basic call-in
and placement interview and 0.75 week for the group that received the
additional call-ins for the job-search workshop and second placement
interview.  Overall, the treatments were cost-effective, with net savings
in UI benefit payments (after deducting added administrative costs)
ranging from $46 to $56 per claimant.  No evidence was found, how-
ever, that the treatments increased employment or earnings.
The Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment was con-
ducted in Tacoma, Washington, in 1986 and 1987 (Johnson and Klepi-
nger 1991).  This demonstration, unlike the others, focused directly on
work-search requirements (as opposed to strengthening the link
between UI and the ES).  A control group was subjected to Washing-
ton’s standard work-search requirement that claimants make three
employer contacts per week.  Control group members were also
required to participate in both group and individual interviews to
review work-search and UI eligibility issues.  These sessions were held
about 13 to 15 weeks after the claimant filed the initial claim.  One
treatment enhanced this approach with a customized approach to work-
search requirements,
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 and another treatment used a more intensive
approach that included a two-day job-search workshop.  A final treat-
ment—exception reporting—abandoned all work-search reporting
requirements.  This final treatment required only that claimants report
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when they became reemployed or changed their earnings; if no report
was made, a benefit payment was mailed to the claimant.  
The exception reporting approach was clearly a disaster; it led to
an 
 
increase
 
 in UI benefit payments of 3.3 weeks, on average.  No sig-
nificant differences in UI receipt were found for the customized
approach relative to the standard work-search policy of three contacts
per week, but a reduction of about 0.5 week in UI benefits was found
for the more intensive service approach (Johnson and Klepinger 1994).
Interestingly, a hazard rate analysis indicated that the impact of this
treatment appeared to occur at the point when claimants received the
letter telling them to come to the workshop, not at the end of the work-
shop.  This finding suggests that the effect was the result of the claim-
ants perceiving the workshop as a “cost” of receiving UI payments and
not as a benefit.
Not all experiments that tested increased work-search requirements
provided support for this approach.  In 1991, Ashenfelter, Ashmore,
and Deschênes (1999) evaluated an experiment conducted in four
states with two treatments.   In one treatment, the subject was exposed
to the so-called Benefits Rights Interview (BRI), wherein the claim-
ant’s responsibility to actively search for work is explained on the first
visit to the UI office.  The controls would receive the BRI on the sec-
ond visit, as would normally be the case.  In addition, the treatment
group received an expanded initial eligibility questionnaire.  For a sec-
ond treatment group, an additional aspect of the treatment involved an
actual verification that the claimant undertook job search.  There were
about 1,900 experimental subjects and the same number of controls in
four states: Connecticut, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Virginia.  No
results in the individual states achieved a 95 percent confidence level.
In the pooled data, claimants in the overall treatment group did show a
5 percent decrease in the likelihood of qualifying for benefits in the
first week; however, there were no statistically significant effects on
benefit amounts or duration, once qualified.  The authors concluded
that the results of this experiment failed to confirm the benefits of
stricter work-search enforcement.  This finding may only apply to the
specific treatments tested, and does not necessarily contradict other
findings that stronger work-search requirements would be effective.  
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THE “CARROT”
 
Self-employment experiments fall into this category.  Two were
conducted in the UI systems of Massachusetts and Washington.  Benus,
Wood, and Grover (1994) summarized findings of these experiments.
The findings led to a temporary five-year authorization of self-employ-
ment assistance (SEA) being included in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NFTA) Implementation Act.
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  The Massachusetts
design was implemented, as it promised a neutral impact on the Unem-
ployment Trust Fund.  SEA programs currently operate in 10 states,
with New York having the most participants.  Vroman (1999) summa-
rized state SEA practices.  
The reemployment bonus experiments have not yet been autho-
rized by any federal legislation.  However, as discussed in the first sec-
tion of this chapter, the Reemployment Act proposed by President
Clinton to Congress in 1994 recommended permitting states to estab-
lish reemployment bonus programs.  Three of the experiments—those
in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington—are described in detail in
this book.  A fourth experiment conducted in New Jersey had a bonus
component, but it had design characteristics that made it unfeasible to
compare its results with those of the other three experiments.  We pro-
vide a summary description of the New Jersey experiment in the fol-
lowing section. 
 
The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment 
Demonstration Project
 
11
 
  
 
In 1986 and 1987, an experiment was conducted in New Jersey in
which almost 9,000 claimants were assigned to one of three treatment
groups, defined as follows:
• Treatment 1 (referred to as Job Search Assistance [JSA]): a set of
requirements and services that began with a notification letter
sent to each enrolled claimant after they received their first UI
payment, which occurred in about the third week after filing.  The
letter required the claimant to come to the ES office for services.
The services included orientation and testing in the fifth week,
followed a week later by a job-search workshop consisting of five
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half-day sessions, and then a one-on-one counseling/assessment
session, which usually occurred in the seventh week.  Of course,
employment or termination of benefit receipt could terminate the
sequence at any time.  There were periodic follow-up contacts 2,
4, 8, 12, and 16 weeks following assessment.
• Treatment 2: JSA plus training or relocation available after
assessment.  Those assigned to treatment 2 were told about the
availability of classroom and on-the-job training and encouraged
to pursue training.
• Treatment 3: JSA plus a reemployment bonus, which was offered
to claimants who were still unemployed after assessment.  The
bonus offer provided for one-half of the claimant’s remaining UI
entitlement at the time of assessment, declining after two weeks
at a rate of 10 percent of the original amount per week unit it was
no longer available.  To qualify, the claimant had to obtain a per-
manent, full-time job, not with a relative or the immediately pre-
ceding employer.  Sixty percent of the bonus was paid after 4
weeks of employment and the remainder if they remained
employed for 12 weeks.  The full bonus offer averaged $1,644,
and the overall average of the two bonus payments was close to
$1,300 for those who received payment.  
The eligible claimant population was restricted to workers who
were over 25 years of age and identified as being 
 
dislocated
 
, which was
defined as having been employed by the same employer for three years
prior to filing and not being on standby or a member of a union that
places its workers through a hiring hall.  The demonstration sample of
11,060 UI beneficiaries was randomly selected from the population of
eligible UI beneficiaries filing in 10 of New Jersey’s 38 local UI
offices.  
All 8,675 participants assigned to one of the three treatments were
offered job-search assistance.  Of these, 77 percent attended the initial
orientation, 50 percent completed a job-search workshop, and 56 per-
cent attended an assessment/counseling interview.  About 15 percent of
the claimants who were offered training participated in training, most
of which was classroom training.  Nineteen percent of those offered the
bonus received at least the first payment, and 84 percent of this group
also received the second installment.  
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The JSA and training provided by the experimental treatments
were not unique in that these services were also available to nonpartic-
ipants in various forms, such as through the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA).  There were, however, significant differences in the
amount of such services received by participants and nonparticipants.
The most easily identifiable part of JSA is the job-search workshop.
Whereas almost half of claimants assigned treatment received the
workshop, only 7 percent of controls did (see U.S. Department of
Labor 1989, Table IV.II, p. 248).  The authors estimate that the 15 per-
cent attendance rate of training classes for participants in treatment 2
was about three to four times that of similar nonparticipants.  
There were strong effects of the treatments on UI outcomes,
namely benefits paid and weeks paid in the benefit year.
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  Job-search
assistance was associated with an average decline in UI payments in
the benefit year of $87 and a decline in number of weeks of benefit
payments of almost 0.5 week.  The bonus offer was associated with an
additional decline of $83 in benefit payments in the benefit year and an
additional reduction of 0.5 week of benefit payments.  The training
offer had no effect on benefit payments in the benefit year, which may
not be surprising, since the initial impact must be to increase UI pay-
ments during the training period.  Any positive effects of training may
show up in the second year.    
Although the bonus offer treatment in the New Jersey experiment
had strong results, we do not believe that this experiment provided
much guidance for policy, because the particular bonus-offer treatment
was not replicable.  In the New Jersey experiment, bonus offers were
made only after seven weeks of insured unemployment, and the pend-
ing offer was unknown to the selected participants prior to that time.
Such a situation could not be replicated in a real program, as knowl-
edge of the pending offer would be available to all claimants from the
start of their benefit year (and probably prior to that, an issue that will
be explored further in Chapter 6).  This knowledge can be expected to
critically affect job-search behavior during the first seven weeks of the
benefit year, as well as during the period in which the bonus was avail-
able.  
A more replicable bonus offer experiment, in which the experi-
mental subjects are informed of the bonus offer at the time they file for
UI benefits, thereby not contaminating the search process, was needed
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to provide guidance to policy in this area.  In fact, a bonus offer experi-
ment with this characteristic was undertaken by the Department of
Employment Security in Illinois.  The experiment in Illinois was to be
followed by similar experiments in Pennsylvania and Washington.  In
this book, we report on the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington
experiments, because the designs of the three experiments were suffi-
ciently similar to make comparison of results among them, and com-
bining of data for simulations, feasible.  The New Jersey experiment
could not be used in this manner.  
 
BONUS OFFER EXPERIMENTS IN ILLINOIS, 
PENNSYLVANIA, AND WASHINGTON
 
Three bonus offer experiments conducted in Illinois in 1984–1985,
in Pennsylvania in 1988–1990, and in Washington in 1988–1989 pro-
vide evidence of the efficacy of a bonus offer program in UI.  These
three experiments are the subject of the remainder of this book.
In May 1984, the Illinois Department of Employment Security
contracted with the W.E. Upjohn Institute to conduct an experiment
with bonus offers in Illinois.  This experiment was funded by use of the
governor’s discretionary money under Title 7(b) of the Wagner-Peyser
Act, which allows states to use funds “for exemplary models for the
delivery of services.”  The initial interest of the state was in an experi-
ment involving an offer of a bonus to employers for hiring UI claim-
ants within a specified period of time.  A second experimental
treatment, called the Claimant Experiment, in which bonuses were
offered directly to unemployed claimants with the same proviso, was
added in order to compare the effects on unemployment of a labor
“supply” and a labor “demand” incentive.  Because of very low partici-
pation, the Employer Experiment had little effect on behavior, but the
Claimant Experiment was very successful in reducing UI benefit pay-
ments (see Chapter 4).  Its success, plus the encouraging results of the
New Jersey experiment, led the U. S. Department of Labor (more spe-
cifically, the Employment and Training Administration, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Service) to undertake two more bonus experiments,
with offers made to claimants.  
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In 1987, the Department of Labor selected Washington and later
that year selected Pennsylvania to be experimental states.  The Depart-
ment of Labor asked the W.E. Upjohn Institute to undertake the design
and evaluation of the Washington experiment, which became known as
the Washington Reemployment Bonus Demonstration
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 (henceforth
referred to simply as the “Washington experiment”).  The Upjohn Insti-
tute obtained a matching grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to
fund the design and evaluation of the experiment.  Institute staff
worked with the Washington State Employment Security Department
to design the Washington experiment.
In 1988, the Department of Labor selected Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., to design and evaluate the Pennsylvania Reemployment
Bonus Demonstration (referred to in this volume as the “Pennsylvania
experiment”).  Washington was to be a pure test of the bonus offer,
with several treatments providing a sufficient range of alternative
bonus offers to permit mapping of the feasible alternative policy
options.  Pennsylvania was similarly to provide a range of bonus offers,
some of which would also provide enhanced job-search assistance.  
As this book unfolds, it will become clear that the bonus offer
clearly reduced the weeks of benefit receipt and generally sped reem-
ployment of UI recipients into fully satisfactory jobs.  However, the net
benefit analysis is not as strong.  In general, the bonus offer appears to
be of positive net benefit to society as a whole, but the benefits are usu-
ally not positive for the UI system, meaning that only if money is trans-
ferred into the system to pay the bonuses is it a benefit to the UI
system.  Such transfer, however, is well within a feasible policy set and
may be undertaken for programs that are overall beneficial, even if not
to the implementing agency.  We believe, in addition, the results do
provide important information as to the existence of voluntary unem-
ployment by those receiving UI benefits.  Secondly, we believe that this
book provides important guidance to researchers and policymakers
alike who want to understand how to use field experiments to design or
improve social policy. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
 
 Chapter 2 starts by formally presenting the four elements that
comprise an experimental design: 1) who will participate, 2) what are
the experimental treatments, 3) how many subjects will be in the exper-
iment and how will they be allocated, and 4) where will the experiment
take place and under what conditions.  The chapter next grapples with
the essential feature of any experiment, i.e., random assignment, dis-
cussing the process and its success in this case and looking at the char-
acteristics of the control populations across experiments.  The chapter
concludes with the description of experimental operations.  The bonus
experiments were unusually “clean” experiments in that they did not
suffer from selection bias, contamination of treatments, difficult opera-
tional environments, or inconsistent treatments.
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Chapter 3 describes the participants and rules of participation, and
it presents results on the rate of participation and the characteristics of
participants and nonparticipants.  In this chapter, the authors provide an
estimate of the extent to which UI claimants assigned to the experiment
failed to collect bonuses for which they appeared to be eligible.  A
large proportion of bonus money was “left on the table” so to speak,
and this has important implications for estimates of the cost and bene-
fits of a program that would be modeled after the experiments (dis-
cussed more fully in Chapters 6 and 7).  
Chapter 4 presents the most critical results of the experiments,
namely, the effects directly on the UI system.  The impact of the exper-
iment on two variables—namely, the dollar value of UI benefits paid
out to claimants and the number of weeks (duration) of insured unem-
ployment—are estimated.  The chapter concentrates on the difference
between experimental and control parameters over the benefit year.
The results are presented utilizing different statistical methods, starting
with a simple comparison of means that, because of random assign-
ment, can provide unbiased estimates of the treatment impacts.  The
chapter then presents results that have been adjusted to account for
accidental differences in the characteristics of treatment and control
groups.  Results are also presented to show how the bonus offers affect
the timing of leaving unemployment and to show how the outcomes
respond to sequential increases in the amount of the bonus offer and
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the length of the qualification period.  Overall, the bonus offer tended
to reduce the length of insured unemployment, and there were differ-
ences in impacts by size of the bonus offer and length of the qualifica-
tion period. 
Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss some other important results, prima-
rily the impact of the treatments on the earnings of claimants, the
nature and quality of jobs, and employer attachment (i.e., did it affect
the tendency for UI claimants to return to their previous employer?).
Earning impacts are investigated by comparing the earnings in the year
starting with the quarter in which benefits are filed—thereby combin-
ing the direct impact of the offer on the timing of reemployment and
any differences in wage rates in the post-filing job that might be due to
the experimental treatment.  The latter is directly addressed by compar-
ing experimental and control differences in earnings after termination
of UI benefits.  The impact on the degree to which UI claimants
returned to the pre-filing employer was deemed important because of
employer concern that the bonus offer—not payable if the claimant is
recalled to the previous job—might loosen employer attachment.  No
support for this concern was found.  
Chapter 6 provides the bridge from experiment to program by dis-
cussing the various issues needed to translate experimental results into
programs.  It is both the most unique and in many ways most important
chapter in the book; it reflects the need to consider how a policymaker
is to make use of experimental results.  Experimental results are con-
fined to a subset of the total population who are exposed to the experi-
mental treatment, but they provide no estimate of the experimental
impact on subsets of persons in the total population who are not ex-
posed to the treatment.  In the case of the bonus experiment, all UI
claimants are in the exposed group, leaving all unemployed workers
who are not UI claimants outside of the experimental realm.  In a full
program, UI-eligible nonclaimants can enter the program realm by
claiming benefits, while those ineligible for benefits might be affected
by the program even if they do not participate in it.  Chapter 6 attempts
to measure these effects.  This chapter discusses, and attempts to quan-
tify, the effects of a bonus offer in a full program on the “entry effect”
(i.e., the tendency to increase filing for UI benefits) and on “displace-
ment” or crowding out (i.e., the tendency for participants to increase
job acquisition at the expense of nonparticipants).  The format and
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approach of Chapter 6, by necessity, differs from that of the proceeding
three chapters.  To measure entry and displacement effects in the econ-
omy at large, it is necessary to reach out to models of employment
equilibrium.  Thus, these results must be considered more speculative
than those that are derived directly from experimental results.  
Chapter 7 presents the results of a benefit-cost analysis that shows
the net benefits that can be potentially derived from a bonus offer pro-
gram from the perspective of society, government, the UI system, and
claimants.  Although recognizing that many benefits and costs cannot
be captured in this analysis, it is suggestive of the net benefits to be
derived from such a program from the perspective of different constitu-
ents.  In the last section of this chapter, we attempt to show the impact
on net benefits from the programmatic effects discussed in Chapter 6.
Basically, the low administrative costs make a bonus offer an appealing
program from society’s perspective.  Although only the high bonus
program generated net benefits from the government’s perspective, the
treatment simulations, using combined data from the three experi-
ments, demonstrated positive benefits from all three perspectives—
society, government, and the UI system—from a relatively small
($500) bonus.  
Chapter 8 presents an overview of what we have learned and the
policy implications.  The expected effects of a bonus offer program on
work effort and the UI system are described, as is why an experimental
approach to answering the questions seems warranted.  The features of
the experiments and the essential findings are reviewed.  The average
effects of the treatments in each of the three experiments are summa-
rized in Table 8.1.  The summary demonstrates that the treatments sig-
nificantly reduced the number of claimants receiving benefits but that
the bonus offer program appears to have been cost-effective only in
Illinois.  In assessing the experiments, Professor Robins, the author of
this chapter, concludes that, from the standpoint of standards for social
policy research, the experiments were quite successful.  However, the
experiments were not successful in pinpointing statistically significant
differences across treatments, and Robins attempts to answer why this
is the case.  Most of the remainder of the chapter discusses alternative
policies that could be employed to accomplish the goals of a bonus
offer program to cost-effectively reduce insured unemployment.  Four
alternatives are discussed: earnings supplement, stricter sanctioning of
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work-search requirements, worker profiling, and Unemployment Insur-
ance Savings Accounts.
 
Notes
 
1. U.S. Department of Labor, 
 
Unemployment Insurance Financial Data
 
, ET Hand-
book 394, 1948–1998, and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 1948–1998.
2. U.S. Department of Labor, ET Handbook 394.
3. The replacement rate is the proportion of previous weekly earnings that is
replaced by UI benefits; specifically, it is the ratio of the weekly benefit amount to
the net pre-UI weekly wage.
4. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the UI
replacement rate (40 percent to 50 percent) would increase a male’s reemploy-
ment wage by 7.0 percent and a female’s wage by 1.5 percent.  Burgess and King-
ston (1976) and Holen (1977) found similar results.
5. The origins of job-search theory are found in the work of George Stigler (1961,
1962).
6. For evaluations of South Carolina, see Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985); for
New Jersey, see Corson et al. (1989) and further discussion in the section below;
for Washington, see Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994).
7. The unemployment compensation amendments of 1993 (Public Law 103-153)
revised extended benefit rules and also required states to implement a system to
identify UI claimants most likely to need job-search assistance to avoid long-term
unemployment.  The system for identification became know as the Worker Profil-
ing and Reemployment Services system.
8. Later work-search demonstrations in Nevada and Minnesota (see Meyer [1995])
confirmed the positive effects of work-search requirements on duration of UI ben-
efits.
9. Different work-search requirements were developed for different groups of work-
ers, depending on their job prospects.  In addition, search requirements were
strengthened as the unemployment spell increased.
10. The NAFTA Implementation Act (Public Law 103-182) gave states the option of
continuing UI benefits for claimants who elect to start their own business.  Perma-
nent authorization was granted by federal legislation in 1998 for states to provide
self-employment assistance with UI trust fund money.
11. The design, operation, and evaluation of this experiment is described in detail by
Corson et al. (1989).
12. A goal of the experiment and its most likely outcome is a reduction in UI utiliza-
tion.  These also happen to be outcomes that are readily measured, since receipt of
unemployment benefits and weeks of benefits paid are data available directly from
the UI record system.  Thus, for the New Jersey experiment, as well as for the
three experiments that occupy most of this book, a principal measure of experi-
mental impact is the average difference in the dollars of benefits received and in
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the number of weeks benefits were paid between those assigned to bonus offer
treatments and those in the control group.
13. While Department of Labor refers to the Washington and Pennsylvania experi-
ments as “demonstrations,” we use the term “experiment” to make it clear that
random assignment to treatment and control groups was used to permit unbiased
estimates of program effects.  Demonstrations do not involve random assignment
and are most useful in testing workability of alternative administrative proce-
dures.
14. See Nathan (1988) for discussion of what makes good demonstration research.
 
References
 
Ashenfelter, Orley, David Ashmore, and Olivier Deschênes.  1999.  “Do
Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized
Trials in Four U.S. States.”  Working paper no. 6982, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February.
Bailey, Martin N.  1977.  “Unemployment Insurance as Insurance for Work-
ers.”  
 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review
 
 30(July): 495–504.
Benus, Jacob, Michelle Wood, and Neelima Grover.  1994.  
 
Self-Employment
as a Reemployment Option: Demonstration Results and National Legisla-
tion
 
.  Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 94-3, U.S. Department
of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Washington, D.C.
Blaustein, Saul.  1993.  
 
Unemployment Insurance in the United States: The
First Half Century
 
.  Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Burtless, Gary.  1990.  “Unemployment Insurance and Labor Supply: A Sur-
vey.”  In 
 
Unemployment Insurance: The Second Half-Century
 
, W. Lee
Hansen and James F. Byers, eds.  Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
pp. 69–107.
Burgess, Paul L., and Jerry L. Kingston.  1976.  “The Impact of Unemploy-
ment Insurance Benefits on Reemployment Success.”  
 
Industrial and Labor
Relations Review
 
 30(October): 25–31.
______.  1987.  
 
An Incentives Approach to Improving the Unemployment
Compensation System
 
.  Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
______.  1990.  “Monitoring Claimant Compliance with Unemployment
Compensation Eligibility Criteria.”  In 
 
Unemployment Insurance: The Sec-
ond Half-Century
 
, W. Lee Hansen and James F. Byers, eds.  Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, p. 138.
 22 Corson and Spiegelman
 
Classen, Kathleen P.  1979.  “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search.”  In
 
Studies in the Economics of Search
 
, S.A. Lippman and John J. McCall, eds.
Amsterdam: North Holland.
Corson, Walter, David Long, and Walter Nicholson.  1985.  
 
Evaluation of the
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration
 
.  Unem-
ployment Insurance Occasional Paper 85-2, U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Training Administration, Washington, D.C.
Corson, Walter, Alan Hershey, and Stuart Kerachsky.  1986.  
 
Nonmonetary
Eligibility in State Unemployment Insurance Programs: Law and Practice
 
.
Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Corson, Walter, Stuart Kerachsky, and Ellen Eliason-Kisker.  1988.  
 
Work
Search among Unemployment Insurance Claimants: An Investigation of
Some Effects of State Rules and Enforcement.
 
  Unemployment Insurance
Occasional Paper 88-1, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Train-
ing Administration, Washington, D.C.  
Corson, Walter, Paul T. Decker, Shari Miller Dunstan, and Anne R. Gordon,
with Patricia Anderson and John Homrighausen.  1989.  
 
The New Jersey
Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project: Final
Evaluation Report
 
.  Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 89-3, U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Decker, Paul T.  1997.  “Work Incentives and Disincentives.”  In 
 
Unemploy-
ment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues
 
, Christopher
J. O’Leary and Stephen A. Wandner, eds.  Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 285–320.
Davidson, Carl.  1990.  
 
Recent Development in the Theory of Involuntary
Unemployment
 
.  Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ-
ment Research.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., and Ronald L. Oaxaca.  1976.  “Unemployment Insur-
ance, Duration of Unemployment, and Subsequent Wage Gain.”  
 
American
Economic Review
 
 66(December): 754–766.
Feldstein, Martin.  1973.  “Unemployment Insurance:  Adverse Incentives and
Distributional Anomalies.”  
 
National Tax Journal
 
 27(June): 231–244.
Holen, Arlene.  1977.  “Effects of Unemployment Insurance Entitlement on
Duration and Job Search Outcome.”  
 
Industrial and Labor Relations
Review
 
 30(July): 445–450.
Johnson, Terry R., and Daniel H. Klepinger.  1991.  
 
Evaluation of the Impacts
of the Washington Alternative Work Experiment
 
.  Unemployment Insurance
Occasional Paper 91-4, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Train-
ing Administration, Washington, D.C.
 Introduction and Background 23
 
______.  1994.  “Experimental Evidence on Unemployment Insurance Work-
Search Policies.”  
 
Journal of Human Resources
 
 29(3): 695.
McCall, J.J.  1965.  “The Economics of Information and Optimal Stopping
Rules.”  
 
Journal of Business
 
 38: 300–317.
Meyer, Bruce D.  1995.  “Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance
Experiments.”  
 
Journal of Economic Literature
 
 33(1): 91–131.
Nathan, Richard.  1988.  
 
Social Science in Government: Uses and Misuses
 
.
New York: Basic Books, Inc.   
Stigler, George.  1961.  “The Economics of Information.”   
 
Journal of Political
Economy
 
 69: 213–225.
______.  1962.  “Information in the Labor Market.”  
 
Journal of Political Econ-
omy
 
 70: 94–104.  
 Topel, Robert, and Finis Welch.  1979.  “Unemployment Insurance:  What the
Theory Predicts and What the Numbers (May) Show, Survey and Exten-
sions.”  Photocopy, University of California at Los Angeles.
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.  1989.
 
New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration
Project
 
.  Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 89-3, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Washington,
D.C.
Vroman, Wayne.  1990.  
 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Adequacy
 
.
Kalamazoo, Michigan:  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
 Vroman, Wayne.  1999.  
 
Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) Program: Report
to Congress
 
.  Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 99-5, U.S.
Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service, Employment and
Training Administration, Washington, D.C.
 Welch, Finis.  1977.  “What Have We Learned from Empirical Studies of
Unemployment Insurance?”  
 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review
 
30(July): 451–461.
 24 Corson and Spiegelman
 25
 
2
Design of Three 
Field Experiments
 
Walter A. Corson and Robert G. Spiegelman
 
INTRODUCTION: WHAT MAKES AN EXPERIMENT 
AN EXPERIMENT?
 
The modern concept of experimental design is primarily a result of
the work of R.A. Fisher, who developed the concept in the 1920s while
conducting agricultural field experiments in England (see Fisher 1960;
Fisher 1968).  Fisher’s approach had several statistical features and
relied on randomization as the key to providing estimates of response
variability.  According to Charles Hicks (1982, p. 1): “A 
 
true experi-
ment
 
 may be defined as a study in which certain independent variables
are manipulated, . . . and the levels of these independent variables are
assigned at random to the experimental units in the study.”  In essence,
an experiment is a process of manipulation and randomization for the
purpose of measuring the underlying responses to treatments.  Its value
over observational studies lies in the increased ability to elucidate
cause-and-effect relationships (Fisher 1968, p. 246).  
Despite the history of controlled experiments in the laboratory and
the agricultural fields, the idea of such an approach did not enter the
realm of social science until Heather Ross, a candidate for a Ph.D. in
economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presented such a
plan to experiment with the negative income tax in a 1966 paper (Ross
1966, cited in Kershaw and Fair 1977).   Until that time, the concept of
manipulating human beings in the same manner as fertilizer or wheat
varieties was not considered.  However, the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (OEO) was eagerly searching for new ways to evaluate alterna-
tive negative income tax proposals and the academic community was
eager to apply newly developed econometric and data handling tech-
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niques.  The result was the New Jersey Income Maintenance Experi-
ment, which was soon followed by income maintenance experiments in
Seattle, Denver, Gary, and two rural areas.  Experiments with housing
vouchers, health insurance, and residential electricity pricing followed.
New at the time was the idea that it was reasonable to establish a con-
trol group that represented a null treatment only in the sense that the
particular intervention being tested was withheld.  In every other sense,
the control group represented the status quo—affected by all the pro-
grams, policies, and economic perturbations that existed in the general
population.  As we will see, experimentation in general and randomiza-
tion in particular is often not as clean in practice as it is in principle.  
Randomization is the process of selecting individuals from a speci-
fied population and placing them into one or more groups by a blind
process that, in principle, assures that on average the characteristics of
the members of the groups are the same.
 
1
 
  This goal can be accom-
plished using a random number generator or the last four digits of an
individual’s social security number to make the assignment.  If the pro-
cess is done correctly and the samples are sufficiently large, then the
members of each group will differ, on average, only due to experimen-
tal interventions.  Basically, there will be two groups: a “treatment”
group that receives the experimental intervention and a “control” group
that receives no treatment.  The number of experimental groups can be
expanded, with each group receiving a different treatment.  There will
invariably be a control group to represents the status quo because a
comparison between the treatment and control groups tells the evalua-
tors what can be expected if the treatment is imposed in the then-cur-
rent environment.  
In this chapter, the design of each of the three bonus experiments is
presented and the three are compared.  The next section examines eligi-
bility requirements for participation in the experiments.  The experi-
mental design is then described, comparing the nature of the treatments
among the three states and pointing out their differences and their more
pervasive similarities.  We then discuss the number and allocation of
participants in the experiment, followed by a discussion of the deci-
sions as to the location and number of experimental sites.  The environ-
ment within which each experiment was conducted, including the
relevant economic characteristics of the states during the periods in
which the experiments were conducted and the characteristics of the
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group of claimants selected to serve as a control group, is then
described.  We next evaluate the randomization process, whose object
was to create treatment and control groups that had essentially the
same characteristics, and then we describe the operation of the experi-
ments, pointing out the overriding similarities as well as the few differ-
ences in operational designs.  The final section briefly discusses an
unplanned experiment generated by the Federal Supplemental Com-
pensation program in Illinois.
 
ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION 
IN THE EXPERIMENTS
General Issues
 
Participation in an experiment should be guided by the expected
decision as to who would be eligible to participate in a program mod-
eled on the experiment.  Additional considerations that might further
limit experimental eligibility are the likelihood of participation in the
program and a desire to increase the homogeneity of the sample,
thereby reducing the sample size required to achieve a given level of
statistical reliability.
Although decisions regarding the characteristics of those eligible
to participate in an experiment should reflect the purposes of the exper-
imental program, limiting the sample also limits the information
obtained from the experiment.  For instance, in an experimental
employment program that had the goal of increasing the employability
of displaced workers, limiting enrollment to only displaced workers
would result in an experiment that provides no information on the rela-
tive effects of the program on displaced and nondisplaced workers.
Furthermore, a change in the definition of displacement would reduce
the usefulness of the results of an experiment that enrolled only dis-
placed workers under the old definition.  It is, however, a waste of
resources to include persons whose behavior is of no interest in reach-
ing the policy decisions.  If the resulting program has the reduction of
unemployment insurance (UI) costs as a major goal, then it would
seem to be unnecessary to include in the experiment persons not eligi-
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ble for UI benefits, unless UI eligibility is affected by the experimental
program.
Such an effect can arise because of the potential for an experimen-
tal program to generate unwanted increases in program participation
(e.g., additional filing for UI benefits).  This so-called “entry effect” is
usually undetected in an experimental evaluation (see Moffit 1992).
 
2
 
In the UI bonus experiments (henceforth referred to simply as the
“bonus experiments”), entry effects could only be determined if both
employed and unemployed workers (including those not filing for ben-
efits) were enrolled.  This was not the case in any of the bonus experi-
ments, thereby precluding any experimental measurement of entry
effects.  This issue is discussed more completely in Chapter 6 with
regard to the bonus experiments.
Eliminating from a sample some persons who would be eligible to
participate in the ensuing program is done primarily to reduce costs.
For example, if relatively young and relatively old workers respond to
programs differently than those in the age group 25 to 55, concentrat-
ing on the middle age group would reduce the sample size needed for
any given degree of reliability.  Of course, the results fail to inform the
policymaker about the effects of the program on the excluded age
groups.  
Who responds to the treatment is relevant to the determination of
net benefits, because of the potential for 
 
windfall gains
 
, which are
gains that accrue to participants in an experiment who receive the treat-
ment benefits (such as a bonus payment) without any change in behav-
ior.  An example would be a program to pay moving expenses to
unemployed workers who take jobs outside their area of current resi-
dence; windfall gain will be the payments to those who would have
moved without the reimbursement.  Net benefits will be larger as the
proportion of payments made to such nonresponders gets smaller.
However, windfall gain cannot be reduced to zero for two reasons: 1)
equity considerations require a relatively comprehensive definition of
eligibility (e.g., if black workers don’t respond to the treatment, you
cannot design a program that makes payments only to white workers),
and 2) behavioral response is measured indirectly by a comparison of
group behaviors; individual response is only inferred on a probabilistic
basis.  
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Windfall gain is minimized by excluding from eligibility groups
whose members have a low probability of responding to the treatment
and whose exclusion does not involve substantial equity issues.  For
instance, in the bonus experiments, not paying bonuses to claimants
who returned to their previous jobs helped reduce windfall gain.  
 
Eligibility to Participate in the Bonus Offer Experiments 
 
All three experiments started from the premise that a major experi-
mental objective was to reduce costs to the UI trust funds by reducing
the length of insured unemployment.  Offering a bonus to unemployed
workers who were not eligible to receive UI benefits would not contrib-
ute to achieving this goal because no change in the behavior of ineligi-
ble claimants could reduce UI benefit payments.  With an exception of
a few cases in Washington, all three experiments required that UI eligi-
bility be established.
 
3
 
  The criteria of UI eligibility meant that the
claimant must have been monetarily eligible to receive benefits payable
out of the host state’s trust fund.  Thus, veterans receiving benefits
under the UCX (unemployment compensation for ex-service members)
program, claimants with only interstate claims, and ex-federal employ-
ees under the UCFE (unemployment compensation for federal employ-
ees) program were all excluded because their benefits would not be
paid out of the state trust funds.  As shown in Table 2.1, these condi-
tions were uniform across the three experiments; other conditions were
not.  The eligibility conditions in Table 2.1 are described in the sections
that follow.  
 
New benefit year
 
All three experiments required that the claimant be filing to estab-
lish a new benefit year.  (See the Glossary on p. 275 for definitions of
“benefit year” and other UI terms.)  This requirement was imposed for
two reasons: 1) it was felt that, in a steady state, the bonus offer would
be made at the start of a benefit year and not sometime in its midst and
thus the requirement would replicate that expected in a real program;
and 2) it created a valuable homogeneity characteristic in that all
experimental subjects would start with the same unemployment history
(at least with regard to the current spell).  In Washington, but not in Illi-
nois or Pennsylvania, claimants filing “transitional” claims were eligi-
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ble to participate.   In a real program, it is doubtful that a claimant who
received an offer in the initial benefit year would receive a repeat offer
in a transitional year.  
 
Monetary eligibility
 
As mentioned above, the programmatic goal of reducing UI system
costs led all three experiments to require monetary eligibility for UI as
a condition for participation in the experiments.  In Pennsylvania and
Illinois, a monetarily valid claim had to be established at the time the
claimant filed for the first compensable week and/or the waiting week.  
 
Table 2.1 Eligibility Conditions for Participation in the Experiments
 
a
 
Eligibility conditions Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
To participate
New benefit year Y Y Y
Monetarily eligible for UI Y Y Y
Monetarily eligible for UI at 
time of filing
N N Y
No separation issues Y Y N
Not totally interstate, UCFE, 
or UCX
Y Y Y
Not on standby or a referral 
union member
N Y N
Register with job service Y N N
Backdated claims more than 
two weeks disallowed
N Y N
To receive a bonus
Terminate benefits, become 
employed for 4 months
Y Y Y
Not be recalled, placed 
by union
N Y Y
Nonmonetarily eligible to 
receive benefits
Y Y Y
 
a
 
Y: yes, it is a condition; N: no, it is not a condition.
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The requirements for monetary eligibility were more stringent in
Washington.  Only a claimant who had a monetarily valid claim at the
time of initial filing was enrolled in the experiment.  Thus, certain cate-
gories of claimants, particularly laid-off state employees whose wage
histories would not be in the file at the time of filing and whose mone-
tary eligibility would not be established until after filing, were
excluded from the Washington experiment.  This made administration
of the experiment easier and permitted fixed dollar offers to be made at
the time of enrollment.  It is likely that the more equitable approach
used in Illinois and Pennsylvania would be followed in a real program.  
 
Nonmonetary eligibility
 
Claimants who were nonmonetarily ineligible for the duration of
their claim were also not eligible to receive a bonus in any of the three
experiments.  Duration exclusions usually occurred because of “sepa-
ration” issues; i.e., the claimant had been fired for cause or had volun-
tarily quit (does not include “good cause” quits, such as for sexual
harassment).  Nonduration issues, such as not being available for work,
did not preclude eligibility for any of the experiments because these
conditions were removable by the decision to search actively for work,
an event regarded as positive for the experiment.  
 Nonmonetary ineligibility was handled somewhat differently in
each of the three experiments.  In all experiments, bonus offers were
made to all who were monetarily eligible.  However, in Washington
and Illinois, an offer letter (officially making the offer) would not be
sent until all nonmonetary duration stops had been removed for at least
one week.  If the stops were removed during the qualification period,
then a bonus offer was made and a bonus could be collected.  In Penn-
sylvania, nonmonetary eligibility was checked when the bonus was
claimed.  Individuals who had been disqualified for the duration of
their unemployment were not eligible to receive the bonus, but individ-
uals disqualified for shorter periods could receive the bonus.  
 
Not totally interstate, UCFE or UCX
 
Interstate claims are filed by claimants whose wage credits were
accumulated in another state; that state is then charged with the costs of
benefit payments for the interstate claimant.  UCFE is the code for fed-
eral employees and UCX is the code for veterans who have been
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recently discharged from the service.  In both of these cases, the bene-
fits are paid under special programs by the federal government.  All
three experiments eliminated these groups, because UI payments for
these claims were not made out of the state UI trust funds, therefore
there was no potential saving to the state UI systems for these groups.
A universal system would probably include these groups. 
 
Recall status or referral union member
 
In an effort to reduce windfall gain, groups of individuals whose 
 
ex
ante
 
 identification could be used for screening and whose length of
unemployment was primarily determined by someone other than them-
selves were excluded from the Pennsylvania experiment.  One such
group was UI claimants on standby awaiting recall to a prior job.  A
second group was members of full referral unions (i.e., unions that
operate hiring halls and take full responsibility for placing their mem-
bers).  Claimants on standby with specific recall dates within 60 days
and claimants who were members of full referral unions were exempt
from UI work-search requirements in all three states.  
The three experiments had different rules regarding participation
of UI claimants on standby or of members of full referral unions, but
the effects were not that different.  These claimants were not eligible to
participate in the Pennsylvania experiment as stated above, did not
generally participate in the Illinois experiment, and were fully eligible
to participate in the Washington experiment.  In both Pennsylvania and
Washington, however, claimants who were in fact recalled to their pre-
vious job were ineligible to receive bonuses, even if they had been
enrolled in the experiment.  In Washington (but not in Pennsylvania),
the same was true for claimants who had been placed on their first post-
unemployment jobs through union hiring halls.  In Illinois, there was
no prohibition against paying bonuses to recalled workers or to work-
ers placed on jobs through a union hiring hall.  However, workers
expecting recall with firm recall dates or expecting to be placed by the
union were not required to register with the ES and generally did not
do so.  If they did not show up the ES office, they would not have been
enrolled in the experiment.  Thus, most of such UI claimants were de
facto excluded from the Illinois experiment. 
For the Washington experiment, the rationale ran as follows: even
an individual on standby or a member of a full referral union can seek,
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and obtain, other employment.  Thus, the claimant’s behavior can be
influenced by a bonus offer, and he or she should have the opportunity
to change behavior.  However, there is no reason to pay a bonus to
someone who is in fact recalled to his or her previous job or placed
through the union hiring hall since the bonus offer could not have influ-
enced that decision.
 
4
 
  If the claimant could demonstrate that the job
with the previous employer was a “new” job, then bonus payment
would not be withheld.  It was not desirable for the bonus offer to dis-
courage workers who had been laid off from one job in a company
from taking an entirely different job in the same company.
 
5
 
 
In the design stage, several union representatives objected to this
provision but went along with it as an experiment, although they stated
that they would oppose this provision if the bonus offer were to
become a regular UI program.  Table 2.2 summarizes the recall require-
ments in the bonus experiments.
Although these rules were somewhat different among the states,
the end results were similar in that recalled workers did not receive
bonuses in Pennsylvania and Washington, and most of such workers
had not registered with the ES in Illinois and thus were ineligible for
the bonus.  
 
Backdated claims
 
Backdating
 
 refers to the process of starting a benefit year at a date
prior to the Sunday of the filing week.  A one-week backdating to cover
the waiting week often occurs if there is good reason for the claimant
 
Table 2.2 UI and Bonus Eligibility for Workers Expecting Recall
 
a
 
Bonus
Enrollment receipt
Recalled worker can 
receive bonus
Recalled worker cannot 
receive bonus
Worker on standby can 
enroll in experiment
Illinois (only if worker 
registers with ES)
Washington
Worker on standby cannot 
enroll in experiment
Pennsylvania
Illinois (if worker does not 
register with ES)
 
a
 
Definitions of recall: Washington, return to same job with layoff employer; Pennsyl-
vania, have recall date with layoff employer.
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not filing in the first unemployment week.  More extensive backdating
occasionally occurs for a variety of reasons (e.g., claimant was ill).  In
the Pennsylvania experiment, a claim backdated more than two weeks
made the claimant ineligible to participate in Pennsylvania.  There
were no such restrictions in Washington or Illinois.
 
6
 
   
 
Register with the Job Service
 
Registration for job search was an explicit requirement for partici-
pation only in the Illinois experiment.  In Illinois, enrollment took
place in the ES office at the time the claimant registered for job search.
Such registration was required of all claimants not explicitly exempted
from job search.
 
7
 
   
 
NATURE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS
General Issues
 
A 
 
treatment
 
 is a particular program configuration that participants
are offered or required to accept.  A treatment may be a single well-
defined program element (e.g., the offer of a $500 reemployment
bonus) or it may be a combination of several program elements.  For
example, a treatment may combine an offer of a reemployment bonus
with job-search assistance.  If this is the only treatment, then the exper-
imental results will be valid only for that particular combination of pro-
gram elements.  To determine the contribution of any one program
component, it is necessary to have more than one treatment that prop-
erly nests the program components: for example, one treatment with
bonus offer only, a second treatment with job-search assistance and
work search requirements only, and a third that combines the two.  The
third treatment is necessary only if you believe that all the components
together will have a different effect than the sum of the effects of the
separate components (i.e., a strong interactive effect among the pro-
gram components).  If this is not the case, then either treatment 2 or 3
could be dropped.
In most social program experiments, those eligible members of the
population assigned to the experiments are free to accept or reject par-
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ticipation in the program.
 
8
 
  For instance, UI claimants assigned to
receive bonus offers were not required to either change job-search
behavior or file for a bonus if they met the conditions for payment.  As
long as all individuals 
 
assigned
 
 to the treatment group are considered
members for evaluative purposes, no harm is done to experimental
integrity by having acceptance of the program voluntary.
Variation in the level or quantity of the program elements is neces-
sary if an experimental objective is to evaluate more than one level of a
program or, more aggressively, to determine an optimum level for a
program.  If a program has more than one level (e.g., different support
levels for an income maintenance program or different bonus offers for
a reemployment bonus program), then interpolation between two treat-
ments in the experiment can be used to estimate the effects of programs
levels that have not been tested but that lie between the two tested lev-
els.  This, of course, is “modeling” in the strict sense, but the necessary
assumptions are sufficiently weak as to not cause undue concern.  Of
course, if three levels are tested, then the linearity assumption can be
more strongly evaluated.  
 
Elements of the Bonus Treatment
 
The three bonus offer experiments all had the same three basic
components: 1) the bonus amount—the dollar value of the bonus offer,
2) the qualification period—the length of time from the date of enroll-
ment into the experiment to the last date on which the claimant must
start a qualifying job, and 3) the reemployment period—the length of
time after starting a qualifying job that the claimant must remain fully
employed in order to collect the bonus.
 
9
 
  The first two components var-
ied among the three experiments, but the third did not.  The reemploy-
ment period was set at four months in all experiments (16 weeks in
Pennsylvania).  The variations in bonus amount offered and qualifica-
tion period among the three experiments are shown in Table 2.3. 
 
The value of the bonus offer
 
Recognizing that acceptance of a bonus offer is intended to gener-
ate a change in job-seeking or job-accepting behavior, there is an
implicit trade-off facing the claimant between the bonus and the UI
benefits that will be foregone by taking a job sooner than would have
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been the case without the bonus offer.  The value of a week’s worth of
UI benefits is represented by the weekly benefit amount (WBA).  Thus,
a fixed dollar offer is worth more to a claimant with a low WBA than to
a claimant with a high WBA because each week’s reduction in benefit
payments is more costly to the latter.  With this view of the bonus offer,
the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments both priced the bonus
offer in multiples of the WBA.  For example, a bonus offer equal to 3 
 
×
 
WBA implies that all claimants are offered a bonus equal to three
weeks of UI benefits.  
 
Table 2.3 Bonus and Qualification Period Structure of the 
Three Bonus Experiments
 
Treatment designation
Bonus offer 
($)
Qualification 
period 
(weeks)
Average 
bonus
 
a
 
($)
Average 
qualification 
period (weeks)
Illinois
All bonus offers 500 11 500 11 
Pennsylvania
Short-low bonus offers 3 
 
×
 
 WBA
 
b
 
6 500 6 
Short-high bonus offers 6 
 
×
 
 WBA 6 1,003 6 
Long-low bonus offers 3 
 
×
 
 WBA 12 498 12 
Long-high bonus offers 6 
 
×
 
 WBA 12 989 12 
Washington
Short-low bonus offers 2 
 
×
 
 WBA (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1
302 5.7 
Short-medium bonus
offers
4 
 
×
 
 WBA (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1
610 5.8 
Short-high bonus offers 6 
 
×
 
 WBA (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1
917 5.7 
Long-low bonus offers 2 
 
×
 
 WBA (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI
duration) + 1
303 11.0
Long-medium bonus 
52
offers
4 
 
×
 
 WBA (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI
duration) + 1
612  11.0 
Long-high bonus offers 6 
 
×
 
 WBA (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI
duration) + 1
924 11.1 
 
a
 
All dollar values are in nominal dollars.  See Chapter 8, note 2, for information on use
of the CPI to adjust the values for inflation.
 
b
 
WBA: weekly benefit amount.
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A second issue facing the designers of the experiment involved the
range of bonus amounts—what should be the smallest and largest
WBA multiplier and how many different multipliers should be used?
The objective was to have a sufficient range and number of bonus
offers to enable evaluators to determine how response is affected by the
size of the bonus offer, thus permitting policymakers to select the most
cost-effective bonus offer.  The determination of the range and number
of options was partly determined by decisions on a likely policy range,
what differences would be large enough to elicit significant differences
in response, how many treatments would be necessary to properly map
the response surface, and finally, cost.  
Two bonus offers, one at the minimum and one at the maximum of
the feasible range, would be sufficient to provide a basis for estimating
the effects over a full range of options.  However, interpolations are
constrained to an assumption of linear differences in effects.  Thus, if
one treatment is at 2 
 
×
 
 WBA and another is at 6 
 
×
 
 WBA, then it must be
assumed that a treatment at 4 
 
×
 
 WBA has an effect halfway between
that of the two observed treatments.  More than two bonus offer levels
would permit validation of this linear effect hypothesis or some estima-
tion of a nonlinear response surface.  The three experiments differed in
regard to ranges of offers.  The $500 bonus offer in the Illinois experi-
ment provided unplanned variations in the bonus/WBA ratio that
ranged from 3 
 
×
 
 WBA to 10 
 
×
 
 WBA.
 
10
 
  However, the natural differ-
ences in this ratio may correlate with other variables that affect behav-
ior and therefore do not provide as a good a basis for decision making
as planned variations.  Pennsylvania had two and Washington had three
planned levels of bonus/WBA offers.
 
11
 
   
Although the treatments in Washington and Pennsylvania were
specified in terms of multiples of the claimant’s WBA, the actual offer
was for a fixed number of dollars.  Thus, a claimant who had a WBA of
$175 and an assigned treatment of 6 
 
×
 
 WBA received a bonus offer of
$1,050.  The claimant was not made aware of the algorithm used to cal-
culate the bonus offer.  The actual dollar offers varied over a fairly wide
range, as follows:
Washington: the minimum bonus offer was $110 (2 
 
×
 
 the mini-
mum WBA of $55) and the maximum offer was for $1,254 (6 
 
×
 
 the
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maximum WBA of $209).  At the mean WBA of $153, a mid-range
offer of 4 
 
×
 
 WBA would have a value of $612.  
Pennsylvania: the offers ranged from a minimum of $105 (3 
 
×
 
 the
minimum WBA of $35) to a maximum offer of $1,596 (6 
 
×
 
 the
maximum WBA of $266, increased from $252 in 1989).
 
Qualification period
 
The second component of the bonus offer is the qualification
period, i.e., the maximum duration of the initial spell of insured unem-
ployment that the participant could experience and still qualify for the
bonus.  The length of the qualification period is important because it
may influence the cost-effectiveness of the prospective program.  A
long qualification period will permit more eligible claimants to be
affected by the offer, while at the same time it increases the opportunity
for persons who do not alter their job seeking behavior to collect a
bonus.  These contradictory behavioral outcomes imply that the net
effect of differing qualification periods would need to be determined
empirically.  As a result, both the Washington and Pennsylvania experi-
ments varied the length of the qualification period. 
As noted above, earlier acceptance of a job to earn a bonus
imposes a cost to the participant equivalent to the amount of UI benefit
payments foregone.  The qualification period should be considered in
this context.  A 12-week qualification period is 46 percent of the enti-
tled duration of 26 weeks in Pennsylvania or Illinois.
 
12
 
  However, in
Washington, where the entitled duration ranges from 10 to 30 weeks, a
12-week qualification period may be as low as 40 percent of entitled
duration to more than 100 percent.  If claimant job-search behavior is
related to the length of entitlement, then a qualification period as a
fixed proportion of benefit duration rather than a fixed number of
weeks represents a more homogeneous treatment in a state with vari-
able benefit durations.  
Thus, the Washington experiment design had two qualification
periods, one at 20 percent of the time that the individual claimant could
draw full benefits (i.e., the compensable duration) plus one week to
account for the waiting week, and a second set of treatments at 40 per-
cent of compensable duration plus one week.  If the algorithm resulted
in a qualification period having a fraction of a week, the qualification
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period was rounded to the next highest whole number of weeks.  Since
the duration of entitlement could run from 10 to 30 weeks, the short-
qualification-period treatments ranged from a minimum of three weeks
(0.2 
 
×
 
 10 + 1 week) to a maximum of seven weeks (0.2 
 
×
 
 30 + 1 week).
The long-qualification period ranged from five weeks (0.4 
 
×
 
 10 + 1
week) to a maximum of 13 weeks (0.4 
 
×
 
 30 + 1 week).  
In Pennsylvania, the 6-week qualification period was 22 percent of
the 26-week entitlement faced by most claimants (i.e., 6/27ths of the
period, including the waiting week), and the 12-week qualification
period was 44 percent of the 26-week entitlement.  These proportions
are similar to those of the short and long qualifications in Washington.
In Illinois, the qualification period was fixed at 11 weeks, which was
40 percent of the 26-week fixed entitled duration of benefits in Illinois
(plus the waiting week).
 
The reemployment period
 
The reemployment period is the length of time that the participat-
ing claimant needed to remain fully employed after terminating receipt
of benefits in order to qualify for a bonus.  Four months was the length
of time selected for this parameter of the system in all of the experi-
ments (16 weeks in Pennsylvania).  Response was not expected to be
sufficiently sensitive to variations in this parameter to warrant varying
it experimentally.
 
13
 
  The four-month interval was believed to be suffi-
ciently long to avoid encouraging claimants to accept short-term
employment simply to qualify for a bonus.  It was also sufficiently long
to avoid payment for employment on temporary seasonal jobs (e.g.,
harvesting in the summer, Christmas employment, or canning in the
fishing season).
The reemployment period had to be served with the same employer
in Illinois, whereas it was only necessary that the claimant remain fully
employed in Pennsylvania and Washington, which was defined as tak-
ing not more than a week to change jobs and not filing for benefits dur-
ing the transition period.  Eighty to 85 percent of participants who
obtained qualifying jobs met the reemployment period conditions.
Surprisingly, there was little difference in this regard between Illinois
and the other two experiments.  
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DETERMINING THE NUMBER AND 
ALLOCATION OF PARTICIPANTS 
General Issues
 
Determining the number of claimants to enroll in the experiment
and the number to enroll in each treatment and the control group are
critical decisions.  Nothing is more frustrating than spending several
years and several million dollars on an experiment only to conclude
that the number of participants was too small to enable the evaluators
to draw statistically reliable conclusions about the results.  In the dis-
cussion to follow, the term 
 
sample size
 
 is used to describe the number
of claimants selected to participate in the experiment.  Despite its
importance, the subject of sample size is given little attention in books
on experimental or evaluation methodology.  In a 500-page book by
Rossi and Freeman (1989), sampling is mentioned only once and does
not merit inclusion in the index.  Hausman and Wise (1985) discussed
sampling as an issue of randomization and selection, not as an issue of
size and cost.  Cohen’s (1988) important book deals with the sample
size implications of statistical reliability, but not with cost and feasibil-
ity.  
On the other hand, actual experiments must deal with the trade-off
between cost and reliability in determining sample size.  In the early
income maintenance experiments, the question was posed as a mathe-
matical programming problem in which the sample was allocated
among income and treatment cells to get the maximum information
about labor supply response from a given budget.
 
14
 
  In this approach,
the question was never asked as to whether the response would be suf-
ficient for policy purposes.  
The correct approach is to provide answers to the following four
sequential questions.  1) What effect must the proposed experimental
program have in order to justify its implementation as a full program?
2) What sample size will be needed to generate a result such that, if the
true response is the expected response, the result will be statistically
significant?  3) How much will this experiment cost?  4) Is the answer
sufficiently important to justify the cost?  Thus, the experimental
designers must be prepared to abort the process if it is determined that
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the budget available for the experiment is insufficient to generate a
usable response.  Each of the four points, especially the first two, are
described in more detail below.  
 
Sample Design for the Bonus Experiments
 
The critical operational question for sample design was the number
of claimants that would need to be enrolled into each treatment or con-
trol group at each site to meet specified design goals.  The principal
design goal was to generate experimental samples that would have the
ability to detect specified changes in the parameters of interest, namely
the length of insured unemployment and the amount of UI benefit pay-
ments. 
In the first bonus experiment, the Illinois experiment, these ques-
tions were not asked explicitly because the experimenters had no
guideline as to what changes to expect and no guidance from the state
as to what changes were of policy interest.  The approach in Illinois
was to first establish a budget for payment of bonuses, i.e., $750,000
for the two experiments based upon the Wagner-Payser funds available
to the state of Illinois for these purposes.
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  The next step was to deter-
mine how many claimants needed to be enrolled in order to pay 1,500
bonuses of $500 each. 
In Washington, there was no predetermined budget at the point the
sample size was being determined.  The sample requirements were
based on the sample sizes needed in each treatment cell to detect
impacts on weeks of insured unemployment as large as those found in
the Illinois experiment (1.15 weeks).  Based on Washington budget
estimates, a budget was established by the U.S. Department of Labor
for the Pennsylvania experiment.  The sample design task in Pennsyl-
vania was then to allocate the budget to achieve an optimum amount of
information and to assure that the experiment could provide reasonable
results.  In the following discussion, we present the sample design pro-
cedures first for Illinois, then for Washington, and then the more elabo-
rate modeling that resulted in the Pennsylvania design. 
 
Sample design in Illinois
 
In Illinois, there were two treatments and a control group to which
assignments were to be made.
 
16
 
  The decision was made to assign one-
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third of the eligible population to each of the three groups.  This was to
be accomplished by using the last two digits of the claimant’s social
security number, a number which had been randomly generated,
thereby assuring random assignment of the eligible population.  
The sample design task was to determine how many bonus offers
to make in order to make bonus payments of $500 each to 1,500 partic-
ipants in the two treatments (just sufficient to exhaust the $750,000
bonus budget).   The following estimates were made using the data pro-
vided by the Illinois Department of Employment Security (DES) on the
number of ES registrants filing new valid claims in the last available
quarter in the 19 UI offices that had been selected for the experiment:
1) the expected number of filers in Fall 1984 (the anticipated enroll-
ment period), 2) the proportion that would be expected to accept the
offer to enroll in the program, 3) the proportion that would be expected
to obtain jobs within the qualification period and retain them for at
least four months, and 4) an added proportion that might be expected to
meet these qualifications as a result of the bonus offer.  
The investigators arbitrarily assumed a refusal rate of 10 percent
(based generally on experience).  The estimated job acquisition rate of
0.317 was equal to the proportion of claimants in the observed period
who obtained employment within 10 weeks of filing (the experimental
design called for 11 weeks, but the data were provided on a 1–10 and
11–15 week basis).  Of those obtaining employment, about 80 percent
were estimated to have retained their jobs for at least four months,
reducing to 1,212 the number of enrolled claimants expected to earn a
bonus without any impact on behavior.  We then assumed that two-
thirds of those who actually terminated benefits in the 11–15 week
period would respond to the bonus and reduce their unemployment
spell below 11 weeks.  Based on data for the period between July and
September 1983, this would add 294 bonus recipients, bringing to
1,506 the expected number of bonus payments.
This rather ad hoc method of estimation was designed to provide a
benchmark for enrollment.  Continuous monitoring of the enrollment
process was used to provide real-time estimates of the number of
claimants terminating benefits within the qualification period and filing
a notice in that regard.  This monitoring process permitted the state to
modify enrollment rates and determine the length of the enrollment
period based on actual experience.  
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In the end, however, only 570 bonuses were paid, leaving half of
the bonus budget on the table.  A major reason for the large overesti-
mate was the failure of the model to consider that many claimants
would meet all the conditions for bonus eligibility but not apply (see
discussion of the “take-up” issue in Chapter 3).  This was particularly
true in the employer experiment.  While the model predicted that 29
percent of assigned eligible claimants would collect bonuses, the
employer experiment paid bonuses to only 3 percent of the employers
of eligible claimants.  The claimant experiment also fell short of its
goal, but by a considerably smaller amount.  Fourteen percent of
assigned eligible claimants collected bonuses, against a predicted 29
percent.  (The shortfall in bonus payments was somewhat mitigated by
assigning an additional 2,900 eligible claimants.)  
 
Sample design in Washington
 
In Washington, sample sizes were selected to enable measurement
of changes in key parameters vis-à-vis the control group.  In determin-
ing the sample, attention was focused on the duration of insured unem-
ployment, and sample sizes in each treatment were set to detect an
experimental effect as large as that found in the Illinois experiment,
i.e., 1.15 weeks.  
Statistical texts such as Cohen (1988) provide the information nec-
essary to determine sample size requirements utilizing four pieces of
information: the number of treatment and control groups in the experi-
ment, the estimated (or desired) experimental effect for each treatment
group, an estimate of the standard deviation of the population, and the
desired statistical properties of the results.  
The required sample size for an experimental cell is dictated by
two policy criteria: 1) the policymaker wants to have a high degree of
confidence that it does not implement an ineffective policy and 2) the
policymaker also wants confidence that it does not reject an effective
policy.  To meet these dual objectives, two statistical tests are adminis-
tered: 1) a test of statistical significance, which means that, if a pro-
gram is judged to be effective, the level of statistical significance gives
the probability that this judgment is wrong, and 2) the power evalua-
tion, which gives the probability that if a program is effective, our test
will reveal it to be so. 
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A statistical significance level of 5 percent and a power of 80 per-
cent is a typical combination of standards used by many analysts.  If a
program is judged to have an effect using these standards, there is a 5
percent probability that there is no effect and there is an 80 percent
chance of detecting an effect when there is one.  A decision must also
be made as to whether a one-tailed or two-tailed significance level is to
be used.  The two-tailed test is generally preferred, unless it is almost
certain that policy interest is in only one direction.
 
17
 
   
In Washington, we imposed a more stringent 1 percent statistical
significance test but used only the one-tailed criteria.
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  The 0.01 sig-
nificance test was used with a power of 0.8.  A table from Cohen
(1977, pp. 54–55), part of which is reproduced as Table 2.4, shows
that each cell would need at least 2,000 observations to meet these
conditions.  
 To apply the Cohen table, the appropriate effect size index must be
determined.  For the Washington experiment, the effect size index was
determined to be 0.1, based on a desire to measure a 1.15-week impact
on weeks of insured unemployment and the determination that the
standard deviation of the distribution of weeks in the population was
about 12 weeks.  The effect size index is the estimated impact in stan-
dard deviation units (i.e., 1.15/12).
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  The data in the table show that the
sample size is very sensitive to the power requirements.
 
20 
 
The sample size requirement relates to that of a single cell.  The
next step in determining total sample size is to set the number of cells
(treatment and control groups) and the degree of variation among treat-
 
Table 2.4 Sample Sizes for Treatment Group, 
Significance Level (one-tailed) = 0.01
 
Power Effect size index = 0.1
 
a
 
Effect size index = 0.2
 
0.5 1,083  272
0.6 1,332  334
0.7 1,627  408
0.8 2,009  503
0.9 2,605  652
SOURCE: Cohen (1977), Table 2.4.1, p. 55.
 
a
 
See text for discussion and calculation of effect size index.
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ments.  In determining sample size, the same considerations hold in
designing experiments to distinguish between the impact of two treat-
ments as in measuring the impact of a treatment relative to a control
group.
 
21
 
  If the basic treatment is an offer of a $500 bonus (compared
with zero), much larger samples would be needed to detect the differ-
ence in impact of a $600 bonus offer.  In Washington, each treatment
progressed in increments of 2 × WBA.  Since the Illinois treatment was
equivalent to about 4 × WBA, we should have considered larger sample
sizes to detect differences in impact among the treatments.  
For a comparison of treatments that represent different quantitative
measures of the same variable, imposition of some modeling con-
straints can reduce the sample size requirement.  In the Seattle/Denver
Income Maintenance Experiment there were 11 treatments.  However,
much of the analysis was conducted using a labor supply model in
which the differences across treatments in tax rates and support levels
were reduced to a model with two variables, thereby substantially
reducing the sample size requirements for estimating experimental
effects (see Spiegelman, Robins, and West 1983).  In the bonus experi-
ments, the bonus values and qualification periods were redefined as
continuous variables and estimated in a model with essentially two
variables.  The cost, of course, is the imposition of constraints on the
relationship among the treatment variables.  
To estimate the cost of a seven-cell experiment with an average
sample size of 2,000 observations per cell, it was necessary to estimate
the cost in bonus payments.  This required prediction of the average
value of the bonus payment and the take-up rate (i.e., the proportion of
eligible claimants who collected bonuses).  Since the experimental
design called for bonus offers to be multiples of the individual WBA, it
was no longer a fixed dollar amount as it had been in Illinois.  The final
sample design called for an unbalanced design underweighting the
more expensive treatments: 20 percent of the sample would be con-
trols; 15 percent in each of the four treatments with multipliers of 2 ×
WBA or 4 × WBA; and 10 percent of the sample in each of the two
treatments with a bonus multiplier of 6 × WBA.  The average bonus
offer was predicted to be $565 using the 1988 average WBA in the
state of Washington of $148 and an average multiplier of 3.8.  
The take-up rate was estimated to be 0.1875, leading to an
expected bonus cost per eligible claimant of about $106.  The take-up
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rate was loosely based on the Illinois experience of 0.14 and an expec-
tation that improved information to claimants and more extensive fol-
low-up procedures would increase take-up.  This did out not turn out to
be the case.  
As a result of these estimates, the total sample of 12,000 treatment-
assigned claimants yielded a final budget estimate of about $1,270,000
(see Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992, p. 21).  The U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor allocated $1.2 million for bonus payments.  Despite
some differences in actual parameters (the bonuses paid were larger
and the take-up rate lower than projected), careful online monitoring
led to actual bonus payments within 1 percent of those projected.    
Sample design in Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, two major design goals were established: 1) the
ability to detect a UI cost saving of $150 (about one week of average
UI benefits) from the high bonus offer and 2) the ability to detect a
$150 cost saving of moving from a 12-week to a 6-week qualification
period.  A third, subsidiary goal was to detect a $150 cost saving from
the removal of the workshop offer.22  Saving of a week’s worth of bene-
fit payments was about the average saving in Illinois and in the New
Jersey experiment (although the Illinois saving resulted from a bonus
offer closer to 4 × WBA, rather than the 6 × WBA in Pennsylvania).
The sample sizes per treatment cell were those necessary to meet the
measurement goals at a minimum of 80 percent power for a one-tailed
test at the 5 percent significant level. 
A formal sample allocation model was developed for Pennsylva-
nia, based on the design objectives, on assumptions about the magni-
tude of the response to the bonus offer, on the cost of individual
treatments, and on an overall budgetary constraint for the treat-
ments.23   The sample allocation obtained from the model provided for
3,000 control and 10,120 treatment group members allocated among
the six treatments, with cell sizes ranging from 1,030 to 2,240.  In the
end, the high-bonus, long-qualification-period treatment, both with and
without workshop, had 3,370 observations (see Corson et al. (1991),
Table I.2, p. 12).
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SELECTION OF EXPERIMENTAL SITES
General Issues
Determining where to conduct the experiment (site selection) is an
often trivialized activity that in fact is as important as determining the
number of individuals to enroll in the experiment.  The number of sites
has important experimental ramifications.  As the number of sites
increase, several things occur: 1) the effects on the results due to the
idiosyncratic actions of specific site administrators are reduced; 2) the
influence of external shocks that may occur during the experiment in
specific sites (e.g., a major plant closing) is mitigated; 3) the experi-
mental sample, and thus the results, become more representative of a
larger population group (i.e., a state instead of a city); and 4) the
administrative costs increase.24    
Although the increased administrative costs of a large number of
sites is usually small relative to the total cost of an experiment, control
over experimental operations—which is important—is weakened in a
multisite experiment.  The staff of the organizational unit managing
experimental operations is usually small, making it difficult to properly
monitor operations occurring simultaneously in many sites.  
A case may also be made for a small number of sites if there are
effects of scale in the operations.  This is of little consequence in a
bonus offer program but is important in workfare-type programs, in
which a whole office is mobilized to carry out the experimental pro-
gram.  It is also important in training programs, where the breadth of
the offering is important, and in counseling programs, where the exist-
ence of a dedicated staff is important. 
Site selection may not arise in experiments that are conducted
statewide.  The U.S. Department of Labor had a requirement that
experimental populations should be representative of the state in which
the experiment was conducted.  In the Washington experiment, this was
accomplished by conducting the experiment in almost all of the state’s
Job Service Centers.   
When the number of sites is a small proportion of the total avail-
able, site selection should be viewed as the first stage in a two-stage
sampling process and the principles of randomization should apply to
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both stages; that is, there should be random selection of sites and ran-
dom selection of sample observations within selected sites.  Metcalf
and Kerachsky (1988) pointed out that failure to recognize that site dif-
ferences contribute to the variance in the parameter estimates can lead
to design errors. 
Site Selection in the Bonus Experiments
With a total desired sample size determined, the next step is to
determine where within each state to conduct the experiment.  This
decision is intimately tied to sample size considerations, as well as to
determination of the length of the enrollment period.  The total sample
size, number of sites in which the experiment is conducted, rate of
enrollment at each site, and length of the enrollment period are all tied
together in a single equation.  A decision with regard to any one of
these variables affects the parameters of the others.  
In Pennsylvania and Washington, UI offices for filing claims
served as sites.  Employment Service offices for registering claimants
(and others) for job search were the sites in Illinois.  In Washington, UI
and ES offices were coterminous.  In Pennsylvania, there are both cote-
rminous and noncoterminous sites, but only the former were included
in the experiment.  Illinois also had both coterminous and noncotermi-
nous sites, but both were included in the experiment.  The decisions as
to the number of sites, their location within the state, and the flow rate
of enrollees were made on the basis of several complex considerations,
including the following. 
1) Reliance on local office staffs with no previous experience in
administering a bonus offer program indicated that a large num-
ber of agency personnel should be involved in order to reduce
the influence of any individual agents.  On the other hand, the
need to train agency personnel and monitor their performance
put practical ceilings on the number of sites.
2) The sensitivity of the results to job-search success indicated the
need to minimize the potential impact of specific labor market
influences, such as adverse weather or a large plant closing.
3) The desire to be able to generalize the results dictated that the
experimental sample be representative of the state or other large
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populations (coupled with the U.S. Department of Labor
requirements for Washington and Pennsylvania that the sample
replicate the characteristics of the host state population).  
4) Treatment consisted only of cash offers in Illinois and Washing-
ton, so there was no critical mass needed to conduct the experi-
ment.  Pennsylvania, with its job-search assistance component,
did have the potential of enrollment rates being too low to main-
tain a program effort.  Even in Illinois and Washington, how-
ever, there were minimums because of the need to train agency
personnel to conduct enrollment interviews and the desire to
keep a sufficient caseload to maintain staff interest and capabil-
ity.  There were no numbers attached to this requirement, but
enrolling 16 percent of eligible new claimants in Washington
was regarded as a minimum.  
5) The previous four considerations all deal with establishing min-
imum sample sizes.  There were also some issues that would
tend to set maximum sample size.  During the four-month
enrollment period in Illinois, all eligible claimants were offered
the opportunity to enroll.  The operational burden on the coun-
seling staff was not a consideration because it was a time that
caseloads were falling and counselors were easily able to handle
the additional workload.  In Washington and Pennsylvania, how-
ever, there were practical limits to the enrollment rate, because
hiring new personnel was not considered and the ability to add
caseloads to the existing staff was limited.  The desire to reduce
the possibility of displacement of control group members also
supported the decision not to enroll all eligible participants at a
single site.  In Washington, 16 percent of eligibles were enrolled
at 20 of the 21 sites, and 32 percent enrolled at the remaining
site.  In Pennsylvania, 26 percent of eligible UI claimants were
enrolled.  These percentages are large enough to raise the spec-
tor of displacement, an issue discussed in Chapter 6. 
Site selection in Illinois
In Illinois, 22 Employment Service offices (also referred to as Job
Service Centers) were used as experimental sites.  Enrollment into the
experiment was carried out by Employment Service counselors.
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Although job-search services are often provided by the Employment
Service and UI offices under a single roof, only 10 of the 22 Employ-
ment Service offices in which the experiment was conducted had coter-
minous Employment Service and UI offices, and almost all of these
were outside of Chicago.25 
Offices south of Springfield were eliminated to reduce administra-
tive costs and to make the sample more representative of the industrial
base; employment in the south of the state was more heavily in agri-
culture and mining.  The central and northern areas were divided into
four regions: Chicago (eight sites), Metro-outlying (four), Central
(four), and Northwest (five) areas of the state.  The largest offices in
each area were selected with a view of acquiring the necessary case-
load in four or fewer months and balancing the caseload among the
four areas.  
Site selection in Washington
Site selection decisions emanated easily from the basic decision to
have the experimental sample replicate the characteristics of the state’s
population.  The decision was simply to eliminate as few sites as possi-
ble and carry out the experiment in the rest of the Job Service Centers
(all joint UI/ES offices.)  In the end, 10 of the state’s 31 Job Service
Centers were eliminated: seven were too small and remote, two were
part of other state experimental programs that could have contaminated
the results, and one (Vancouver) was part of the Portland, Oregon, met-
ropolitan area.  The 21 offices included in the study accounted for
approximately 85 percent of the state’s UI claims.  
The replication of state characteristics in the enrollment sites was
increased by doubling the sampling rate at one site, Rainier.  Because
of the elimination of Pierce County (Tacoma and Lakewood Job Ser-
vices), a large concentration of the state’s black population was elimi-
nated.  To compensate, enrollment in Rainier, located in King County
adjacent to Pierce County and also containing a large concentration of
the black population, was doubled.  As a result, the enrolled claimant
population had the racial mix of the state as a whole (i.e., about 85 per-
cent non-Hispanic white, 4 percent black, and 11 percent other).
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Site selection in Pennsylvania
An early decision was made to conduct the Pennsylvania experi-
ment in 12 sites, both for operational reasons and because analysis
showed that 12 sites was a sufficient number to reduce site-specific
effects on the variance to an acceptable size.  Desiring to enroll partici-
pants in only 12 of the state’s 87 UC offices and able to eliminate only
24 for cause (mostly for being too small or not having collocation of
Unemployment Compensation and Job Service offices), the researchers
adopted a process of stratified random sampling to select the 12 out of
the 63 eligible sites.   The principle was to assure that each eligible
claimant in the 63 sites had an equal chance of being selected into the
experiment.  With only 12 sites to be selected, the researchers wanted
to guard against an accidentally skewed selection of sites with regard to
administrative region of the state or duration of UI benefits.  The latter
stood as proxy for employment conditions in the local labor market.
Seven regions and four duration categories provided the potential for
stratification into 28 cells, which exceeded the number of sites to be
selected.  As described by Metcalf and Kerachsky (1988), the 28 cells
were condensed into 12 clusters with approximately equal size UI
caseloads.  One site was randomly selected from each cell.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
Characteristics of the States of Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington
Table 2.5 provides information on the three states in which bonus
experiments were conducted, permitting comparison among states and
over the two years for each state that were most relevant for the opera-
tional phases of the experiments.  What do we learn from this table that
is of importance to understanding the working of the bonus experi-
ments?  
Illinois and Pennsylvania were close in size and population density
and experienced little population change over the relevant period.
Washington was considerably smaller and less dense, but it experi-
enced some modest population growth in the period.  Illinois had the
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Table 2.5 Characteristics of the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington 
States in Selected Years
Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
Characteristic 1984 1985 1989 1990 1988 1989
Population (000) 11,511 11,535 12,040 11,882 4,648 4,761
Pop/sq. mile 207 207 268 265 70 72
Racial groups (%)a
Black 14.7  9.2  3.1
Hispanic  5.6  2.0  4.4
Asian  0.2  1.2  1.3
Nat. American  0.1  0.1  1.7
Labor force (000)  5,604 5,673 5,857 5,901 2,295 2,451
Employment (000)  5,093 5,160 5,592 5,583 2,153 2,300
Insured unemployment 
rate (%)
 2.5 2.7 2.4 3.1 3.0 2.9
Total unemployment 
rate (%)
 8.4 8.9 4.8 5.8 5.8 5.5
Labor force 
participation (%)  
Male 76.8 78.2 73.4 73.2 74.1 76.9
Female 54.3 54.4 52.8 53.5 59.5 61.4
UI claims (000) 835 836 1044 1184 465 457
Exhaust. rate (%) 39.4 38.7 23.3 25.1 27.9 25.7
Avg. weekly wage ($) 364 377 419 441 393 403
Avg. compensation 
duration (weeks)
18.6 17.2 14.5 14.8 14.8 15.3
Avg. WBA ($) 134 136 182 189 151 156
WBA/weekly wage 0.368 0.361 0.434 0.429 0.384 0.387
SOURCE: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1984, 1985, 1988, 1989,
1990); U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992); U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Employment and Training Administration (1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990).
a Available only for census years: Illinois 1980; Pennsylvania 1990; Washington 1990.
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largest non-Caucasian population proportions and Washington the
smallest.  The proportion of blacks in Washington was considerably
below the national average.  
Labor force participation was similar, although male labor force
participation was somewhat higher in Illinois than in the other two
states and female labor force participation was somewhat higher in
Washington than in the other two.  Employment grew in both Illinois
and Washington in the relevant periods but declined slightly in Penn-
sylvania.  The total unemployment rate (TUR) was much higher in Illi-
nois in the period, which reflects the conditions at the time.  However,
the insured unemployment rate (IUR) did not differ much across the
states, despite the differences in TUR.
Relative to the sizes of the labor forces in the three states, it would
appear that initial claims were lower in Illinois and were fairly stable
across the two-year period.  The much higher exhaustion rate in Illinois
is consistent with the relatively low ratio of IUR to TUR in the state, as
one explanation for the low ratio is a large number of exhaustees who
remain unemployed.  However, the low initial claims in Illinois may
reflect a lower rate of layoffs in the early phases of a recovery that had
not yet translated into significant job growth.  The longer duration of
compensation in Illinois was consistent with greater exhaustion of ben-
efits and with the lingering effects of the recession.  (The durations are
for regular benefits and, therefore, do not include the effects of the
extended benefit program.)
The lower weekly wage rate in Illinois is consistent with the differ-
ence in timing of the experiments, fully reflecting the 3 percent rate of
inflation that characterized the period.  Overall, the Pennsylvania UI
program appears to be the more generous as displayed by the higher
WBA/weekly wage ratio, known as the “replacement rate.”
What does this information tell us about possible differences in
impact of the bonus offer among states?  The higher exhaustion rates
and longer durations of insured unemployment in Illinois imply either
1) worse job prospects for covered workers in this state, at that time,
than in the other two states or 2) a much greater tendency to use the UI
system to voluntarily extend unemployment.  The much higher TUR
suggests the former.  Employment growth was very modest, and the
increasing labor force participation led to increases in unemployment
rates—not suggestive of a situation in which increased job search
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would be productive.  However, to the extent it is successful, there
were potentially greater savings in Illinois, as the bonus responder
would be, on average, making a greater reduction in the length of the
unemployment spell than his peer in Pennsylvania or Washington.
Thus, the economic data from the states are ambiguous as a basis for
explaining the larger impact of the bonus offer in Illinois.  
The higher wage replacement rate in Pennsylvania implies that a
bonus offer representing the same ratio of bonus offer to WBA in the
three states is more generous in terms of earning equivalence in Penn-
sylvania, which leads to an expectation of greater response in Pennsyl-
vania.
Comparison of Control Groups across the Three Experiments
The control group represents the population from which the exper-
imental sample is drawn.  Differences and similarities among the con-
trol groups of the three experiments can help explain differences in the
effects of the experimental treatments.  Table 2.6 displays characteris-
tics (including basic demographic and economic characteristics) of the
control group members.  There are some potentially important similar-
ities and differences worth mentioning.  The Illinois sample was
slightly more female than the Washington or Pennsylvania samples,
which both show a 60/40 male/female split—not unlike the working
population.  The age distributions are remarkably similar in Pennsylva-
nia and Washington but differ by design in Illinois, which set 55 as the
maximum age for enrollment.  Nevertheless, the Illinois sample is even
younger than indicated by the design, because it differs from the other
two in the proportion of those under age 35.  
 In terms of racial differences, Illinois had a much lower proportion
of white non-Hispanics and a much higher proportion of blacks than
either Pennsylvania or Washington.  The proportion of blacks is partic-
ularly low in Washington, consistent with its population mix.  The
basic manufacturing/nonmanufacturing industrial mixes are essentially
the same in the three experiments.  
 The UI characteristics differ somewhat among the states.  The
lower WBA and base period earnings in Illinois probably reflects tim-
ing, since this experiment preceded the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments by about four years.  An annual increase at a compound
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Table 2.6 Characteristics of Control Group Members 
in the Three Experiments
Characteristic  Illinois  Pennsylvania Washington
Total members  3,952  3,354  3,082
Gender (%)
Male 45.3 40.5   39.5
Female 54.7 59.5 60.5
Age (%)
Less than 35 62.2 53.5 52.2
35 to 54 37.8 36.7 39.8
55 and above 0.0 9.7 8.0
Race (%)
White, non-Hispanic 63.2 83.8 83.3
Black 27.1 12.1 4.3
Hispanic 7.6 3.5 7.0
Other 2.1 0.6 5.4
Industry (%)
Manufacturing 26.4 25.8 23.1
Nonmanufacturing 73.6 74.2 76.9
Occupation (%)
White-collar 42.1 34.2
Other occupations 57.9 65.8
Weekly benefit amount ($) 119.93 164.08 150.51
Entitled duration (weeks) 26.0 25.9 26.9
Base period earnings ($) 12,753 14,126 15,475
UI Benefits
Weeks of insured
 unemployment
20.1 14.9 14.3
Benefits drawn ($) 2,487.00 2,387.00 2,066.00
Exhaustion rate (%) 47.2 27.7 23.9
Initial UI spell (weeks) 18.3 12.5 11.4
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rate of 5.8 percent would bring the Illinois WBA up to the Washington
level at the time the Washington experiment was launched.  This rate of
increase is not inconsistent with the wage growth rates in this period.  
Pennsylvania had a somewhat more generous UI program than
Washington, as indicated by the higher WBA, despite somewhat lower
base period earnings.  The average weeks of entitled duration are
roughly 26 in all states.  In Illinois and Pennsylvania, 26 weeks is the
standard (although a few UI recipients get only 16 weeks, making the
average for Pennsylvania 25.9 weeks), whereas in Washington it repre-
sents the average over a potential range of 10 to 30 weeks.  
The poorer economic climate in Illinois at the time is indicated by
the considerably longer average weeks of UI benefits, the longer initial
spell of weeks on UI, and the much higher exhaustion rate than in
either Pennsylvania or Washington.  These differences do not carry
over to much higher dollars of benefits drawn, however, because of the
lower WBA.  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RANDOMIZATION PROCESS
The objective of random assignment is to create groups that are
homogeneous in terms of the characteristics that affect outcomes.  If
this is accomplished, a simple comparison of mean outcomes among
treatment and control groups provides an unbiased estimate of the
treatment effects.  The characteristics of claimants in the different
groups, within each experiment, are compared to test the effectiveness
of the assignment process in creating homogeneous groups.  Homoge-
neity is achieved if differences in the distribution of characteristics
among the treatment and control groups are small and generally statis-
tically insignificant.  Chance alone will create some statistically signif-
icant differences.  At a 90 percent confidence level, chance alone would
be expected to produce a statistically significant difference in one out
of ten characteristic comparisons.  Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show the
distribution of characteristics generally found to affect the outcomes of
interest—weeks of unemployment or UI benefit payments—in each of
the experiments. 
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For Pennsylvania, the mean values of characteristics across the six
treatment groups and the control group are shown in Table 2.7.  Sixty-
six treatment/control differences were calculated.  Seven of the com-
parisons are statistically different at the 90 percent confidence level,
which is what you would expect by chance alone.  The three differ-
ences at the 95 percent confidence level are what you would expect.  In
all, the Pennsylvania results are not inconsistent with random assign-
ment.26
For Washington, 14 characteristic means are compared across 6
treatment groups and the control group, providing a total of 84 treat-
ment/control group comparisons (Table 2.8).  Chance alone could
account for as many as four statistically significant differences at the
95 percent confidence level and eight at the 90 percent confidence
level.  These are essentially the number of statistically significant dif-
ferences shown in the table.
For Illinois, the means of 11 characteristics are compared in
Table 2.9 for the single treatment and the control groups.  These
results are somewhat less supportive of the conclusion as to the
effectiveness of random assignment, since 4 of the 11 means dif-
fered statistically at the 95 percent confidence level, considerably
more than the 0 or 1 statistically significant differences that chance
alone should account for.   
However, validating the random process does not necessarily mean
that the samples are sufficiently homogenous to warrant use of unad-
justed mean comparisons.  It is shown in Chapter 4 that treatment/con-
trol differences in UI compensation are affected by the inclusion of
WBA (and base earnings) in the Pennsylvania and Washington estimat-
ing equations, requiring use of regression-adjusted treatment/control
comparisons to provide unbiased estimates of treatment.
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Table 2.7 Tests of Randomization in the Pennsylvania Experiment, 
Control and Six Treatment Group Meansa
 
Treatment group
Variable Control
Low/
shortb
Low/
long
High/
short
High/
long
Declin./
long
High/
long
Female (%) 40.5 40.9
(0.22)
39.3
(0.94)
40.2
(0.19)
40.0
(0.37)
40.7
(0.16)
39.8
(0.46)
Age less than
35 (%)
53.5 53.2
(0.23)
54.7
(0.93)
56.4**
(2.02)
56.4**
(1.99)
53.2
(0.23)
52.7
(0.50)
Age 55 and 
above (%)
9.7 9.8
(0.05)
9.1
(0.81)
9.8
(0.02)
9.8
(0.11)
10.3
(0.63)
8.6
(1.12)
Black (%) 12.1 10.3*
(1.83)
11.5
(0.69)
12.3
(0.16)
12.4
(0.25)
11.5
(0.71)
10.7
(1.31)
Hispanic (%) 3.5 3.9
(0.66)
3.8
(0.45)
3.9
(0.68)
2.7
(1.50)
3.8
(0.55)
3.9
(0.53)
Other non-
Whites (%)
0.6 0.5
(0.42)
0.4
(0.58)
0.5
(0.18)
1.0**
(2.10)
0.4
(0.67)
0.7
(0.36)
Manufacturing 
(%)
25.8 25.5
(0.20)
26.0
(0.25)
25.8
(0.00)
25.7
(0.01)
26.1
(0.24)
25.5
(0.15)
Weekly benefit 
($)
164.1 165.5
(0.65)
166.4
(1.27)
167.1
(1.52)
165.1
(0.50)
167.8*
(1.82)
166.9
(1.23)
Base earnings 
($)
14,126 14,375
(0.72)
14,650*
(1.83)
14,352
(0.73)
14,317
(0.60)
14,695*
(1.83)
14,301
(0.49)
Maximum 
WBA (%)
18.6 19.3
(0.49)
20.7**
(1.99)
18.3
(0.27)
20.0
(1.16)
20.5
(1.63)
20.7
(1.57)
Expected recall 
(%)
10.8 10.1
(0.78)
10.4
(0.47)
10.9
(0.05)
11.4
(0.61)
10.1
(0.85)
11.7
(0.82)
 SOURCE: Corson et al. (1991), Table III.7, p. 46; used with permission of Mathemat-
ica Policy Research, Inc.
a The t-statistic of the difference from the control group mean is in parentheses.
* = Significantly different from the control group mean at the 90 percent level of con-
fidence; ** = significantly different from the control group mean at the 95 percent
level of confidence.
b Treatment groups are described by the bonus amount (e.g., “Low”) and the qualifica-
tion period (e.g., “Short”).
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Table 2.8 Tests of Randomization in the Washington Experiment, 
Control and Six Treatment Group Meansa 
Treatment group
Variable
Control Low/
short
Middle/
short
High/
short
Low/
long
Middle/
long
High/
long
Female (%) 39.5   38.9
(0.42)
  39.3
(0.17)
  38.7
(0.55)
  38.5
(0.74)
  39.8
(0.22)
  38.0
(0.99)
Age less than 35 
(%)
52.2   53.3
(0.84)
  52.8
(0.43)
  51.9
(0.20)
  52.2
(0.02)
  52.4
(0.14)
  53.8
(1.01)
Age 55 and 
above (%)
8.0    7.7
(0.48)
   7.8
(0.36)
   8.0
(0.01)
   8.2
(0.21)
   8.4
(0.49)
   6.8
(1.47)
Black (%) 4.3    5.2
(1.48)
   4.7
(0.65)
   4.0
(0.43)
   4.7
(0.67)
   4.1
(0.42)
   4.2
(0.23)
Hispanic (%) 7.0    6.8
(0.40)
   6.4
(0.96)
   6.8
(0.28)
   7.0
(0.00)
   6.8
(0.42)
   5.3**
(2.18)
Other non-
Whites (%)
5.4    4.9
(0.76)
   4.6
(1.27)
   4.7
(0.92)
   4.9
(0.84)
   5.1
(0.36)
   4.4
(1.47)
Manufacturing 
(%)
23.1   22.0
(0.92)
  22.8
(0.28)
  21.9
(0.91)
  22.8
(0.24)
  22.3
(0.69)
  22.5
(0.43)
Weekly benefit 
($)
150.5 150.5
(0.02)
152.1
(1.12)
152.8
(1.40)
153.5**
(2.11)
152.8
(1.58)
154.0**
(2.12)
Entitlement 
(weeks)
26.9   26.7
(1.22)
  27.0
(0.91)
  26.8
(0.75)
  26.9
(0.62)
  26.8
(0.06)
  27.0
(1.16)
Base earnings 
($)
15,475 15,486
(0.03)
15,860
(1.22)
15,537
(0.17)
15,872
(1.27)
16,073*
(1.90)
16,148*
(1.88)
Maximum 
WBA (%)
  33.0 32.7
(0.18)
  33.5
(0.43)
  33.5
(0.40)
  34.8
(1.40)
  34.0
(0.83)
  36.0**
(2.03)
Search exempt 
(%)
22.5   21.7
(0.66)
  21.8
(0.64)
  20.9
(1.23)
  22.3
(0.18)
  20.7
(1.58)
  22.7
(0.14)
White collar (%) 34.2  33.3
(0.70)
 35.6
(1.05)
  34.8
(0.39)
  35.3
(0.83)
 36.7*
(1.87)
  35.6
(0.94)
Years of 
education 
12.3   12.3
(0.34)
  12.4*
(1.80)
  12.3
(0.43)
  12.3
(0.34)
  12.4
(1.00)
  12.4
(1.61)
SOURCE: Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 5-1, p. 85.
a The t-statistic of difference from the control group mean is in parentheses.  * = Statis-
tically significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; ** = statisti-
cally significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.
60 Corson and Spiegelman
Table 2.9 Tests of Randomization in the Illinois Experiment, Control and 
Treatment Group Meansa
Variable Control mean Treatment mean
Female (%) 45.3 43.7
(1.45)
Age less than 35 (%) 62.2 61.8
(0.32)
Black (%) 27.1 25.1**
(2.10)
Hispanic (%) 7.6 7.4
(0.27)
Other non-Whites (%) 2.1 2.5
(1.01)
Manufacturing (%) 26.4 24.8
(1.62)
Weekly benefit ($) 119.9 118.8
(1.27)
Base earnings ($) 12,753 12,888
(0.65)
Maximum WBA(%) 35.3 33.1**
(2.15)
White collar (%) 42.1 45.2**
(2.79)
Years of education 11.5 11.8**
(6.03)
SOURCE: Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987).
a The t-statistic of difference from the control group mean is in parentheses. ** = Sig-
nificantly different from the control group mean at the 95 percent level of confidence
for a two-tailed test.
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OPERATIONS
In this section, the operational design and procedures of the three
experiments are described and compared.  All experiments start from
the premise that participation in the experiment is limited to individu-
als who file claims for UI benefits.  Thus, before embarking on a jour-
ney through the bonus experiment, we will digress to describe in some
detail the process of filing a UI claim. 
 The UI Filing Process  
To start the UI filing process, a prospective UI claimant enters a UI
office and files a claim to establish a benefit year.  A benefit year is the
12-month period in which the claimant can draw benefits before having
to reestablish entitlement.  Filing usually occurs the week immediately
after the claimant becomes unemployed.27  
In all three states, the claimant returns to the UI office to establish
the waiting week and to claim the first week of compensation two
weeks after filing to establish the benefit year.  In all three states, as in
most states, an eligible claimant must serve a waiting week before ben-
efits can be paid for subsequent weeks of unemployment.  
To receive UI benefits, the claimant must be unemployed at the
start of the benefit year and must be both monetarily and nonmone-
tarily eligible for benefits.  The two terms have technical definitions.
Monetarily eligible means that there are sufficient wage credits in the
base year (usually the first four of the five quarters prior to filing for
benefits) to establish monetary entitlement.  Nonmonetarily eligible
means that separation from employment did not occur under conditions
that made the claimant ineligible to receive benefits and that the claim-
ant is “able and available” to work.
In all three states, a claimant is required to register with the ES
some time in the two-week period between filing the initial claim and
claiming the first week of benefits.  Registration with the ES is tied to
the requirement that a UI claimant must be actively seeking work in
order to be eligible for UI benefits.  The registration requirement is not
enforced in Pennsylvania.  In Washington, all UI and ES offices were
joint, so that ES registration occurred at the same time as filing a claim
for benefits.  In Illinois, some offices were joint and other were not.
62 Corson and Spiegelman
Claimants there were required to register with the ES before returning
to the UI office to claim the first week of benefits (plus the waiting
week credit). 
Assignment and Enrollment 
Assignment into the experiment took place in the UI office in the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, but occurred in the
Employment Service office in Illinois.  In all three states, however, eli-
gibility was limited to those claimants filing initial claims to establish a
benefit year.  
We will start with Washington, because the enrollment process
there was simplest and most closely linked to the filing for UI benefits.
For all UI applicants, an on-line computer file was accessed which pro-
vided the status of monetary eligibility and printed an initial statement
of entitlement.  Software was written exclusively for the experiment.  It
used the agency data file to randomly select some of the UI-eligible
claimants according to last two digits of their social security number
and assigned them to treatment or control status.  A computer-gener-
ated form that was provided to every worker filing a claim would also
contain information on the bonus offer if the claimant was assigned to
an experimental treatment.  A treatment-assigned claimant was tenta-
tively enrolled into the experiment; the enrollment was confirmed by
letter when both monetary and nonmonetary UI entitlement were deter-
mined.  This process was also followed in Illinois.   
The process in Pennsylvania differed somewhat, especially with
regard to the timing of assignment and enrollment.  Upon UI applica-
tion, local office staff entered information from the UI application form
into the state computer.  A computer file was then created on the state
system to extract information on all claimants in the demonstration
offices who were determined to be monetarily eligible for UI benefits
during the past week.  The file was transferred to the special demon-
stration data system (the Participant Tracking System), and experiment
eligibility screens were applied (described below).   Once the screening
was completed, a weekly maximum number of individuals was
selected randomly from each office from among the pool of eligible
claimants.  The selected claimants were then assigned randomly to
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treatment and control groups (by the last two digits of their social secu-
rity number).  
Enrollment in Pennsylvania differed from that in Washington
because it occurred at the time the claimant filed a claim to establish
waiting week credit and collect benefits for the first week of compen-
sated unemployment.  Thus, enrollment into the experiment occurred
two weeks after a claimant filed for benefits and excluded claimants
who did not return to claim a waiting week (and a compensable week if
also earned).  
Illinois differed from the other two in that assignment and enroll-
ment into the experiment occurred in the ES office at the time the
claimant, who had previously filed for benefits, registered for job
search assistance.  Thus, only UI claimants who registered with the ES
were eligible to participate, thereby de facto excluding most claimants
exempt from job search.  At the end of the registration process, the ES
counselor would inform the selected claimant that he or she was eligi-
ble to participate in an experimental program.  The claimant would
then be asked to wait for a specially trained counselor who would hand
the claimant a printed, one-page instruction sheet and explain the
experiment.  Unique to Illinois, the claimant would be asked to sign an
agreement to participate, but the agreement did not really commit the
claimant to any particular actions.  This requirement was dropped in
Pennsylvania and Washington.  
The enrollment process in all three states was one of attempting to
communicate the nature of the bonus offer and the necessary require-
ments to receive the bonus.  Either in individual counseling sessions or
in group enrollment sessions, the assigned claimant was given a single-
page information sheet and a verbal description of the experiment,
including an explanation of the participant’s actions that would lead to
a bonus.  In Washington, the UI interviewer would end by asking a
series of four questions designed to ensure that the claimant understood
the program.  The low rate at which apparently eligible participants
collected bonuses in Illinois led to increased efforts in Pennsylvania
and Washington to improve claimant’s understanding of the program.
(As described in Chapter 3, there was some improvement in the take-
up rate in Washington over that in Illinois, but not in Pennsylvania.)  
Differences in timing and location of enrollment among the exper-
iments were not merely administrative details; they affected the charac-
64 Corson and Spiegelman
teristics of the sample in each experiment.  In Washington, where
enrollment took place in the UI office at the time the claimant filed for
UI benefits, every claimant eligible for UI benefits was a potential par-
ticipant.  In Pennsylvania, where enrollment took place at the time the
claimant submitted his or her first claim for waiting week credit or
compensation, claimants who obtained jobs within the first two weeks
after filing the initial claim were unlikely to file for the waiting week or
the first compensable week and were thus ineligible for a bonus (Penn-
sylvania data indicated that 6 percent of initial filers didn’t return to file
a continued claim).  The same situation would arise in Illinois for those
claimants who did not register for job search assistance at the same
time as filing an initial claim—this would differ among ES centers,
depending upon whether or not the UI and ES offices were unified. 
An external validity problem arises in the Pennsylvania design,
because in a real program—unlike the experiment—knowledge of the
bonus offer would be universal and claimants could postpone taking
jobs until they had served the waiting week and established entitlement
to the bonus.  The Illinois design also has an external validity issue in
that knowledge of the bonus offer could attract some of those exempt
from job search to register with the ES.  In general, all three experi-
ments have an external validity problem of unknown dimension in that
nonfilers who do not expect to be unemployed very long might file any-
way in a real program to get the bonus. 
Determination of Full Eligibility to Participate
To be fully eligible to participate, the monetarily eligible claimant
must not have had a separation issue on the claim that would prevent
payment of UI benefits.  In Illinois and Washington, but not in Pennsyl-
vania, central office personnel reviewed the claims files of claimants
assigned to experimental treatment groups.  If there were “issues” on
the claim regarding separation from the previous employer, then eligi-
bility for a bonus would be held up until the issue was resolved, and it
was denied if the resolution was against the claimant or was not
resolved prior to the end of the reemployment period.  When the review
showed the claimant to be eligible to receive UI benefits, the agent sent
an enrollment letter to the assigned claimant, informing that person
that he or she was eligible to participate in the experiment.28  A Notice
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of Hire form accompanied the letter, with instructions regarding the
procedures for submission.  In Pennsylvania, the review for nonmone-
tary eligibility did not occur unless the bonus was claimed.
Submitting the Notice of Hire
 The next step in the process occurred when the participating
claimant obtained a full-time job within the qualification period.  In all
three experiments, the claimant informed the central UI office of a job
acquisition that would establish eligibility for a bonus by submitting a
Notice of Hire (NOH) form.  In Illinois, the NOH was actually sent by
the employer, thereby providing instant verification of employment.
The employer verified that the claimant was hired in a job for 30 hours
a week or more, starting on a particular date.  The UI claim file was
then accessed to verify that the hiring date was within the qualification
period and that the claimant stopped receiving UI benefits.  In Wash-
ington and Pennsylvania, the NOH was submitted directly by the
claimant.  The interposition of the employer was eliminated to reduce
the possible stigmatizing effect of requiring the participating claimant
to enlist the support of the employer in his or her quest for a bonus.    
In Pennsylvania and Washington, the NOH provided information
about the claimant’s prior and new jobs, permitting a comparison to
assure that the new job was not a recall to a previous job—a non-issue
in Illinois.  If the employer, occupation title, and wage rates of the prior
and new jobs matched, there was a presumption of a recall and the
employer would be contacted.  Affirmative answers to the query as to
whether the claimant was self-employed or placed on the job by his or
her union would generate letters requesting clarification.  A self-
employed individual could receive a bonus but had to provide proof
that he or she had a business license and some business income.  The
NOH process in Washington and Pennsylvania was more complicated
than in Illinois because claimants could change jobs and still qualify
for a bonus—with the condition that the claimant did not claim benefits
and did not take more than a week between jobs.  A claimant changing
jobs in Washington and Pennsylvania would file an NOH for each job.  
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Submission of the Bonus Voucher
Sixteen or 17 weeks after reemployment, if the claimant had
remained fully employed for the entire period (or changed jobs in
Pennsylvania and Washington, with no more than a week interlude and
no filing for benefits), the claimant submitted a voucher for the bonus
payment.  In Illinois, a valid voucher was certified by the employer
before submission.  In Washington and Pennsylvania, the voucher was
submitted without such certification, but office personnel contacted
employers to verify continual employment for the reemployment
period and checked the UI claim file to ascertain that UI benefits had
not been drawn during the reemployment period.  
For payment of the bonus to be authorized, verification had to
show the following: the claimant had not drawn benefits during the
four-month qualification period; he or she had been employed on a
full-time job (30 hours in Illinois and Pennsylvania, 34 hours per week
in Washington); the first post-unemployment job was not a recall to the
job held prior to filing for benefits or a placement through a union hir-
ing hall; and that any self-employment was documented.  If any of
these issues were not favorable, the claimant would be contacted to
resolve the discrepancies.  When the agent was assured that the condi-
tions for bonus payment had been met, a check would be issued for the
amount of the bonus.   
Participation in the Three Experiments
 Table 2.10 shows the numbers of claimants offered enrollment
into the bonus offer experiments and the proportions who participated
at various levels (by submitting NOHs and vouchers for payment of
bonuses).  The proportion of eligibles submitting valid NOHs was
highest in Illinois and lowest in Pennsylvania, as was the case with
payment of bonuses.  In all three experiments, only a small proportion
of eligible enrollees fully participated by receiving a bonus. 
The Illinois results pertain only to the claimant experiment.  If the
employer experiment had been included, the number of assignees
would be double the number in the table.  The drop-off in number of
enrollees was much larger in Illinois than in the other experiments and
was due to refusal to participate.  Since the assignees included only
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those eligible to participate, there is no difference in the number of
enrollees and number of eligibles.  In Pennsylvania, the decline from
assigned to enrolled represents the nonmonetary ineligibility of some
participants.  In Washington, all who were monetarily eligible for UI
were enrolled, but the ineligibles were then eliminated from the sam-
ple.  Thus, much of the difference shown prior to “eligibility” repre-
sents differences in timing of dropping ineligibles from the sample and
is not substantive.  
Despite differences in procedure (discussed above) regarding NOH
submissions that should have disadvantaged Illinois, the proportion of
valid NOFs submitted was greatest in Illinois.  The drop in the number
of participants submitting valid NOHs to the number submitting bonus
vouchers could be accounted for by failure to remain fully employed
for the reemployment period (there might also be some take-up failure,
Table 2.10 Participation in the Three Experimentsa
Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
Participation Number % Number % Number %
Assigned  4,186 11,410  14,080
Enrolled  3,527  10,694  14,080
Eligible  3,527   100 10,694 100 12,140 100  
Submitted NOH  NAb 1,604  15.0 2,533 20.9
Valid NOH    765   21.7 1,315  12.3 2,255 18.6
Submitted bonus 
voucher  NA 1,155 10.8 1,946 16.0
Voucher paid    570   16.2 1,123 10.5 1,816 15.0    
SOURCE: Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987), Table 5-1; Corson et al. (1991), Table
III.3, p. 40 and Table VI.1, p. 77;  Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1983), Table 3-1,
p. 50 and Table 3-2, p. 52. 
a In Illinois, the number assigned includes only those eligible to participate and the
number enrolled includes those who agree to participate.  In Pennsylvania, some of
the eligible assignees did not return to claim a waiting week and therefore were not
enrolled.  All those enrolled were eligible.  In Washington, assignment and enrollment
occurred simultaneously at the time of filing for benefits for all those monetarily eligi-
ble.  Some of those “tentatively” enrolled were found to be ineligible due to nonmon-
etary issues.
b NA = not available.
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as discussed in Chapter 3).  In the end, the procedures adopted to
increase participation in Pennsylvania and Washington were for
naught, as Illinois had the highest proportion of eligible enrollees col-
lecting bonuses.
Monitoring for Operational Performance
In all three experiments, the enrollment rates at the various offices
were monitored to assure compliance with the experimental design.
Monitoring occurred at two levels.  In Pennsylvania and Washington,
there was an on-line Oracle system developed to manage the paper
flow (e.g., tracking claimants and sending out letters and forms) and to
track enrollment rates in the offices.  Staffs of the state agencies and of
the evaluation contractors visited each of the offices, armed with infor-
mation regarding performance.  Real operational problems were
uncovered in only one office in Washington—the claimstaker assigned
to enroll bonus-eligible claimants into the experiment had been trans-
ferred and no one had yet taken her place.  This lapse was immediately
corrected.  
A concern was the possible dwindling of interest and parallel
reduction in information flow to the assigned claimant.  Monitoring of
sites did not uncover this tendency.  Overall, it was concluded that the
experiment operated according to design and that any lapses were very
minor.  
THE FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL COMPENSATION (FSC) 
PROGRAM IN ILLINOIS: AN UNPLANNED EXPERIMENT
As will be seen in Chapter 4, the impacts of the Illinois experiment
were about double those experienced in similar size treatments in the
other two experiments.  A possible explanation for the large impacts of
the bonus offer in Illinois was the presence in Illinois of a temporary
extended benefit program that did not exist in the other states.  FSC
was a federally funded, national program that existed between 1982
and 1985.  Its discontinuation in Illinois in the middle of the experi-
mental enrollment period had not been anticipated by the research
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designers and resulted in a “natural experiment.”  The FSC program
nationally extended benefits for most recipients by 10 to 16 weeks,
depending upon the state’s unemployment rate.  For Illinois, the exten-
sion for those eligible was 12 weeks.  Most of those claimants enrolled
in the experiment in July and August 1984 had available the 12 weeks
of extended UI benefits in addition to their 26 weeks of state regular
benefits.  After that date, all claimants had only the 26 weeks of regular
benefits available.    
Because the criteria for receiving extended benefits was somewhat
more stringent than that for regular benefits, about 6 percent of the
claimants eligible for regular benefits were not eligible for extended
benefits.  In Chapter 4, we compare the effects of the bonus offer on
two groups: the first group is comprised of those claimants enrolled in
the experiment (or controls) who were eligible for FSC (“FSC-eligi-
bles”), and the second group is comprised of those experimentals and
controls enrolled in the second period who, though not eligible for
FSC, would have been eligible if it had been available (“FSC-ineligi-
bles”).  
A natural experiment exists because each of these groups has its
own control group and differs largely because of the FSC availability.
Of course, there are also some other differences between the two
groups due to differences in timing of enrollment, but the average dif-
ference in date of enrollment of two to three months is probably not
substantive. 
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 shows that the FSC-eligible group partici-
pated to a greater degree than the FSC-ineligible group.  The results in
Chapter 4 show that indeed, the impacts were greater on the FSC-eligi-
ble group, explaining a large part of the differences in impact among
the three experiments.  
Notes
1. Obtaining unbiased estimates of program impact by a process that is essentially
“model free” is the major motivation for an experimental design.  We draw on the
discussion by Hausman and Wise (1985) to present the argument.  Starting with
the premise that any evaluation goal is to estimate an equation of the following
simple form
(1) Y = XB + e, 
70 Corson and Spiegelman
where B is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with each element of B measur-
ing the effect on Y of a unit change on the corresponding element of X, and e are
the unmeasured determinants of Y, referred to as the error term.  B will be an unbi-
ased estimate of the effect of X on Y if X is uncorrelated with e.  In the operations
of a program, so-called “self-selection” is almost invariably going to create this
correlation.  For example, a government training program (the X variables)
offered to those unable to obtain employment attracts those most motivated to get
jobs (part of the e term), thus X and e are correlated, and if motivation affects out-
comes, then Y and e are correlated, and B is a biased estimate of the effect of X on
Y.  At best, according to Hausman and Wise (1985, p. 189), you can never be sure
that the estimates are unbiased. 
Randomization is a means for assuring that the estimates of B are unbiased.
Suppose there is a treatment, T, and random assignment is used to select persons
to receive the treatment.  Then in the following equation
(2) Y = TB + u, 
where T is the treatment and u is the error term, T will be uncorrelated with u, and
therefore B will be an unbiased estimate of the effect of T on Y.   
2. Extending the eligibility for an experiment to include potentially eligible as well
as actually eligible persons would permit measurement of such an effect.  For
instance, in the income maintenance experiments, all adults were potentially eligi-
ble and families with incomes considerably above the benefit cut-off point were
enrolled although they would receive no benefits.  Such families, however, could
reduce income in order to become eligible for income maintenance payments.  
3. The exception in Washington occurred when claimants obtained employment
that qualified them for a bonus without having established a waiting week for UI
benefits.  In this case, issues that might have resulted in the claimant being ineli-
gible for benefits were not resolved, but the bonus was paid anyway; 7.6 percent
(138/1,813) of those collecting the bonus did not serve a waiting week. 
4. A reason advanced for excluding standbys in Pennsylvania was the desire to avoid
antagonizing employers, who would not like standbys to be encouraged to take
other jobs.  Programmatically, the issue is difficult, because exclusion of standbys
from bonus eligibility might simply encourage workers not to report standby sta-
tus.
5. For a participant to receive a bonus payment while returning to a previous
employer, the claimant must complete a form demonstrating that the position was
different (e.g., different department, different job title, different salary level). 
6. For the first two months of experimental enrollment in Washington (until May 9,
1988), the start of the qualification period for backdated claims was also back-
dated, reducing the length of the effective qualification period.  After that date, the
qualification period started with the filing date, the same as for other enrolled
claimants.  Although the proportion of backdated claims of experimental subjects
increased substantially—from 10 percent to over 20 percent—between the two
periods, the change could not be attributed to the treatment.  This conclusion is
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based on the absence of any statistically significant difference between experi-
mental and control group members in the proportions backdating (see Appendix B
in Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992).  At any rate, the proportion of claim-
ants backdating claims more than two weeks was very small; only 1.4 percent of
treatments and 1.2 percent of controls in Washington.
7. Of the 12,452 treatment-enrolled claimants in Washington, 1,445 were exempt
from job search because of standby status or membership in full referral unions.
The impact analysis showed essentially no difference in measured outcome
including or excluding the exempt group.  Compare Tables 5-4 and 5-5 in Spiegel-
man, O’Leary, and Kline (1992).    
8. The workfare experiments are exceptions.  These were a set of state-level experi-
ments in which randomly selected AFDC recipients were placed into an experi-
mental program and required to work or accept training in order to continue
receiving welfare benefits.   See Gueron and Pauly (1991) for a detailed descrip-
tion of these experiments.
9. The Pennsylvania and Illinois experiments had other components.  The Pennsyl-
vania experiment offered a voluntary job-search workshop of four half-days in
combination with five of the bonus offer treatments.  A sixth treatment was identi-
cal to one of the other treatments but did not include the workshop offer (labeled
“PT4,” a high-bonus, long-qualification-period treatment).  While the workshop
was implemented as designed, so few claimants chose to participate (less than 3
percent) that the workshop was discontinued.  For analysis purposes, the samples
from the two treatments with identical bonus offers were combined and presented
herein as a single high-bonus, low-qualification-period treatment.
The Illinois experiment actually comprised two experiments—a claimant
experiment in which a $500 bonus was offered to assigned UI claimants and an
employer experiment in which the $500 bonus was paid to the employer of the
participating UI claimant who obtained a job under the same conditions.  The
employer experiment is not discussed further in this book, but it is described fully
in the final report of the Illinois experiment (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987) and
more briefly in Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987).
10. In Illinois, the fixed bonus offer of $500 was equivalent to an offer 4.2 times the
mean WBA ($120) and ranged in value from 9.8 times the minimum WBA of $51
to 3.1 times the maximum WBA of $161.  
11. Pennsylvania used a parsimonious two-level experiment because of the need to
have treatments that offered job workshops (see note 6 above) and the desire to
experiment with a declining bonus offer.  In this treatment, the bonus offer was set
initially at 6 × WBA, and the offer declined over the qualification period.  This
treatment is not easily compared with the fixed bonus amount offers and further-
more had no effect on UI outcomes.  Therefore, it is not discussed further in this
monograph.  For details, see Corson et al. (1991).  
12. In Pennsylvania, a small proportion of claimants (less than 2 percent) are only eli-
gible for 16 weeks of benefits; the rest are eligible for 26 weeks.  
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13. Although some claimants could be expected to accept temporary jobs just to qual-
ify for the bonus, it was difficult, given the rules regarding voluntary quits, for a
claimant to go on and off jobs at will and still collect UI benefits or the bonus.
The evidence from Illinois showed no tendency to shift unemployment from the
first spell to later spells in the benefit year.  
14. The mathematical programming model used for SIME/DIME is described in Con-
lisk and Kurz (1972).
15. Administration and research were paid for out of state funds not subject to these
budgetary constraints.  
16. As discussed previously, the two treatments in Illinois were actually two experi-
ments, the claimant experiment in which bonuses were offered to claimants and
the employer experiment in which bonuses were offered to employers to hire
claimants.  
17. Although logic suggests that a bonus offer would only serve to reduce the length
of the unemployment spell, that is not necessarily the case.  For those who would
normally find jobs within the qualification period, the bonus could create an
income effect that would lengthen the unemployment spell.  Only if there is a
compelling case to consider only reductions in unemployment as of interest
should a one-tailed test be adopted. 
18. At that time, a one-tailed statistical significance test was considered appropriate
because of the belief that the bonus could only serve to reduce the length of the
unemployment spell.  Subsequently, theoretical considerations led to an interest in
possible adverse effects of the bonus offer for at least some groups, which sug-
gests a preference for a two-tailed test. 
19. The effect size is a pure number index (called d in Cohen) that is the difference
between the treatment and control group means measured in standard deviation
units.  For a two-tailed test, the effect size index is d = |MA – MB|/s, where d =
effect size index for t tests of means in standard deviation units, MA and MB =
population means expressed in original units, and s = standard deviation of either
population.
20. The power of the test in the table refers to the power of a two-cell test.  If there is
more than one treatment and it is desired to know the joint power of the tests on
all treatments (i.e., what is the probability of rejecting a true effect of any of the
treatments), then one must look at the joint probability.  Thus, if there are three
treatments and each has a power of 0.8, the joint probability of rejecting at least
one true effect is 0.51, i.e., (0.8)3.
21. These sample size considerations do not take into account the desire to learn
about the effectiveness of the experimental treatment on subgroups of the relevant
population, but the costs of having independent treatment groups representing
each interesting subgroup is too large.  The reasons for needing knowledge about
subgroup impacts are either that a policy that strongly affects some population
subgroups and not others may not be politically desirable or that it may suggest
the need for some restructuring of the treatment to better serve some groups.  For
instance, a policy ineffective for some racial groups (or one gender) may not be
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good policy, even if the overall effect is positive.  It must be accepted, however,
that estimating subgroup impacts on fully separated samples reduces the reliabil-
ity of estimates considerably.  For instance, dividing the sample into four sub-
groups (say, two ethnic and two gender groups) implies that, for each of the four
groups, only an effect size twice that for the group as a whole will be detectable at
the same significance level and power.  As discussed in Chapter 4, more parsimo-
nious means of estimating subgroup impacts can be used.    
22. See note 10 above for discussion of why the workshop treatment is not being fur-
ther discussed in this book.  
23. A detailed discussion of the sample allocation model is provided in Metcalf and
Kerachsky (1988). 
24. Another advantage of a larger number of sites, which is not as yet well under-
stood, is related to the displacement effect discussed in Chapter 6.  The possibility
that displacement would contaminate the control group, thereby compromising
the internal validity of the experiment, is small if the sample size relative to the
size of the relevant labor market is small.  This speaks in favor of smaller samples
in many sites rather than larger samples in fewer sites.  However, this does not
reduce the possibility of displacement in a full-blown program, thereby affecting
the generalizability of experimental results.  
25. Of the 22 ES offices in which the experiment was conducted, 8 were unified (none
of which were in Chicago); 2 others were not unified but were housed in the same
building (both in Chicago); and the other 12 were in separate buildings (7 of
which were in Chicago).  
26. This conclusion is reinforced because not all of the 48 tests are independent.  The
most important interdependency occurs because each of the six treatment group
means are compared with the same control group mean.  If one treatment/control
test fails, there is an increased likelihood that other treatment/control tests for the
same characteristic will fail.  As a possible demonstration of this point, among the
six statistically significant differences, there are two pairs.  
27. It may occur before the claimant becomes unemployed based upon an expectation
of imminent unemployment and a desire to establish a benefit year before the
event, or it may occur after the week of becoming unemployed.  In this case, the
benefit year may start in a week prior to the filing week, referred to as a “back-
dated claim.”     
28. There was an exception to this rule in the Washington experiment.  Unlike in
Pennsylvania, claimants who filed and were monetarily eligible for benefits but
who did not proceed to claim a waiting week were still eligible for a bonus.  This
created a small group who might have been ineligible for nonmonetary reasons,
which would only have been determined if the claimant claimed a waiting week.
74 Corson and Spiegelman
References
Cohen, Jacob.  1977.  Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences.
Revised ed.  Orlando, Florida: Academic Press.
______.  1988.  Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences.  Sec-
ond ed.  Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum Associates.
Conlisk, J., and M. Kurz.  1972.  The Assignment Model of the Seattle and
Denver Income Maintenance Experiments.  SRI Research Memorandum
no 15, Menlo Park, California, July.
Corson, Walter, Paul Decker, Shari Dunstan, and Stuart Kerachsky.  1991.
Pennsylvania Bonus Demonstration: Final Report.  Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, September.
Fisher, R.A.  1960.  The Design of Experiments.  Seventh ed.  New York:
Oliver and Boyd.
Fisher R.A.  1968.  Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol 5.  New York:
MacMillan and Co.
Gueron, Judith, and Edward Pauly.  1991.  From Welfare to Work.  New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Hausman, Jerry, and David Wise, eds.  1985.  Social Experimentation.  Chi-
cago: University of Chicago and NBER.
Hicks, Charles R.  1982.  Fundamental Concepts in the Design of Experi-
ments.  New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., p. 1.
Kershaw, David, and Jerilyn Fair.  1977.  The New Jersey Income Maintenance
Experiment, vol. 8, p. xv, Academic Press, New York.
Metcalf, C., and S. Kerachsky.  1988.  “Sample Allocation and Office Selec-
tion.”  Memorandum dated March 25, 1988, Mathematica Policy Research,
Inc., Princeton, New Jersey.
Moffitt, Robert.  1992.  “Evaluation Methods for Program Entry Effects.”  In
Evaluation Welfare and Training Programs, C. Manski and I. Garfinkel,
eds.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ross, Heather.  1966.  “A Proposal for a Demonstration of New Techniques in
Income Maintenance,” Memorandum, December, Data Center Archives,
Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Rossi, Peter H., and Howard E. Freeman.  1989.  Evaluation: A Systematic
Approach.  Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.
Spiegelman, Robert G., Christopher J. O’Leary, and Kenneth J. Kline. 1992.
The Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment: Final Report.  Unem-
ployment Insurance Occasional Paper 92-6, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
Design of Three Field Experiments 75
Spiegelman, Robert G., Philip K. Robins, and Richard West.  1983.  Final
Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, SRI Inter-
national, Menlo Park, California, May.
Spiegelman, Robert G., and Stephen A. Woodbury.  1987.  The Illinois Unem-
ployment Insurance Incentive Experiments: Final Report. Kalamazoo,
Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  Various years.  Statis-
tical Abstract of the United States.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Various years.  Geo-
graphic Profile of Employment and Unemployment.
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, UI
Data Summary. Various years.  Fourth quarter. Unemployment Insurance
Service, Division of Actuarial Services.
U.S. Department of Labor.  1984 and 1985.  Quarterly Unemployment Insur-
ance Compilation and Characteristics.  Fourth quarter.
Woodbury, Stephen, and Robert G. Spiegelman.  1987.  “Bonuses to Workers
and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois.”
American Economic Review 77(4): 513–530.
76 Corson and Spiegelman
 77
 
3
Participation in the Reemployment 
Bonus Experiments
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Christopher J. O’Leary
and 
Stephen A. Woodbury
 
Participation in a social experiment—the proportion of program-
eligible individuals who actually participate—is of interest for two
main reasons.   The first is external validity, or the relevance of an
experiment’s results to implementing a program based on the experi-
ment.  If participation in an experiment differs from participation in an
actual program, then the experiment’s results, however valid they may
be on their own grounds, may yield poor estimates of the costs, the
number of individuals served, and the outcomes for individuals that
could be expected in an actual program.  The issue of translating
experimental results into estimates that are useful for policy is central
to experimentation, and we explore it both here and more fully in
Chapter 6.
Second, differences in the extent to which different groups respond
to an experimental treatment are intrinsically interesting to both policy-
makers and experimenters.   The policymaker’s interest in participation
stems mainly from a need to design policies that are “target efficient,”
i.e., that benefit groups believed to be most in need of assistance.
Other things equal, a program that benefits workers with high earnings
would generally be less desirable than a program that benefits workers
with low earnings.   Similarly, the experimenter’s interest in participa-
tion stems from a need to understand how a treatment “works.”  In the
case of a reemployment bonus, for example, if workers with long
expected spells of unemployment participate in the program—that is,
respond to the treatment and accept the bonus offer—then the bonus
will be effective in reducing the duration of unemployment spells.
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Understanding which groups of workers respond to a bonus treatment
can shed light on the extent to which a bonus is effective.
Many of these issues overlap the issues of treatment impact dis-
cussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  Although it could be argued that impact,
not participation, is the central issue in evaluating and understanding
an experimental treatment, we hope that it will be clear from both this
chapter and Chapter 6 that participation is central to understanding
what the costs of a reemployment bonus program would be and how
the reemployment bonuses in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington
operated.
The next section of this chapter provides a descriptive look at par-
ticipation in the three reemployment bonus experiments.  In particular,
we focus on three measures of participation: the rate at which claim-
ants partially qualified for a bonus (as defined below), the bonus receipt
rate, and the bonus take-up rate.  We then offer an attempt to model and
explain the differences in participation among the experiments using
various regression models.
 
BONUS QUALIFICATION, RECEIPT, 
AND TAKE-UP RATES
 
What percentage of UI claimants enrolled in the three experiments
qualified for a bonus?  What percentage actually received a bonus?
What was the bonus take-up rate—that is, what percentage of those
who qualified chose to collect a bonus?
Table 3.1 displays basic data on participation in the three reem-
ployment bonus experiments and allows one to trace the progress of
claimants through the bonus experiments.  As discussed in Chapter 2,
both the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments had multiple treat-
ments: each of these treatments is referred to by its bonus amount (low
or high in Pennsylvania; low, medium, or high in Washington) and its
qualification period (short or long).  In Illinois, there was only one
treatment, but about half the claimants assigned to the single $500
bonus treatment were eligible only for 26 weeks of regular state UI
benefits, whereas the other half were eligible for an additional 12
weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC), for a total of 38
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Table 3.1 Reemployment Bonus Qualification, Receipt, and Take-Up 
Rates, by Treatment Group
 
Claimants in group who
Received bonus
Group
 
a
 
Sample 
size
(1)
Partially 
qualified
 
b
 
(%)
(2)
Total
(%)
(3)
Given partially 
qualified
(%)
(4)
Illinois experiment
All treatment groups
 
c
 
4,186 42.9 13.6 31.8
Treatment—FSC-elig. 2,337 46.0 15.7 34.3
Treatment—FSC-inelig. 1,589 39.1 11.5 29.4
Control—FSC-elig. 2,106 39.6 — —
Control—FSC-inelig. 1,600 34.0 — —
Pennsylvania experiment
All treatment groups 8,834 56.6 10.6 18.6
Low bonus/short qual. 
period
1,395 46.1 6.9 14.9
High bonus/short qual. 
period
1,910 47.5 8.4 17.3
Low bonus/long qual. period 2,456 61.6 10.7 17.6
High bonus/long qual. 
period
3,073 63.1 13.5 21.4
Control/short qual. period 3,392 42.8 — —
Control/long qual. period 3,392 58.1 — —
Washington experiment
All treatment groups 12,452 55.7 14.6 26.1
Low bonus/short qual. period 2,246 47.0 8.7 18.6
Medium bonus/short qual. 
period
2,348 48.2 12.4 25.8
High bonus/short qual. 
period
1,583 50.2 15.0 29.8
Low bonus/long qual. period 2,387 63.0 13.9 22.1
Medium bonus/long qual. 
period
2,353 61.3 17.8 29.0
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High bonus/long qual. period 1,535 65.9 22.0 33.3
Control/short qual. period 3,082 48.0 — —
Control/long qual. period 3,082 61.3 — —
SOURCE: Tabulations from the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington Reemploy-
ment Bonus Experiment Public-Use data files.
 
a
 
See text for full description of each group and the bonus take-up rate.
 
b
 
Stopped receiving UI by qualification date.
 
c
 
The number of claimants assigned to “All treatment groups” in the Illinois experiment
exceeds the sum of FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible treatment-assigned claimants
because claimants who were monetarily ineligible for FSC have been dropped from
the FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible subgroups.  See Chapters 2 and 4 for further dis-
cussion.
 
weeks of benefits.  Since the effects of the bonus offer differed signifi-
cantly between these two groups (see Chapter 4), it is important to dis-
tinguish between FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible claimants.
Table 3.1 also displays data on the control groups from each exper-
iment.  The Illinois control group is divided into those who were eligi-
ble and those who were ineligible for FSC.  For Pennsylvania and
Washington, the percentages of each control group who satisfied the
criteria of the short and long bonus qualification periods are reported.
Column 2 of Table 3.1 shows that between 39 and 66 percent of the
eligible UI claimants who were assigned to one of the bonus treatments
stopped receiving UI benefits within their bonus qualification period.
We refer to these claimants as having “partially qualified” for the
bonus, because in order to fully qualify for a bonus they also needed to
be reemployed (and submit a Notice of Hire) and stay employed for
four months.  We adopt this definition of qualification because the
available administrative data do not allow us to construct a reliable
measure of full qualification that is consistent across the three experi-
ments
 
.  
 
We would expect variation in the percentage of claimants who par-
tially qualified for a bonus to be influenced by three factors: the length
of the qualification period, the bonus amount, and a variety of other
factors such as individual characteristics and labor market conditions.
A longer qualification period clearly makes it easier to qualify for a
bonus.  Hence, it is not surprising that, in both the Pennsylvania and
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Washington experiments, a higher percentage of claimants partially
qualified for the bonus offers that had long qualification periods (11 or
12 weeks).  In Pennsylvania, 62 to 63 percent of claimants partially
qualified for the bonus offers that had a long (12-week) qualification
period.  In Washington, 61 to 66 percent of claimants partially qualified
for the bonus offers that had a long (11-week) qualification period.
Surprisingly, though, only 43 percent of claimants in the Illinois
experiment stopped receiving UI benefits within its 11-week qualifica-
tion period, which was roughly the same as the long qualification peri-
ods in Pennsylvania and Washington.  It seems likely that general labor
market factors played a role in reducing the number of Illinois claim-
ants who stopped receiving UI within the qualification period.  Only 34
and 40 percent of the Illinois controls stopped receiving UI by the qual-
ification date, whereas the comparable figures for long-qualification-
period controls in Pennsylvania and Washington are 58 percent and 61
percent (Table 3.1).
 
1
 
  That is, the labor market and other factors unre-
lated to the bonus experiment reduced the rate at which claimants
escaped from UI during the Illinois experiment.
Higher bonus amounts appear to lead to a higher percentage of
claimants ending insured unemployment within the qualification
period, although the relationship is not strong.  The high bonus treat-
ment led to a slightly higher percentage of claimants ending UI within
the short-qualification-period treatments in Pennsylvania (47 percent in
the high bonus treatment versus 46 percent in the low bonus treatment).
Comparisons across the long-qualification-period treatments in Penn-
sylvania suggest a similar result.  The results are again similar in the
Washington experiment: larger bonus amounts led to higher percent-
ages of claimants who stopped receiving UI within the short-qualifica-
tion-period treatments (47, 48, and 50 percent).  The most generous
bonus also led to the highest percentage of claimants who stopped
receiving UI within the long-qualification-pepriod treatment (65.9 per-
cent), although the relationship between low and medium bonus treat-
ments is anomalous.
Differences between the control groups and the corresponding
treatment groups in the percentage of claimants who stopped receiving
UI by the qualification date foreshadow differences in treatment effects
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  For example, in Illinois, the difference
in qualification rates between the FSC-eligible control and FSC-eligi-
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ble treatment groups is about 6 percentage points (46.0 vs. 39.6), and
the Illinois bonus had a large effect on unemployment and reemploy-
ment outcomes of the FSC-eligible treatment group.  In contrast, there
are only small differences between the qualification rates of the control
group and the short-qualification-period treatment groups in Washing-
ton (–1.0, 0.2, and 2.2 percentage points).  These Washington treat-
ments had relatively small effects on unemployment and reemploy-
ment outcomes.
Column 3 of Table 3.1 reports the percentages of claimants who
ultimately collected a bonus.  Overall, 13.6 percent of the claimants
assigned to the Illinois treatment, 10.6 percent of the Pennsylvania
claimants, and 14.6 percent of the Washington claimants received a
bonus.  In both Pennsylvania and Washington, the highest rates of
bonus receipt occurred for the high-bonus/long-qualification-period
bonus offers.  In Illinois, the bonus receipt rate was higher among
FSC-eligible claimants than among those ineligible for FSC.
What is striking about the bonus receipt rates is that in Illinois,
where the rate of ending UI by the qualification date was low as com-
pared with both Pennsylvania and Washington, the overall bonus
receipt rate was 13.6 percent—nearly as high as in Washington.  In
Pennsylvania, where the rate of ending UI by the qualification date was
similar to that in Washington (and much higher than in Illinois), the
overall bonus receipt rate was only 10.6 percent.  Compared with either
Pennsylvania or Washington, then, more of the Illinois claimants who
ended UI by the qualification date ultimately collected a bonus.
Why did the Illinois treatment-assigned claimants overtake the
Pennsylvania claimants and nearly catch up with the bonus-receipt rate
of the Washington claimants?  There are two possible reasons.  First,
they may have been more likely to fully satisfy the bonus qualification
requirements (that is, by staying employed for four months) once they
found a job within the qualification period.  Second, they may have
been more likely to claim a bonus when they fully qualified for one.
Whether a worker stays employed for four months after reemployment
(so as to fully qualify for a bonus) is at least partly a question of labor
demand conditions during a bonus experiment.  Collecting a bonus
after qualifying for one, however, is a matter of voluntary participation.
Unfortunately, the available data are inadequate to distinguish between
the above two possibilities in a convincing way.
 
2
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We refer to the propensity of claimants who partially qualify for a
bonus to collect a bonus as the 
 
bonus take-up rate
 
.   The rate is calcu-
lated as the number of bonus-offered claimants who received a bonus,
divided by the number who stopped receiving UI benefits by the quali-
fication date (that is, partially qualified), expressed as a percentage.
The denominator of this bonus take-up rate overstates the number of
claimants who qualified for a bonus, because some claimants who
ended UI within the qualification period were not reemployed in a job
that they held for at least four months.  But again, the available data do
not permit construction of a convincing indicator of full bonus qualifi-
cation.
Column 4 of Table 3.1 displays estimates of the bonus take-up rate
for each experiment.  The figures again suggest that participation in the
Illinois and Washington experiments was greater than in the Pennsylva-
nia experiment.  Take-up rates were 32 percent in Illinois (which had a
qualification period of 11 weeks), 18 and 21 percent for the long-quali-
fication-period treatments in Pennsylvania, and 22, 29, and 33 percent
for the long-qualification-period treatments in Washington.  We explore
possible explanations of these differences in the next section.  
These observations on bonus qualification, receipt, and take-up can
be tied together by observing that there is a simple relationship among
the three.  Specifically, the probability that a worker receives a bonus is
the product of the probability that she partially qualifies for a bonus
and the probability that she collects a bonus given that she partially
qualified:
Pr(bonus received) = Pr(partially qualified for bonus) 
 
×
 
 Pr(bonus received | partially qualified)
In Table 3.1, these probabilities translate into the proportions
(expressed as percentages) shown in columns 3 (bonus receipt), 2 (par-
tial bonus qualification), and 4 (bonus take-up).
The above relationship makes clear that bonus receipt depends
partly on a probability that is to some degree beyond the control of a
worker—the probability of partially qualifying for a bonus, which
depends on the existence of job vacancies as well as on a worker’s job
search efforts.  Bonus receipt also depends on a probability that is to a
significant extent a matter of voluntary program participation—the
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probability of collecting a bonus conditional on ending UI by the qual-
ification date.  In the next section, we examine the correlates of each of
these three probabilities.
 
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN BONUS 
QUALIFICATION, RECEIPT, AND TAKE-UP
 
To what extent can the differences in partial bonus qualification,
bonus receipt, and bonus take-up rates among the three experiments be
explained by the characteristics of claimants who enrolled in each of
the three experiments and other observable variables?  We approach
this issue by using the data on individual claimants from each of the
three experiments to estimate linear probability models of participation
in the bonus experiments.  Each of the models we estimate has a zero-
one dependent variable indicating some form of participation in the
reemployment bonus experiment—partial qualification for a bonus,
bonus receipt, or bonus receipt conditional on partial qualification (that
is, bonus take-up).
 
Partial Qualification for the Bonus
 
We first examine the correlates of partial qualification for the
bonus.  Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3.2 report estimates of a model in
which the dependent variable equals 1 if a claimant stopped receiving
UI benefits by the qualification date, zero otherwise.  In view of the
data limitations described in note 1 to this chapter, this measure of par-
tial qualification is the best available measure of qualification for a
bonus.  For each of the three experiments, we regress partial qualifica-
tion on the following explanatory variables:
• Gender of the claimant.
• Ethnicity of the claimant.
• Age of the claimant.
• Whether the claimant was employed in manufacturing before the
current UI claim spell.
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• Whether the claimant expected to be recalled to the previous job
(in Pennsylvania or Washington only) or received job referrals
only through a union (in Washington only).
• Base period earnings of the claimant (in $10,000s)—that is, earn-
ings in roughly the year preceding the initial claim for UI bene-
fits.
• Basic features of the UI benefits received by the claimant—the
weekly benefit amount (in $100s) and the potential duration of UI
benefits.  In Illinois, the latter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the worker was eligible for FSC—that is, a total of 38 weeks of
benefits rather than only 26 weeks of regular state benefits.  In
Pennsylvania, potential duration of benefits is modeled by a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker was eligible for 26
weeks of benefits, rather than the 16 weeks of benefits for which
about 1 percent of Pennsylvania claimants were eligible.  In
Washington, potential duration is modeled as the number of
weeks of benefits for which the worker was eligible (times 10,
which scales the variable to make its coefficient roughly compa-
rable to those of the Illinois and Pennsylvania potential duration
variables).
• In Pennsylvania and Washington, characteristics of the bonus
offer made to the claimant, modeled in each case as a set of
dummy variables.  As in Table 3.1, treatments are referred to by
their bonus amount (low or high in Pennsylvania; low, medium,
or high in Washington) and the qualification period (short or
long).
• A set of site dummy variables indicating the ES office where the
claimant was assigned to treatment status and informed of the
bonus offer.  These site variables may capture a variety of effects,
including differences from site-to-site in the way the bonus
experiment was applied as well as regional differences in the
labor market, which would affect the difficulty of obtaining reem-
ployment.  (Coefficients of the site dummies are not reported in
the table.)
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Dependent variable
Explanatory 
variable
Partially qualified Received bonus Bonus take-up
Illinois
(1)
Pennsylvania
(2)
Washington
(3)
Illinois
(4)
Pennsylvania
(5)
Washington
(6)
Illinois
(7)
Pennsylvania
(8)
Washington
(9)
Gender
Female –0.024
(0.016)
–0.053
(0.011)
–0.046
(0.009)
0.007
(0.011)
–0.002
(0.007)
–0.003
(0.007)
0.038
(0.023)
0.019
(0.012
0.034
(0.011)
Ethnicity
Black –0.103
(0.024)
0.054
(0.021)
–0.042
(0.022)
–0.074
(0.017)
–0.064
(0.013)
–0.072
(0.016)
–0.121
(0.037)
–0.114
(0.021)
–0.120
(0.028)
Hispanic –0.016
(0.034)
0.021
(0.030)
0.005
(0.020)
–0.084
(0.023)
–0.058
(0.019)
–0.044
(0.015)
–0.176
(0.050)
–0.099
(0.030)
–0.076
(0.023)
Other –0.063
(0.052)
0.870
(0.067)
0.011
(0.021)
–0.036
(0.036)
–0.039
(0.042)
–0.039
(0.015)
–0.032
(0.076)
–0.073
(0.065)
–0.074
(0.024)
Age
<35 0.061
(0.016)
0.010
(0.012)
0.059
(0.009)
0.026
(0.011)
–0.001
(0.007)
0.025
(0.007)
0.006
(0.024)
–0.024
(0.012)
0.011
(0.011)
 
≥
 
55 NA
 
b
 
–0.096
(0.018)
0.001
(0.016)
NA –0.058
(0.011)
–0.042
(0.012)
NA –0.082
(0.021)
–0.073
(0.019)
Industry before 
unemployment
Manufacturing –0.015
(0.018)
0.054
(0.012)
0.073
(0.011)
–0.011
(0.013)
–0.019
(0.008)
–0.014
(0.008)
–0.018
(0.026)
–0.045
(0.013)
–0.050
(0.012)
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Unknown –0.091
(0.025)
0.030
(0.018)
0.149
(0.106)
–0.028
(0.017)
0.018
(0.012)
0.182
(0.077)
–0.020
(0.039)
0.023
(0.019)
0.199
(0.115)
Job attachment
Expect recall 
or union 
referral
NA –0.056
(0.017)
0.247
(0.011)
NA –0.068
(0.011)
–0.088
(0.008)
NA –0.116
(0.018)
–0.240
(0.012)
Base period 
earnings 
($10,000s)
–0.004
(0.012)
0.016
(0.008)
–0.004
(0.005)
0.000
(0.000)
0.027
(0.005)
–0.004
(0.004)
0.010
(0.018)
0.050
(0.009)
–0.002
(0.006)
UI benefits
Weekly benefit 
amount 
($100s)
–0.022
(0.028)
–0.067
(0.013)
–0.090
(0.012)
0.037
(0.019)
0.007
(0.008)
0.041
(0.009)
0.099
(0.041)
0.028
(0.013)
0.128
(0.015)
Illinois: FSC-
elig.
0.062
(0.016)
NA NA 0.035
(0.011)
NA NA 0.038
(0.023)
NA NA
Pennsylvania: 
long duration
NA 0.045
(0.051)
NA NA 0.005
(0.032)
NA NA –0.007
(0.053)
NA
Washington: 
potential 
duration (
 
×
 
10)
NA NA 0.127
(0.012)
NA NA 0.058
(0.009)
NA NA 0.049
(0.015)
 
(continued)
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Table 3.2 (continued)
 
Dependent variable
Explanatory 
variable
Partially qualified Received bonus Bonus take-up
Illinois
(1)
Pennsylvania
(2)
Washington
(3)
Illinois
(4)
Pennsylvania
(5)
Washington
(6)
Illinois
(7)
Pennsylvania
(8)
Washington
(9)
Bonus 
characteristics
 
c
 
 
(Penn. and Wash. 
only)
Low bonus/
short qual. 
period
NA NA reference
 
d
 
NA NA reference NA NA reference
Medium 
bonus/short 
qual. period
NA reference 0.011
(0.014)
NA reference 0.034
(0.010)
NA reference 0.070
(0.018)
High bonus/
short qual. 
period
NA 0.003
(0.017)
0.036
(0.016)
NA 0.015
(0.011)
0.061
(0.011)
NA 0.032
(0.020)
0.100
(0.019)
Low bonus/
long qual. 
period
NA NA 0.160
(0.014)
NA NA 0.050
(0.010)
NA NA 0.024
(0.017)
Medium 
bonus/long 
qual. period
NA 0.142
(0.016)
0.148
(0.014)
NA 0.036
(0.010)
0.088
(0.010)
NA 0.030
(0.018)
0.089
(0.017)
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High bonus/
long qual. 
period
NA 0.157
(0.016)
0.183
(0.016)
NA 0.068
(0.010)
0.129
(0.011)
MA 0.071
(0.018)
0.131
(0.018)
Low bonus NA NA reference NA NA reference NA NA reference
Medium bonus NA reference –0.003
(0.010)
NA reference 0.036
(0.007)
NA reference 0.067
(0.012)
 
(continued)
 
High bonus NA 0.004
(0.011)
0.026
(0.011)
NA 0.023
(0.007)
0.068
(0.008)
NA 0.036
(0.011)
0.103
(0.013)
Short qual. 
period
NA reference reference NA reference reference NA reference reference
Long qual. 
period
NA 0.149
(0.011)
0.147
(0.008)
NA 0.044
(0.007)
0.055
(0.006)
NA 0.033
(0.012)
0.021
(0.010)
Intercept 0.376
(0.045)
0.385
(0.062)
0.160
(0.055)
0.038
(0.031)
–0.004
(0.039)
–0.073
(0.040)
0.111
(0.067)
0.047
(0.065)
0.008
(0.069)
Sample size 4,186 8,748 12,452 4,186 8,748 12,452 1,795 4,947 6,939
 
R
 
2
 
0.040 0.054 0.092 0.036 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.078 0.124
MSE 0.235 0.232 0.224 0.113 0.090 0.118 0.206 0.140 0.169
 
a
 
OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
 
b
 
“NA” indicates that the variable does not apply to the analysis.
 
c
 
The Pennsylvania and Washington bonus characteristics are not strictly comparable, but the medium and high bonus amounts are similar, as are
the short and long qualification periods.  There was no low bonus amount in Pennsylvania.  Also included in each regrression is a set of site
dummy variables indicating where the claimant was assigned to the bonus experiment.
 
d
 
“Reference” refers to the reference category in a set of categorical variables.
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We estimate a separate model of bonus receipt for each of the three
experiments because pairwise tests for pooling the samples (Chow
tests) strongly reject pooling.
Although many of the relationships between the explanatory vari-
ables and partial bonus qualification differ across the three experi-
ments, some patterns do emerge (see columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3.2).
These patterns reflect widely observed patterns of unemployment dura-
tion by ethnicity, age, and so on.  For example, ethnic minorities tend
to be less likely to partially qualify for a bonus (in Illinois and Wash-
ington), and younger workers are more likely than older workers to
partially qualify for a bonus.  Both outcomes reflect the shorter spells
of unemployment that white workers and younger workers generally
experience.  Higher weekly benefit amounts (in Pennsylvania and
Washington) tend to reduce the probability of partially qualifying for a
bonus, and greater potential duration of benefits (in Illinois and Wash-
ington) tends to increase the probability of partially qualifying.
The estimates suggest that larger bonus offers and longer qualifica-
tion periods lead to higher probabilities of partially qualifying for a
bonus.  The increases in partial qualification resulting from increased
bonus amounts are rather small and are statistically significant only in
the case of the high bonus amount in Washington (compare the coeffi-
cients of the low, medium, and high bonus amounts under the bonus
characteristics in Table 3.2).  It is much clearer that partial qualification
rates rise with the length of the qualification period (compare the coef-
ficients of the short and long qualification periods under the bonus
characteristics in Table 3.2).
In regressions that are not reported, we included the bonus amount
and the qualification period as continuous variables in models that are
otherwise the same as those reported in Table 3.2.  These regressions
suggest that a $1,000 increase in the bonus amount increased the prob-
ability of partially qualifying by about 3 percentage points in Pennsyl-
vania and by about 6 percentage points in Washington.  They also
suggest that extending the bonus qualification period by one week
increased the probability of partially qualifying by about 1.5 percent-
age points in both Pennsylvania and Washington.
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Bonus Receipt
 
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 3.2 display estimates of models in
which a dummy variable equal to 1 if a claimant received a bonus (zero
otherwise) is regressed on the same explanatory variables used in the
partial qualification equations reported in columns 1–3.  The bonus
receipt equations have less explanatory power than do the partial quali-
fication equations (see the lower adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
 values at the bottom of
Table 3.2).  Again we estimate a separate model for each of the three
experiments because pooling is rejected for the model of bonus receipt,
as it was for partial qualification.
Most of the relationships between bonus receipt and the explana-
tory variables are similar to the those observed for partial qualification.
Ethnic minorities are less likely to receive a bonus (in all three experi-
ments), and younger workers are more likely to receive a bonus than
are older workers (again in all three experiments).  Workers who expect
recall are less likely to receive a bonus (in Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton).  Greater potential duration of benefits (in Illinois and Washington)
tends to increase the probability of bonus receipt.  Although higher
weekly benefit amounts tend to reduce the probability of partially qual-
ifying for a bonus, higher weekly benefit amounts tend to increase the
probability of bonus receipt (in Illinois and Washington).  (We return to
this point in the discussion of bonus take-up rates below.)  Also,
although there is an ambiguous relationship between the industry from
which a worker was laid off and partial qualification, workers laid off
from manufacturing jobs seem less likely than others to receive a bonus
(in Pennsylvania and Washington).
The probability of bonus receipt increases strongly both with larger
bonus offers and with longer qualification periods—compare the coef-
ficients of the low, medium, and high bonus amounts and those of the
short and long qualification periods under the bonus characteristics in
Table 3.2.  In regressions not reported, we find that a $1,000 increase in
the bonus offer increased the probability of bonus receipt by 4.5 per-
centage points in Pennsylvania and by 10 percentage points in Wash-
ington.  Extending the bonus qualification period by one week
increased the probability of bonus receipt by about 1 percentage point
in both Pennsylvania and Washington.
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Bonus Take-Up Rates
 
The third issue we seek to understand is what factors influenced
whether a claimant who partially qualified for a bonus ultimately col-
lected a bonus.  This propensity of claimants who partially qualified for
a bonus to collect a bonus is the bonus take-up rate. 
 
 
 
Columns 7, 8, and
9 of Table 3.2 display estimates of take-up rate models for Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.
 
3
 
  In each, we have regressed a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a claimant received a bonus (zero otherwise) on
the same explanatory variables that were used in the partial qualifica-
tion and bonus receipt equations already discussed.  The difference
between the take-up rate models and the partial qualification and bonus
receipt models is that the sample used in the take-up rate models
includes only treatment-assigned claimants 
 
who partially qualified for
the bonus
 
 (that is, ended UI benefit receipt by the qualification date).
These estimates show several patterns.  Women tend to have higher
take-up rates than men, other things equal, although the relationship is
strong and statistically significant only in Washington.  Ethnic minori-
ties have much lower take-up rates than whites in all three experiments.
Workers laid off from manufacturing jobs have lower take-up rates
than other workers (in Pennsylvania and Washington).  These effects
arguably reflect differences in tastes—including possible differences in
the extent to which workers trust the experimenters—that exist among
different groups of workers.
Workers who expected to be recalled or (in Washington) to be
placed by a union had much lower take-up rates than others, all else
equal.  In Pennsylvania, this effect was in addition to a lower tendency
of workers who expected recall to qualify for a bonus.  In Washington,
this effect offsets the (rather surprising) positive effect of recall expec-
tations on partial qualification and produces a net negative impact of
recall expectations on the probability of bonus receipt.
Higher weekly benefit amounts (in all three experiments) are asso-
ciated with higher take-up rates.  This result seems counterintuitive, at
least in Illinois, where a given bonus provides a smaller payoff (in rela-
tive terms) to a worker who receives high weekly benefits than to a
worker who receives low weekly benefits.  A possible interpretation,
however, is that workers with higher weekly benefits tend to have rela-
tively higher human capital and earnings.  In other words, workers with
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high weekly benefit amounts are likely to be more productive, better
able to make use of the UI system, and more likely to collect a bonus
for which they qualify.
 
4
 
A potentially interesting result is the relatively weak relationship
between the potential duration of benefits and the bonus take-up rate.
Recall that (except in Pennsylvania) longer potential duration of bene-
fits lead to higher probabilities of qualifying for and receiving a bonus.
The relationship between potential duration and bonus take-up is
weaker in both Illinois and Washington, however, which suggests that
the gross relationship between potential duration and bonus receipt
results from search behavior, not bonus take-up behavior.  That is, the
evidence is consistent with the idea that bonus offers lead to a signifi-
cant increase in the search intensity of workers for whom the potential
duration of benefits is longer.  Their propensity to collect a bonus is no
greater than that of workers whose potential duration of benefits is
shorter, but because they increase their search intensity more than do
workers with shorter potential duration of benefits, a higher proportion
of workers with a long potential duration of benefits qualifies for and
ultimately collects a bonus.
The results in Table 3.2 suggest that larger bonus offers lead unam-
biguously to larger bonus take-up rates.  In regressions not reported,
we find that a $1,000 increase in the bonus offer would have increased
the take-up rate by 8 percentage points in Pennsylvania and by 17 per-
centage points in Washington.  
We have seen that larger bonus offers result in a higher probability
of receiving a bonus, but they are only weakly related to the probability
of qualifying for a bonus.  The results in columns 7, 8, and 9 of Table
3.2 show that the observed positive effect of a larger bonus offer on
bonus receipt occurs because larger bonus offers increase the take-up
rate.  That is, larger bonuses raise the probability of bonus receipt
mainly because they raise the bonus take-up rate, not because they
raise the probability of qualification.  The point is potentially important
in designing a reemployment bonus program.  If higher bonus offers
raise the bonus take-up rate without significantly raising the probability
of partial qualification for a bonus (that is, of cutting short the spell of
unemployment), then a higher bonus would lead to larger bonus pay-
ments without the benefit of shortening unemployment spells.  This
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question is considered further in Chapter 4 when we consider the opti-
mal size of a bonus offer.
Extending the bonus qualification period has a relatively weak
effect on the probability of bonus take-up.  Although statistically non-
zero, the coefficients on the long qualification period variable are rather
small in the take-up equations compared with those in the qualification
equations.  In unreported regressions, we find that extending the bonus
qualification period by one week would have increased the take-up rate
by less than 1 percentage point in Pennsylvania and Washington.  A
longer qualification period makes it easier to qualify for a bonus but
does not increase a worker’s incentive to collect a bonus (as does an
increase in the bonus amount).  Accordingly, it makes sense that the
take-up rate should be weakly affected by the length of the qualifica-
tion period.
 
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES AMONG THE EXPERIMENTS
 
How would partial qualification for the bonus, bonus receipt, and
bonus take-up have differed if the workers in one experiment (Illinois,
say) had faced the “structure” of partial qualification, bonus receipt,
and bonus take-up that existed in either of the other experiments (Penn-
sylvania or Washington)?  Answering this question can suggest the
extent to which differences among the experiments in partial qualifica-
tion, bonus receipt, and bonus take-up can be explained by differences
in observable factors associated with the experiments, such as the char-
acteristics of claimants and characteristics of the labor market where
the experiments were conducted.
For example, we could ask how many of the workers assigned to
the Illinois treatment would have received a bonus if their probability
of receiving a bonus had been determined by the structure of bonus
receipt estimated in the Pennsylvania experiment.  First, let 
 
x
 
PA
 
 denote
the vector of mean observed characteristics of the workers who were
assigned to a treatment in Pennsylvania and let 
 
b
 
PA
 
 denote the vector of
estimated coefficients from the Pennsylvania bonus receipt equation.
Then the proportion of Pennsylvania claimants who actually received a
bonus (
 
y
 
PA
 
) can be expressed as:
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y
 
PA
 
 = 
 
x
 
PA
 
 
 
·
 
 
 
b
 
PA
 
Next, we can simulate the proportion of Illinois claimants who
would have received a bonus if their bonus receipt were determined by
the structure of bonus receipt observed in the Pennsylvania experiment.
We denote this simulated proportion by 
 
y
 
IL
 
|
 
PA 
 
and compute it by substi-
tuting the mean characteristics of the Illinois claimants (
 
x
 
IL
 
) into the
Pennsylvania bonus receipt equation:
 
y
 
IL
 
|
 
PA
 
 = 
 
x
 
IL 
 
·
 
 
 
b
 
PA
 
The dot product 
 
x
 
IL
 
 
 
·
 
 
 
b
 
PA
 
 is a simulated proportion of Illinois bonus
recipients because it applies the model of bonus receipt that was esti-
mated for the Pennsylvania experiment to the characteristics of work-
ers assigned to the Illinois experiment.  A similar approach can be used
to simulate the proportion of Washington claimants who would have
received a bonus if they had been assigned to the Pennsylvania experi-
ment, and so on.
Implementing the above procedure requires that the partial qualifi-
cation, receipt, and take-up equations reported in Table 3.2 be modified
in three ways.  First, in the Illinois and Pennsylvania models, the
dummy variables indicating the potential duration of UI benefits are
replaced with continuous variables for the potential duration of UI ben-
efits.  Second, in the Pennsylvania and Washington models, the bonus
amount and qualification period dummy variables are replaced with
continuous variables indicating bonus amount and length of the qualifi-
cation period (there was no variation in either the bonus amount or
qualification period in Illinois).  Third, in the models for all three
experiments, we replace the site dummies with two sets of variables
that attempt to capture the state of the labor market in which workers
sought reemployment:
• The unemployment rate in the local area and quarter in which the
worker filed his or her initial claim for UI benefits (entered as
four dummy variables: less than 5 percent, from 5 to 7 percent,
from 7 to 10 percent, and greater than 10 percent).
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• The percentage change in employment in the local area where the
worker filed the initial claim during the three months following
the initial claim.
 
5
 
The above modifications are needed so that the mean characteristics of
the workers in each experiment can be substituted into the structure of
partial qualification, bonus receipt, and bonus take-up estimated for the
other experiments.  The dummy variables that were used to character-
ize the potential duration of UI benefits, bonus characteristics, and sites
in the models reported in Table 3.2 are not conformable across the
three experiments.
Table 3.3 displays the results of simulating the partial qualification,
bonus receipt, and take-up rates for each of the three experiments using
the approach outlined above.  The actual bonus receipt rate in Illinois
was 13.6 percent, in Pennsylvania 10.6 percent, and in Washington
14.6 percent (column 2).  The differences among the three experiments
can be explained in either of two ways.  First, recall that the probability
of bonus receipt is the product of the probability of partially qualifying
for a bonus and the probability of taking up a bonus for which one par-
tially qualifies (see pp. 83).  Column 1 of Table 3.3 shows that the par-
tial qualification rates were higher in Pennsylvania and Washington
than in Illinois.  However, Illinois made up for its low partial qualifica-
tion rate by having the highest take-up rate, and Pennsylvania was
pulled down by the lowest take-up rate.  This much we already knew
from Table 3.1.
The simulations in Table 3.3 allow a second, potentially more
revealing, kind of explanation of the differences among the three
experiments.  The simulations let us speculate about whether the differ-
ences among the three experiments in partial qualification and take-up
rates can in turn be explained by differences among the three in the
characteristics of the experimental claimants or the labor market condi-
tions they faced.  If claimant characteristics and labor market condi-
tions don’t explain much of the differences, then we would have to
conclude that the differences in partial qualification and take-up stem
from factors that are not captured in the variables that we can quantify
and observe.
The partial qualification rates in column 1 suggest that more of the
Illinois claimants would have partially qualified for a bonus if they had
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been in either the Pennsylvania or the Washington experiment (57.2 or
65 percent, instead of the actual 42.9 percent).  Fewer Pennsylvania
claimants would have partially qualified for a bonus in Illinois (46.1
percent, instead of the actual 56.6 percent), and a somewhat higher per-
centage of Pennsylvania claimants would have partially qualified for a
bonus in Washington (58.3 percent, instead of the actual 56.6 percent).
Finally, fewer of the Washington claimants would have partially quali-
fied for a bonus in either Illinois (47.3 percent, instead of the actual 55.7
percent) or in Pennsylvania (49.1 percent, instead of the actual 55.7 per-
cent).
However, differences among the experiments in the observable
characteristics of the claimants and the labor market explain little if
 
Table 3.3 Actual and Simulated Partial Qualification, Bonus Receipt, and 
Bonus Take-Up Rates
 
a
 
 (%)
 
Partially 
qualified
 
b
 
(1)
Received bonus
(2)
Bonus take-up
 
c
 
(3)
Illinois means applied to
Illinois model (actual) 42.9 13.6 31.8
Pennsylvania model 57.2 10.1 19.8
Washington model 65.0 20.8 32.8
Pennsylvania means applied to
Illinois model 46.1 19.7 42.5
Pennsylvania model (actual) 56.6 10.6 18.6
Washington model 58.3 19.1 25.3
Washington means applied to
Illinois model 47.3 19.4 41.7
Pennsylvania model 49.1 10.3 17.3
Washington model (actual) 55.7 14.6 26.1
 
a
 
The simulated take-up rates were obtained by substituting the mean characteristics of,
for example, the Illinois treatment group into the take-up equations that were esti-
mated for the Pennsylvania and Washington treatment groups.  Actual values are
shaded.  See the text for further discussion.
 
b
 
Partial qualification is defined as ending UI receipt by the bonus qualification date.  
 
c
 
The take-up rate is defined as the percentage of workers who actually collected a
bonus given that they stopped receiving UI benefits by the qualification date.
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any of the differences between Illinois and the other two experiments
in partial qualification rates.  For example, the actual difference
between the Illinois and Pennsylvania partial qualification rates is 13.7
percentage points (56.6 minus 42.9).  If the Illinois claimants had been
assigned to the Pennsylvania experiment, the simulations suggest that
their partial qualification rates would have increased to 57.2 percent—
similar to what was actually observed in Pennsylvania.  Hence, none of
the difference between the Illinois and Pennsylvania partial qualifica-
tion rates is explained by differences between the two experiments in
observed variables.  Rather, the differences depend wholly on how
observed variables map into the probability of partially qualifying in
each of the two experiments.  
The conclusion is slightly less negative if we ask what would have
happened to the Pennsylvania claimants if they had been assigned to
the Illinois experiment.  If the Pennsylvania claimants had been
assigned in Illinois, their partial qualification rate would have fallen to
46.1 percent—3.2 percentage points higher than was observed in Illi-
nois.  Hence, observed variables explain less than one-quarter of the
total observed difference between partial qualification rates in Illinois
and Pennsylvania (3.2 points out of the total 13.7-point difference)—
the rest is unexplained.  (A decomposition of this simulation, which we
do not report, shows that this 3.2 percentage point difference can be
explained roughly half and half by more favorable labor market condi-
tions in Pennsylvania and by Pennsylvania claimants having character-
istics that are more favorable to partially qualifying for a bonus.)
Comparison of the Illinois and Washington partial qualification
rates gives similar results.  The actual difference between the Illinois
and Washington partial qualification rates is 12.8 percentage points
(55.7 minus 42.9).  If the Illinois claimants had been assigned to the
Washington experiment, their partial qualification rates would have
been 65 percent, which suggests that observables explain none of the
differences in partial qualification between Illinois and Washington.  On
the other hand, if the Washington claimants had been assigned to the
Illinois experiment, their qualification rates would have been 47.3 per-
cent, which suggests that observables can explain only about one-third
of the total difference between the partial qualification rates in Illinois
and Washington (4.4 points out of the total 12.8-point difference).  
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Given that the Illinois experiment occurred during the early stages
of a recovery (late 1984 and early 1985), whereas the Pennsylvania and
Washington experiments occurred after the recovery had matured
(1988–1989), it is tempting to suggest that relatively slack labor demand
played an important role in lowering the Illinois qualification rates.
However, given that we have tried to control for labor market conditions
in the partial qualification models, this is purely a speculative and post
hoc rationalization of the apparent difference between Illinois and the
other two experiments in how partial qualification came about.  (There
may be deficiencies in the labor market controls we have included, but
they are standard measures of the health of the labor market.)
Consider next the take-up rates shown in column 3 of Table 3.3:
the observed take-up rate was 31.8 percent in Illinois, 18.6 percent in
Pennsylvania, and 26.1 percent in Washington.  Was the take-up rate
lowest in Pennsylvania and highest in Illinois as a result of differences
in observable characteristics of claimants and the labor market condi-
tions they faced, or do the differences stem from factors that are not
captured in the observed variables?
The take-up rate was lower in Pennsylvania than in Illinois and
Washington for reasons that are not accounted for by observed vari-
ables.  Far fewer Illinois claimants would have taken up a bonus if they
had been in the Pennsylvania experiment (just 19.8 percent, instead of
the actual 31.8 percent).  Similarly, fewer of the Washington claimants
would have taken up a bonus if they had been in the Pennsylvania
experiment (17.3 percent, instead of the actual 26.1 percent).  That is,
given individual and labor market characteristics mapped into much
lower take-up rates in Pennsylvania than in either Illinois or Washing-
ton, and differences among the three experiments in measurable char-
acteristics of claimants or labor market conditions do not explain the
differences in take-up behavior.  As with the partial qualification rates,
differences in the take-up rates depend on the “structure” of bonus
take-up—that is, on how observables map into the probability of bonus
take-up in each of the experiments—rather than on individual charac-
teristics or measurable features of the labor market.
Another way to see the point is to note that the Pennsylvania claim-
ants would have had a much higher take-up rate either in Illinois (42.5
percent) or in Washington (25.3 percent) than they actually did (18.6
percent).  The simulated take-up rate for Illinois (42.5 percent) is well
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above the actual take-up rate in Illinois (31.8 percent), and the simu-
lated rate for Washington (25.3 percent) is very close to the actual
take-up rate in Washington (26.3 percent), indicating again that the dif-
ferences among the three experiments in take-up behavior cannot be
explained by measurable characteristics of claimants or labor market
conditions.  It is clear that something about the Pennsylvania experi-
ment—other than claimants’ characteristics and the state of the labor
market, at least to the extent that we have been able to control for these
variables—resulted in lower take-up rates in Pennsylvania than in
either Illinois or Washington.
Our inability to explain the large difference between the bonus
take-up rates in Pennsylvania on the one hand, and Illinois and Wash-
ington on the other, suggests again the difficulty in predicting and
understanding participation in a bonus program.  It is difficult to quan-
tify, or even to characterize descriptively, differences in a program’s
implementation from state to state and site to site.  Yet differences in
implementation of the three experiments would seem to be the most
likely source of the large gap between the take-up rates of Pennsylva-
nia and the other two experiments.
Anecdotal evidence on the Illinois experiment illustrates the poten-
tial importance to program participation of variables that are intangible
and hard to quantify.  In the Illinois experiment, each claimant who
was assigned to a treatment was asked to sign a form indicating will-
ingness to participate in the experiment.  At one of the experimental
sites, the treatment was administered by a woman who was reported to
be enthusiastic about the reemployment bonus and readily trusted by
the experimental claimants.  (She was described to one of us as “grand-
motherly.”)  At this site, the rates of willingness to participate and
bonus take-up were higher than the average for the experiment as a
whole, even after adjusting for measurable correlates of willingness to
participate and bonus take-up.  This sort of evidence is a reminder that
a bonus treatment—like any treatment—includes more than a financial
incentive.  It also includes the way the incentive is presented and the
attitude and trustworthiness of those who are assigned the job of
administering the treatment.
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DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
 
This chapter has attempted to sort out differences among the Illi-
nois, Pennsylvania, and Washington reemployment bonus experiments
in what we have referred to generally as “participation.”  By participa-
tion in the bonus experiments, we mean three things: qualifying (in this
case, partially) for a bonus, actually receiving a bonus, and collecting a
bonus given partial qualification for a bonus (bonus take-up).  These
three concepts of participation are related by a simple identity: the
probability of a worker receiving a bonus is the product of the proba-
bility that she partially qualifies and the probability that she collects a
bonus given that she partially qualified.  Table 3.1 shows each of these
as empirical probabilities (expressed as percentages) of claimants qual-
ifying for a bonus (column 2), receiving a bonus (column 3), and tak-
ing up a bonus (column 4).
Table 3.1 and the discussion on pp. 78–84 showed that the partial
qualification rate in Illinois (43 percent) was much lower than in either
Pennsylvania (57 percent) or Washington (56 percent).  Ultimately,
however, nearly as high a percentage of claimants received a bonus in
Illinois (13.6 percent) as in Washington (14.6 percent), whereas only
10.6 percent of the Pennsylvania claimants received a bonus.  The sim-
ple explanation is that the bonus take-up rate was higher in Illinois
(31.8 percent) than in either Pennsylvania (where it was just 18.6 per-
cent) or Washington (where it was 26.1 percent).  At a rather superficial
level, then, we were able to explain the bonus receipt rate.
But we are much less successful in quantifying the large differ-
ences across the experiments in the partial qualification and take-up
rates that underlie the bonus receipt rate.  The qualification models
suggest, not surprisingly, that the correlates of partial qualification are
similar to the correlates of short spells of unemployment (see Table
3.2).  For example, younger workers and white workers are more likely
than older workers and ethnic minorities to qualify for a bonus.  Also,
not surprisingly, higher bonus amounts and longer qualification periods
tend to increase the probability of qualifying for a bonus.  The bonus
receipt models offer similar findings.
The bonus take-up estimates differ in some ways from the partial
qualification and receipt estimates.  The probability of collecting a
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bonus conditional on qualifying is influenced again by ethnicity (with
racial minorities less likely to take up a bonus) and the bonus amount
(with larger bonuses more likely to be collected), but several additional
relationships also emerge.  Women, nonmanufacturing workers, and
workers who do not expect to be recalled are more likely to take up a
bonus.  Workers with higher weekly benefit amounts are more likely to
take up a bonus.  Those who face a longer qualification period are only
slightly more likely than others to take up a bonus.
Nevertheless, it would be an understatement to say that puzzles
remain in explaining differences in partial qualification, receipt, and
take-up among the three experiments.  In the last section, we use esti-
mated models of partial qualification, receipt, and take-up to simulate
the percentages of claimants who would have partially qualified for,
received, and taken up a bonus if they had been assigned to one of the
other experiments (see Table 3.3).  Such simulations can suggest the
extent to which differences among the experiments in observed partici-
pation are accounted for by observable differences in the characteris-
tics of claimants (or in the labor market conditions they faced).  We
find that measurable differences in claimants’ characteristics or labor
market conditions explain very little of the differences across the three
experiments in partial qualification and bonus take-up behavior.
Instead, the differences depend on the “structure” of partial qualifica-
tion and bonus take-up—that is, on how claimants’ characteristics map
into the probability of partial qualification or bonus take-up in each of
the experiments 
We are left with rather ad hoc explanations of the differences in
participation across the three experiments.  Perhaps partial qualifica-
tion for the bonus was lower in Illinois than in Pennsylvania or Wash-
ington because the Illinois experiment took place during the early part
of the 1980s recovery (whereas the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments occurred after the recovery had matured) or because of
some other difficult-to-quantify feature of the labor market in Illinois.
Perhaps the bonus offer was presented to claimants differently (and
less attractively) in Pennsylvania than in Illinois or Washington.  In
fact, there is no convincing quantitative evidence for or against either
of these views.  The conclusion is that the estimated models of partial
qualification and take-up offer little help in explaining the differences
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among the three experiments in the observed partial qualification and
take-up rates.
 
Notes
 
1. The figures for the control group in Pennsylvania (“Control/short qual. period”
and “Control/long qual. period”) were obtained by observing the number of
claimants in the Pennsylvania control group who stopped receiving UI benefits
within 6 weeks and 12 weeks, respectively.  A similar approach yielded the figures
for the Washington control group. 
2. Two types of administrative data were used in the analysis: UI claims records,
which provide data on the timing and amounts of UI benefits paid to claimants;
and wage records, which provide data on each worker’s quarterly earnings in UI-
covered employment in the state where the worker claimed UI benefits.  Because
the wage records are quarterly, they do not provide information on the exact tim-
ing of reemployment or whether employment was continuous during the required
four months.  Also, because wage records provide information only on UI-cov-
ered employment in the state where each worker claimed benefits, they miss
reemployment in jobs that are in another state or are not covered by UI.
Note that the partial qualification measure used in this chapter differs from the
full qualification concept that is used elsewhere in this volume (especially Chapter
6).  As a result, the bonus take-up rates that are calculated in this chapter cannot
be compared with those derived in Chapter 6.  In Chapter 6, the take-up rate is
defined as the proportion of UI claimants who received a bonus given that they 1)
were eligible for UI benefits, 2) became reemployed and stopped receiving UI
benefits by the qualification date, and 3) remained employed for four months.  In
other words, the bonus take-up rate is the proportion of claimants who fully qual-
ified for the bonus who then collected a bonus.  Conceptually, this latter definition
is the correct definition of the bonus take-up rate.
3. Pooling of the three experiments was rejected for the bonus take-up rate models as
it was for the models of partial qualification and bonus receipt.
4. A possible problem with this interpretation is that the regressions already control
for base period earnings.  But base period earnings and the weekly benefit amount
are systematically related and may be collinear.  Indeed, the coefficients on base
period earnings are essentially zero in Illinois and Washington (in Pennsylvania
the coefficient is positive), so it is tempting to suggest that the weekly benefit
amount variable is capturing most of the effect of higher earnings capacity on
bonus take-up.
5. The employment level used is a three-month moving average of employment in
the local area where the worker filed for UI benefits.
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Bonus Impacts on Receipt 
of Unemployment Insurance
 
Paul T. Decker
Christopher J. O’Leary
and
Stephen A. Woodbury
 
This chapter presents estimates of how a reemployment bonus
affected three different outcomes of policy interest: weeks of unem-
ployment insurance (UI) receipt during the benefit year, dollars of UI
received during the benefit year, and the percentage of persons who
exhaust their benefits.  An assessment of how the reemployment bonus
affected reemployment wages is made in Chapter 5.
To provide a deeper understanding of the reemployment bonus
effects, this chapter also presents impact estimates based on slightly
more involved computations.  As shown in Chapter 2 in the discussion
of the results of randomization (pp. 56–57), the characteristics of the
treatment and control groups were quite similar in the Washington and
Pennsylvania experiments; however, numerous statistically significant
differences existed between the control and treatment groups in Illi-
nois.  Since the control and treatment groups were not completely
homogenous, “regression adjustment” was done to account for differ-
ences between the treatments and controls in observable characteristics
and improve the precision of treatment impact estimates.
Taken together, the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington experi-
ments examined a wide variety of bonus levels and qualification period
lengths.  In the third section of this chapter, we examine the marginal
response to variations in these parameters.  The analysis is done using a
“continuous variables model” with the bonus amount and qualification
period entered linearly.
 
1
 
  Results are presented for the experiments sep-
arately and then for a pooled sample using evidence from all three.
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To examine how the bonus offers changed behavior regarding the
timing of unemployment, we present a hazard analysis of leaving
insured unemployment.  We then report treatment impacts in the three
experiments for various subgroups: treatment impact estimates are pre-
sented by gender, age, race, previous industry, area unemployment rate,
and weekly benefit entitlement.  Some evidence from the Washington
experiment about the effectiveness of the reemployment bonus for dis-
located workers is also presented.  The final section offers some con-
clusions.
Evidence from the three experiments suggests that a cash reem-
ployment bonus offer can be expected to modestly shorten the average
spell of insured unemployment, but the likely impacts seem to be too
small for the bonus offer to be an optimum strategy for reducing UI
costs.  A full cost-benefit analysis investigating this question is pro-
vided in Chapter 7.  No particular population subgroups had distinctly
stronger reactions to the bonus than other groups; however, the bonus
was more effective at times and places where the unemployment rate
was lower. 
 
TREATMENT IMPACTS ON INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT
 
The three experiments differed in the number and type of treat-
ments examined and in the samples given a bonus offer.   Figure 4.1
summarizes the characteristics of the treatment designs for the three
experiments (which are more fully described in Chapter 2).
While there was only a single claimant treatment in the Illinois
experiment—$500 for reemployment within 11 weeks on a job held 4
months—the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation
(FSC) was ended about halfway through the enrollment period.  This
resulted in a “natural experiment” in which 53 percent of the claimants
offered a bonus in the Illinois experiment had a maximum entitled ben-
efit duration of 38 weeks, while the others had a maximum duration of
26 weeks.  According to Davidson and Woodbury (1991), the different
entitled durations lead to significantly different response to the bonus
offer.  We present estimates separately for the different duration entitle-
ment groups.  
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Figure 4.1 Design of the Reemployment Bonus Offers
 
As described in Chapter 2, the four treatments in Pennsylvania
involved either a low or high bonus amount and either a short or a long
qualification period.  The low bonus (set at three times the weekly ben-
efit amount [WBA]) had a mean of $502, while the high bonus (set at 6
 
×
 
 WBA) had a mean of $1,000.  The short qualification period was set
at 6 weeks and the long qualification period was set at 12 weeks.  With
WBAs ranging from  $35 to $260, bonus offers in Pennsylvania ranged
from $105 to $1,560.  For all treatments in Pennsylvania, the reem-
ployment period was set at 16 weeks.
In Washington, there were three formulas for the bonus amount
(low, medium, and high) and two formulas for the qualification period
(short and long).  The bonus amounts were figured as 2, 4, or 6 times
the WBA, and the qualification periods were computed as either 20
percent or 40 percent of the entitled duration of benefits plus one
week.
 
2
 
  The mean low bonus amount offered was $307, the mean
medium amount was $615, and the mean high amount was $925.  The
 
A.  Illinois Job Search Incentive Experiment
Bonus amount Qualification period
$500 11 weeks
B.  Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Experiment
Qualification period
Bonus amount 6 weeks 12 weeks
3 
 
×
 
 WBA Low bonus/short qual. Low bonus/long qual.
6 
 
×
 
 WBA High bonus/short qual. High bonus/long qual.
C.  Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment
Qualification period
Bonus amount
(0.2 
 
×
 
 potential UI duration) 
+ 1 week
(0.4 
 
×
 
 potential UI duration) 
+ 1 week
2 
 
×
 
 WBA Low bonus/short qual. Low bonus/long qual.
4 
 
×
 
 WBA Med. bonus/short qual. Med. bonus/long qual.
6 
 
×
 
 WBA High bonus/short qual. High bonus/long qual.
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mean short qualification period was 7 weeks, and the mean long quali-
fication period was 12 weeks.  The bonus offers in Washington ranged
from $110 to $1,254.  The reemployment period for all treatments was
set at four months.
For the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments we present esti-
mates of the impact of each separate offer.  For each of those experi-
ments, we give an estimate of the mean effect of the short-
qualification-period offers, the long-qualification-period offers, and the
different bonus level offers, as well as an estimate for each experiment
of the overall mean impact of all treatments.
 
Unadjusted Treatment Impacts
 
For a classically designed experiment involving random assign-
ment and large sample sizes, treatment impact estimates may be com-
puted as the simple difference between treatment and control group
means of outcome measures.  Simple experimental impact estimates
are not constrained by econometric models and may be very convinc-
ing and easy to understand if randomization was effective in creating
homogenous control and treatment group samples.  This simplicity is
one of the fundamental appeals of experiments for program evaluation.  
Table 4.1 presents unadjusted estimates of the response to the bonus
offer.  The overall mean estimates indicate that the bonus offer reduced
weeks of UI benefit receipt by 1.15 weeks in Illinois, 0.62 weeks in
Pennsylvania, and 0.34 weeks in Washington (Woodbury and Spiegel-
man 1987; Corson et al. 1992; O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995).
For Illinois and Pennsylvania, the null hypothesis of no impact can be
rejected at the 95 percent confidence level.  The estimates also show
that the bonus offer reduced UI benefits received by $194 in Illinois,
$81 in Pennsylvania, and $22 in Washington.  The bonus offer also
reduced the probability of UI benefit exhaustion by 3.3 percent in Illi-
nois, 0.8 percent in Pennsylvania, and 1.0 percent in Washington.
 
3
 
This pattern of results—bonus impacts in Illinois being markedly
larger than those in Pennsylvania, and impacts in Pennsylvania being
somewhat larger than those in Washington—holds up throughout the
comparison of various measures of treatment impact across the three
experiments.  The relative impacts from the three experiments may be
examined in comparison to the parameters of the bonus offers.  The
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Table 4.1 Unadjusted Differences between Experimental and Control 
Group Means in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington 
Reemployment Bonus Experiments
 
a
 
Insured 
weeks
UI compensation
($)
 Exhaustion 
rate
Sample 
size
 
b
 
ILLINOIS
Control 20.1 
(0.19)
2,786 
(33)
0.472
(0.008)
3,952
Treatment –1.15** 
(0.27)
–194** 
(46)
–0.033** 
(0.011)
4,186
Control—FSC-elig. 21.6 
(0.30)
3,094 
(51)
0.490 
(0.011)
2,106
Treatment—FSC-elig. –1.78**
 (0.41)
–316** 
(70)
–0.054**
(0.015)
2,337
Control—FSC-inelig. 18.3 
(0.23)
2,520 
(41)
0.447 
(0.012)
1,600
Treatment—FSC-
inelig.
–0.71** 
(0.34)
–90
(59)
–0.015 
(0.018)
1,589
PENNSYLVANIA
Control 14.9 
(0.18)
2,388 
(36)
0.277 
(0.008)
3,392
Low bonus/short qual. –0.42 
(0.34)
–26
(68)
0.012 
(0.014)
1,395
Low bonus/long 
qual.
–0.41 
(0.28)
–44
(56)
–0.001 
(0.012)
2,456
High bonus/short qual. –0.51* 
(0.31)
–66
(61)
–0.001 
(0.013)
1,910
High bonus/long qual. –0.95** 
(0.27)
–146** 
(54)
–0.026** 
(0.011)
3,073
Mean bonus/short qual.
 
–0.47 
(0.26)
–49
(52)
0.004 
(0.011)
3,305
Mean bonus/long qual.
 
–0.71** 
(0.23)
–100** 
(46)
–0.015 
(0.010)
5,529
Low bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.41 
(0.25)
–38
(50)
0.003 
(0.011)
3,851
High bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.78** 
(0.24)
–115** 
(47)
–0.016* 
(0.010)
4,983
Mean bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.62** 
(0.22)
–81* 
(43)
–0.008 
(0.009)
8,834
 
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)
 
Insured 
weeks
UI compensation
($)
 Exhaustion 
rate
Sample 
size
 
b
 
WASHINGTON
Control 14.3 
(0.19)
2,066 
(34)
0.239 
(0.008)
3,082
Low bonus/short qual.
 
–0.05 
(0.30)
30
(52)
0.011
 (0.012)
2,246
Med. bonus/short qual. –0.19 
(0.30)
5
(51)
–0.004 
(0.012)
2,348
High bonus/short qual. –0.62* 
(0.33)
–69
(58)
–0.012 
(0.013)
1,583
Low bonus /long qual. –0.50* 
(0.29)
–58
(51)
–0.030** 
(0.011)
2,387
Med. bonus/long qual. –0.14 
(0.30)
12
(51)
–0.014 
(0.012)
2,353
High bonus/long qual. –0.73** 
(0.34)
–86
(58)
–0.023*
 (0.013)
1,535
Low bonus/mean qual. –0.28 
(0.25)
–16
(43)
–0.010 
(0.010)
4,633
Med. bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.16 
(0.25)
9
(43)
–0.009 
(0.010)
4,701
High bonus/mean qual. –0.67** 
(0.27)
–77 
(47)
–0.018 
(0.011)
3,118
Mean bonus/short qual.
 
–0.25 
(0.24)
–5
(41)
–0.000 
(0.009)
6,177
Mean bonus/long qual. –0.42* 
(0.24)
–39
(41)
–0.022** 
(0.009)
6,275
Mean bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.34 
(0.22)
–22
(38)
–0.011 
(0.008)
12,452
 
a
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level; ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
 
b
 
The Illinois sample sizes for FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible do not sum to the total
Illinois sample size.  This discrepancy is due to the FSC eligibility conditions, which
differed depending on the date of the benefit claim, and our desire to use the largest
possible sample in the full sample analysis.  Further details are given in Chapter 3.
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average bonus offer as a multiple of the average WBA was 3.6 in Illi-
nois, 4.7 in Pennsylvania, and 3.8 in Washington.  The average qualifi-
cation period was 11.0 weeks in Illinois, 9.0 weeks in Pennsylvania,
and 8.4 weeks in Washington.  Pennsylvania had both an average bonus
which was a higher multiple of the average WBA and a longer average
qualification period than did Washington.  Pennsylvania also had an
average bonus which was a higher multiple of the average WBA than
Illinois, but the average qualification period in Pennsylvania was two
weeks shorter than the uniform 11-week qualification period in Illinois.
A variety of bonus levels and lengths of qualification periods were
tested in Pennsylvania and Washington.  The results found in each of
these separate experiments tends to corroborate the conclusion which
might be drawn from the above comparison of overall mean responses
across experiments.  For Pennsylvania, combining treatments with sim-
ilar WBA multiples yields two groups that differ in the level of the
bonus offer but have the same mean qualification period; a similar
exercise yields three bonus level groups for Washington.  For both
Pennsylvania and Washington, the only combinations estimated with
statistical significance are the high bonus treatments combined across
qualification periods.  For Pennsylvania, the high bonus offers had a
mean impact of –0.71 weeks across qualification periods, while in
Washington the mean impact of the high bonus treatments was –0.67.
In both experiments, these impact estimates are greater than the point
estimates for the lower bonus multiples.  When the responses to the
short and long qualification periods in Pennsylvania and Washington
are compared, the estimated response to the long qualification period is
statistically significantly greater than for the short qualification period.
The largest and most statistically significant impact estimates in both
Pennsylvania and Washington were for the high-bonus-multiple/long-
qualification-period treatments, with the effect on UI compensation
being –0.95 weeks in Pennsylvania and –0.73 weeks in Washington.  
An interesting sub-analysis involves the natural experiment with
varying entitled duration of benefits in Illinois.  The average bonus
response of –1.15 weeks of benefits was made up of a response of –1.78
weeks for those eligible for FSC (38 weeks of benefit entitlement) and
–0.71 weeks for those not eligible (26 weeks of benefit entitlement).
The average response of –0.71 for the FSC-ineligible sample in Illinois
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is close to the response observed in Pennsylvania and Washington,
where the entitled duration of benefits was also similar.
When the Illinois FSC-ineligible results are compared with the
findings in Pennsylvania and Washington, the patterns of bonus offer
impacts on the UI exhaustion rate within and across the three experi-
ments are also similar.  The mean FSC-ineligible impact was –1.5
percent in Illinois, –0.8 percent in Pennsylvania, and in –1.0 in Wash-
ington.  The overall impact on exhaustions in Illinois was –3.3 per-
cent, with the impact for the FSC-eligible group in Illinois an
astounding –5.4 percent.  For the high bonus/long qualification treat-
ments, the impact on exhaustion of benefits was –2.6 percent in Penn-
sylvania and –2.3 percent in Washington.  In Illinois and for the high
bonus/long qualification treatments in Pennsylvania and Washington,
the reductions in exhaustion rate were statistically significant, indicat-
ing that some participants dramatically changed behavior by moving
from benefit exhaustion to relatively short-term unemployment.  The
same general pattern of bonus offer impacts is observed on dollars of
UI in the benefit year; however, the results in Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington were relatively weak compared with estimated impacts on the
other outcomes.
 
4
 
  
 
Adjusted Treatment Impacts
 
If treatment-control differences in outcome variables are due to
factors other than the treatment, a simple comparison of means may
not be adequate to identify treatment effects.  As discussed in Chapter
2, for the Washington experiment there were no more differences
between treatment and control groups in observable characteristics
than would be expected to result from a random assignment process.
Unfortunately, the variables on which there were the most pronounced
differences—WBA and base period earnings (BPE)—may have
affected the measurement of outcomes of interest.
An alternative procedure for computing the simple difference
between treatment and control means on an outcome variable of inter-
est that yields the same result involves estimating
(4.1)
 
Y
 
 = 
 
a
 
 + 
 
T
 
B
 
 + 
 
u
 
,
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by ordinary least squares regression.  In this equation the intercept, 
 
a
 
,
is the mean value of the outcome variable, 
 
Y
 
, for the control group.  
 
T
 
 is
a matrix of dummy variables representing the treatments, and 
 
u
 
 is a
normally distributed mean zero error term.  The parameter vector 
 
B
 
contains estimates of the simple differences between treatment and
control means on the outcome variable.
The model used to estimate treatment impacts while holding other
factors constant is a straightforward generalization of Equation 4.1.
The specification for computing adjusted treatment impacts involves
adding terms for concomitant variables and is referred to as a covari-
ance model.  In the present case it takes the form
(4.2)
 
Y
 
 = 
 
a
 
 + 
 
T
 
B
 
 + 
 
ZC
 
 + 
 
u
 
,
where the introduction of concomitant variables, 
 
Z
 
, into the model
reduces the experimental error caused by differences in the observable
characteristics between the control and treatment groups.
 
5
 
  When esti-
mating this model, each concomitant variable is included as a deviation
from its own mean, thereby allowing interpretation of the intercept as
the mean value of the outcome variable 
 
Y
 
 for the control group given
the mean observable characteristics of the whole sample.
 
6
 
  By this
approach, the vector 
 
B
 
 yields estimates of treatment impacts adjusted
for differences across observations in the characteristics 
 
Z
 
.  
Investigation into the causes of the lack of homogeneity in the
observable characteristics of the experimental and control groups in the
Washington sample indicated that treatment impacts estimated without
adjusting for the heterogeneity of the groups are likely to be biased.
Variations in the WBA accounted for most of the important heteroge-
neity across the Washington groups.  In particular, it was found that
omission of WBA when estimating treatment effects on dollars of UI
compensation in Washington is likely to yield biased impact estimates.
Nonetheless, to avoid any possibility of omitted variable bias in esti-
mating adjusted treatment impacts, a full set of concomitant or adjust-
ment variables is included as covariates in estimation of treatment
effects for Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
 
7
 
 
The introduction of adjustment variables as covariates reduced the
standard errors on parameter estimates, with a greater effect on dollars
of UI compensation than the other outcomes (Table 4.2).  The mean
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Table 4.2 Adjusted Differences between Experimental and Control 
Group Means in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington 
Reemployment Bonus Experiments
 
a
 
Benefit 
weeks
UI compensation 
($)
Exhaustion 
rate
Sample 
size
 
b
 
ILLINOIS
Control 20.0 
(0.19)
2,763 
(28)
0.468 
(0.008)
3,952
Treatment –1.04** 
(0.26)
–150** 
(40)
–0.026** 
(0.011)
4,186
Control—FSC-elig. 21.45 
(0.30)
2,996 
(45)
0.485 
(0.011)
2,106
Treatment—FSC-elig. –1.46** 
(0.41)
–228** 
(62)
–0.042** 
(0.015)
2,337 
Control—FSC-inelig. 18.18 
(0.24)
2,458 
(37)
0.446 
(0.012)
1,600
Treatment—FSC-inelig. –0.65* 
(0.33)
–57 
(51)
–0.009 
(0.017)
1,589
PENNSYLVANIA
Control 14.9 
(0.18)
2,400 
(31)
0.274 
(0.008)
3,358
Low bonus/short qual. –0.62* 
(0.34)
–99* 
(58)
0.001 
(0.014)
1,388
Low bonus/long qual. –0.35 
(0.28)
–67
(48)
0.000 
(0.012)
2,432
High bonus/short qual. –0.44 
(0.30)
–99* 
(52)
0.001 
(0.013)
1,890
High bonus/long qual. –0.82** 
(0.26)
–133** 
(45)
–0.014 
(0.011)
3,038
Mean bonus/short qual.
 
–0.53** 
(0.26)
–99** 
(45)
0.000 
(0.011)
3,278
Mean bonus/long qual. –0.62** 
(0.23)
–104** 
(39)
–0.008 
(0.010)
5,470
Low bonus/mean qual. –0.43* 
(0.25)
–75** 
(43)
0.002 
(0.010)
3,820
High bonus/mean qual. –0.69** 
(0.24)
–123** 
(40)
–0.009 
(0.010)
4,928
Mean bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.58** 
(0.21)
–102** 
(37)
–0.004 
(0.009)
8,748
 
(continued)
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Benefit 
weeks
UI compensation 
($)
Exhaustion 
rate
Sample 
size
 
b
 
WASHINGTON
Control 14.35 
(0.19)
2,099 
(30)
0.241 
(0.007)
3,082
Low bonus/short qual. –0.05 
(0.29)
22
(46)
0.008 
(0.011)
2,246
Med. bonus/short qual.
 
–0.23 
(0.29)
–28 
(45)
–0.005 
(0.011)
2,348
High bonus/short qual.
 
–0.72** 
(0.32)
–117** 
(51)
–0.017 
(0.013)
1,583
Low bonus/long qual. –0.58** 
(0.29)
–112** 
(45)
–0.032** 
(0.011)
2,387
Med. bonus/long qual. –0.28 
(0.29)
–44
(45)
–0.019* 
(0.011)
2,353
High bonus/long qual. –0.75** 
(0.33)
–135** 
(52)
–0.020 
(0.013)
1,535
Low bonu/mean qual. –0.33 
(0.24)
–47 
(39)
–0.013 
(0.010)
4,633
Med. bonus/mean qual. –0.25 
(0.24)
–36
(38)
–0.012 
(0.009)
4,701
High bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.74** 
(0.27)
–126** 
(42)
–0.018* 
(0.010)
3,118
Mean bonus/short qual.
 
–0.29 
(0.23)
–33
(37)
–0.003 
(0.009)
6,177
Mean bonus/long qual. –0.51** 
(0.23)
–92** 
(36)
–0.024** 
(0.009)
6,275
Mean bonus/mean qual.
 
–0.40* 
(0.21)
–63* 
(33)
–0.014* 
(0.008)
12,452
 
a
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level; ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
 
b
 
The Illinois sample sizes for FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible do not sum to the total
Illinois sample size.  This discrepancy is due to the FSC eligibility conditions, which
differed depending on the date of the benefit claim, and our desire to use the largest
possible sample size in the full sample analysis.  Further details are given in Chapter 3.
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regression-adjusted response across all treatments to a bonus offer was
a reduction of $150 in Illinois, $102 in Pennsylvania, and $63 in Wash-
ington.  The Illinois and Pennsylvania estimates are significant at the
95 percent confidence level, while the Washington estimate is signifi-
cant at the 90 percent confidence level.  The adjusted impact estimates
are somewhat larger for Pennsylvania and Washington and somewhat
smaller in Illinois than the unadjusted estimates, but in no case is the
adjusted estimate significantly different from the unadjusted estimate. 
Regression adjustment of impact estimates has the greatest effect on
the high bonus/long qualification treatments in Pennsylvania (–$133)
and Washington (–$135).  Both estimates are statistically significant and
larger than the unadjusted estimates, but they are not significantly dif-
ferent from the unadjusted estimates.
 
8
 
  
Regression-adjusted estimates of the bonus impact on weeks of UI
and benefit exhaustion were only modestly changed from the unad-
justed estimates.  The overall regression-adjusted mean estimates indi-
cate that the bonus offer reduced UI benefit receipt by 1.04 weeks in
Illinois, 0.58 weeks in Pennsylvania, and 0.40 weeks in Washington.
The mean regression-adjusted estimate of the reduction in the probabil-
ity of UI benefit exhaustion was 2.6 percent in Illinois, 0.4 percent in
Pennsylvania, and 1.4 percent in Washington.
For Washington, where lack of homogeneity was most severe,
regression adjustment allowed detection of statistically significant
impacts on compensation and weeks for three of the individual
treatments at the 95 percent level of confidence, whereas not a single
treatment impact on dollars of compensation was estimated with
significance before regression adjustment.
 
A CONTINUOUS VARIABLES MODEL OF 
TREATMENT RESPONSE
 
In both Pennsylvania and Washington the bonus amount was
defined in terms of the WBA.  Since the WBA varies widely across
claimants, the bonus amount may be used as a continuous variable
when estimating bonus impacts.  In Pennsylvania the qualification
period was set at either 6 or 12 weeks, while in Washington it was
defined as either 20 or 40 percent of the entitled duration of benefits
plus 1 week.  Therefore, the qualification period may also be used as a
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continuous variable.  The variation in the bonus amount and qualifica-
tion period in Pennsylvania and Washington is sufficient to allow esti-
mation of the impact of incremental changes in the values of these
parameters of a bonus offer.  This section presents estimates from con-
tinuous variables models of bonus impacts for the separate Pennsylva-
nia and Washington experiments and for these experiments combined
with data from the Illinois experiment.  
The continuous variables models represent a bonus offer as a given
dollar amount paid for reemployment within a certain number of
weeks.  (These models are called continuous variables models because
the treatments are represented by continuous variables rather than dis-
crete indicator variables.)  These models allow estimation of the effect
of incremental changes in the bonus amount and the qualification
period.  The estimating equations have the following general linear
specification:
(4.3)
 
Y
 
 = 
 
a
 
 + 
 
b
 
1
 
B
 
 + 
 
b
 
2
 
Q
 
 + 
 
ZC
 
 + 
 
u
 
,
where, 
 
B
 
 is the bonus amount in dollars, 
 
Q
 
 is the qualification period
length in weeks, and 
 
Z
 
 is a set of concomitant or adjustment variables
centered around their mean.
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  The parameters to be estimated are 
 
a
 
,
 
 b
 
1
 
,
 
b
 
2
 
, and 
 
C
 
.  The random error term, 
 
u
 
, is assumed to be normally distrib-
uted with mean zero.  In Equation 4.3, 
 
B
 
 and 
 
Q
 
 take on the value of
zero for members of the control group.  Including the WBA as a con-
trol variable improves the within-treatment homogeneity of 
 
B
 
 and
results in the parameter 
 
b
 
1
 
 being estimated using variation in 
 
B
 
 across
the treatments.  The same effect is achieved in estimating the parameter
on 
 
Q
 
 by including the entitled duration of benefits.  Parameter esti-
mates for Equation 4.3 are presented in Table 4.3 for five samples.  The
dependent variable for each regression model is weeks compensated in
the benefit year.  
In the models estimated separately on the Pennsylvania and the
Washington samples, none of the parameter estimates on 
 
B
 
 nor 
 
Q
 
 are
statistically significant.  For the sample formed by pooling data from
the two experiments, however, the standard errors on the estimated
parameters on 
 
B
 
 and 
 
Q
 
 are smaller and the parameter on the bonus
amount, 
 
B
 
, is estimated with statistical significance.  The pattern and
magnitude of results is consistent across the Pennsylvania and Wash-
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ington samples; a higher bonus amount and a longer qualification
period both reduce the weeks of UI drawn in the benefit year by similar
magnitudes.
Evidence from the pooled Pennsylvania and Washington sample
suggests that a $100 increase in a bonus offer will reduce weeks of UI
compensation in the benefit year by an average of 0.039 weeks, and a
1-week increase in the qualification period will reduce weeks of UI
compensation in the benefit year by 0.026.  These parameters, esti-
mated on the combined data, have sampling errors about 50 percent
smaller than parameters estimated on the separate samples.  Using
results of the pooled estimation, response to the bonus offer in Pennsyl-
vania and Washington may be summarized by saying that with a 12-
week qualification period, it would take a bonus of nearly $1,800 to
induce an average 1-week decline in insured unemployment among
 
Table 4.3 Continuous Variables Models of Bonus Impacts (UI Weeks)
 
a
 
Sample
 
b
 
$100 Increase 
in bonus amt.
One-week 
increase in qual. 
period
Sample 
size
Pennsylvania –0.035
(0.030)
–0.028
(0.026)
2,106
Washington –0.044
(0.031)
–0.023
(0.024)
15,534
Pennsylvania and Washington 
(pooled)
–0.039*
(0.021)
–0.026
(0.018)
27,640
Pennsylvania, Washington, and 
Illinois (pooled)
–0.031
(0.021)
–0.047**
(0.016)
35,778
Pennsylvania, Washington, and 
Illinois FSC-inelig. (pooled)
–0.027
(0.021)
–0.034**
(0.017)
30,829
 
a
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level in a two-tailed test;  ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in a
two-tailed test.
 
b
 
The Pennsylvania estimates were computed in a regression model which also
included cohort indicators, office indicators, and demographic and economic vari-
ables.  The Washington estimates were computed in a regression model which also
included the WBA and the entitled duration of benefits.  The pooled sample estimates
were estimated in regressions which included cohort indicators, office indicators,
indicators for Washington, Pennsylvania, and Illinois FSC where possible, and demo-
graphic and economic variables.
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those offered a bonus.  To appreciate the meaning of this, recall that
about 12.9 percent of those offered a bonus in Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington actually were paid a bonus (Table 3.1 in Chapter 3).
 
10
 
  This
means that, on average, it cost about $232 in bonus payments to save a
week of UI benefit payments, which averaged about $159.
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For Illinois, because there is no variation in either the bonus
amount or the qualification period, the separate influence of these
parameters may not be estimated using a sample with data only from
Illinois.  Nonetheless, these effects may be inferred by combining the
Illinois data with that from the other experiments.  Adding the Illinois
data to the combined Pennsylvania and Washington sample yields a
total sample of nearly 36,000 UI beneficiaries.  As seen in Table 4.3,
combining the Illinois data with that from Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton results in an estimated increased effect of the qualification period
and a reduced effect of the dollar bonus amount.  In a formal statistical
sense, however, the parameter estimates on the dollar bonus amount
and the qualification period are not affected by adding the Illinois data
to the Washington and Pennsylvania data.
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It was previously noted that the Illinois beneficiaries who were
FSC-ineligible, and therefore had an initial benefit entitlement of 26
weeks, responded to the bonus offer in much the same way as benefi-
ciaries in Pennsylvania and Washington.  When the FSC-eligible group
is excluded from the three-state sample, the results of estimating the
continuous variables model indicate that the qualification period has a
diminished impact on benefit duration.  This impact is more in line
with the combined Pennsylvania and Washington impact; however,
even with the FSC-eligible group excluded, the impact of the dollar
bonus amount for the three-state sample remains somewhat smaller
than for the Pennsylvania and Washington sample.  Even though there
appears to be some underlying differences between Illinois and the
other two experiments, the results of estimating the continuous vari-
ables model on the combined sample excluding the Illinois FSC-eligi-
ble group probably provides the best summary of bonus response
across the three experiments.  
In Table 4.4 we present estimates of the reduction in weeks of UI
receipt for four hypothetical bonus offers based on parameter estimates
for the sample formed by pooling data from Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington together with the FSC-ineligible sample from Illinois.  The fol-
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lowing four hypothetical bonus offers are examined: 1) $500 for
reemployment within 6 weeks, 2) $1000 for reemployment within 6
weeks, 3) $500 for reemployment within 12 weeks, and 4) $1000 for
reemployment within 12 weeks.  For wage and benefit levels prevailing
during the 1980s, these four hypothetical bonus offers span the range of
policy-relevant bonus options reasonably approximated by use of a lin-
ear model.  
As shown in Table 4.4, weeks of UI benefit receipt are predicted to
decline for each of the separate hypothetical bonus offers.  Further-
more, the impact on UI receipt of a hypothetical bonus offer increases
as the bonus amount or the duration of the bonus increases.  All of the
impact estimates computed using this simulation methodology are sig-
nificant at the 99 percent confidence level.  The least generous hypo-
thetical bonus offer—$500 with a six-week qualification period—
would reduce UI receipt by one-third of a week.  Since the continuous
variables model involves a linear relationship between the bonus
parameters and UI receipt, doubling the bonus amount and duration
simply doubles the impact of the bonus offer on UI receipt.  As shown
 
Table 4.4 The Predicted Impacts
 
a
 
 of Four Hypothetical Bonus Offers on 
UI Receipt, Based on a Continuous Variables Model Estimated 
on the Pooled Pennsylvania, Washington, and Illinois Data
 
b
 
Hypothetical 
bonus offer
Amount of the 
bonus offer 
($) 
Bonus qual. period 
(weeks)    
Impact on weeks 
of UI benefits
1 500 6 –0.34***
(0.09)
2 1,000 6 –0.47***
(0.16)
3 500 12 –0.54*** 
(0.15)
4 1,000 12 –0.68*** 
(0.17)
 
a
 
Predicted impacts are based on the regression-adjusted impact estimates presented in
Table 4.3 for the pooled Pennsylvania, Washington, and Illinois FSC-ineligible sam-
ple, which included 30,829 observations.
 
b
 
Standard errors of predicted impacts in parentheses.  *** = Statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level in a two-tailed test.
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in Table 4.4, the offer with a $1,000 bonus amount and 12-week quali-
fication period has twice the impact of the offer with a $500 bonus
amount and 6-week qualification period.  Hypothetical bonus offers 2
and 3, which combine a high dollar amount with a short qualification
period or a low dollar amount with a long qualification period, would
be likely to reduce UI receipt by a greater amount than the least gener-
ous offer but less than the most generous offer.  
The offers reviewed in Table 4.4 are summarized graphically along
with all other possible dollar bonus amounts for the 6- and 12-week
qualification periods in Figure 4.2.  The figure makes plain the linear
nature of the impact response surface estimated.  It is also clear from
the diagram that, for any given dollar bonus amount, there will be a
greater response the longer the qualification period and, for any given
qualification period, there will be a greater response the higher the dol-
lar bonus amount.  The illustration does, however, mask the seemingly
different way that Illinois beneficiaries respond to the parameters of the
bonus in comparison with benefit recipients in Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington.
 
13
 
   
 
THE TIMING OF TREATMENT IMPACTS
 
We now consider the impact of bonus offers on the time pattern of
ending receipt of UI benefits.  To understand this pattern, we examine
the cumulative UI exit rate.14  Since UI continued claim forms must be
filed every two weeks by claimants wishing to continue benefit receipt,
we analyze patterns over time measured in two-week intervals. 
Estimates of cumulative UI exit rates through the end of any time
period, t, are computed by dividing the difference between the initial
risk pool of UI claimants and the remaining number of UI claimants at
the start of time period t +1 by the initial risk pool of UI claimants.
The algebraic formula for the computation is simply:
(4.4) c(t) = (R0 – Rt + 1)/R0
In this formula R0 is the initial number of UI benefit recipients in
the separate treatment and control groups, and Rt + 1 is the number of UI
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Figure 4.2 Linearized Effect of the Bonus Offer on Benefit Year 
UI Weeks
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recipients in these groups at the start of time period t + 1.  Throughout
our discussion of the timing of treatment response, we focus on the first
spell of UI benefit receipt that followed the initial claim for UI benefits.
In none of the three experiments did as many as 5 percent of initial
claimants have multiple spells of UI benefit receipt during their benefit
year.
Cumulative exit rates for treatment and control groups for each of
the three experiments are reported in Table 4.5 observed at  two-week
intervals for unemployment spells between 1 and 39 weeks in duration.
This number of periods is considered because the longest entitled dura-
tion of benefits among the experiments was 38 weeks for FSC-eligible
claimants in Illinois.    
To clearly understand the ideas involved consider an example from
Table 4.5.  The cumulative UI exit rate through the fifth week in the
benefit year for control subjects in Pennsylvania was 0.403.  This
means that out of 8,834 initial UI recipients, 40.3 percent of the control
group had stopped drawing UI benefits by the start of the sixth week of
their claim.  The comparable percentage among those offered a bonus
in Pennsylvania was 42.4.  The difference in these cumulative UI exit
rates was found to be statistically significant.
There is a common pattern in the cumulative UI exit rates across
the three experiments.  Cumulative exit rates are higher among the
treatment groups, at least through the first several weeks of UI receipt.
However, the general level of UI exit rates is considerably lower in Illi-
nois than in either Pennsylvania or Washington and tends to be slightly
lower in Pennsylvania than in Washington.15  Four factors might
account for these differences: 1) differences in the labor market struc-
tures of the three states (that is, differences in the mix of industries and
occupations), 2) differences in demand for labor among the three
states, 3) differences among the three states in the administration of UI,
and 4) differences among the three states in the characteristics of work-
ers who are eligible for UI. 
An effective bonus offer would lead claimants in treatment groups
to have higher UI exit rates than controls during the period over which
the bonus could be earned.  Comparison of exit rates for the control
and treatment groups in Illinois clearly shows that exit rates were
higher during the bonus qualification period for UI claimants who were
offered the bonus.  
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Table 4.5 Cumulative Hazard Rates for Leaving 
Unemployment Insurance
Illinois Control Treatment
FSC-eligible 
control
FSC-eligible 
treatment
Initial risk set 3,952 4,186 2,106 2,337
Spell length (weeks)
0–1 0.127 0.150** 0.138 0.154
2–3 0.197 0.230** 0.215 0.249**
4–5 0.252 0.287** 0.271 0.307**
6–7 0.298 0.343** 0.322 0.370**
8–9 0.339 0.389** 0.364 0.417**
10–11 0.372 0.427** 0.396 0.458**
12–13 0.406 0.460** 0.422 0.484**
14–15 0.432 0.488** 0.443 0.509**
16–17 0.457 0.513** 0.466 0.531**
18–19 0.483 0.537** 0.487 0.548**
20–21 0.515 0.559** 0.508 0.569**
22–23 0.541 0.584** 0.528 0.590**
24–25 0.578 0.616** 0.556 0.615**
26–27 0.816 0.833** 0.661 0.709**
28–29 0.825 0.843** 0.674 0.724**
30–31 0.835 0.853** 0.690 0.740**
32–33 0.841 0.859** 0.702 0.749**
34–35 0.851 0.869** 0.720 0.767**
36–37 0.863 0.877* 0.744 0.780**
38–39 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.995
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Pennsylvania Control
Mean 
treatment
High bonus/
long qual.
Initial risk set 3,392 8,834 3,073
Spell length (weeks)
0–1 0.258 0.271 0.273
2–3 0.343 0.355 0.357
4–5 0.403 0.424** 0.428**
6–7 0.456 0.486** 0.487**
8–9 0.515 0.538** 0.542**
10–11 0.564 0.587** 0.591**
12–13 0.608 0.635** 0.649**
14–15 0.647 0.671** 0.681**
16–17 0.681 0.701** 0.713**
18–19 0.708 0.726* 0.740**
20–21 0.734 0.750* 0.763**
22–23 0.759 0.773* 0.786**
24–25 0.787 0.797 0.810**
26–27 0.986 0.989* 0.991*
28–29 0.993 0.993 0.993
30–31 0.994 0.994 0.994
32–33 0.995 0.995 0.995
34–35 0.995 0.996 0.996
36–37 0.996 0.996 0.997
38–39 0.997 0.996 0.997
(continued)
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Table 4.5 (continued)
Washington Control
Mean 
treatment
High bonus/
long qual.
Initial risk set 2,702 11,052 1,358
Spell length (weeks)
0–1 0.206 0.196 0.221
2–3 0.333 0.337 0.364*
4–5 0.431 0.437 0.464**
6–7 0.506 0.508 0.526
8–9 0.564 0.563 0.588
10–11 0.611 0.613 0.653**
12–13 0.644 0.650 0.684**
14–15 0.679 0.681 0.720**
16–17 0.715 0.720 0.758**
18–19 0.748 0.756 0.781**
20–21 0.784 0.792 0.816**
22–23 0.813 0.821 0.838*
24–25 0.838 0.850 0.862**
26–27 0.862 0.873 0.888**
28–29 0.885 0.899** 0.909**
30–31 0.982 0.982 0.980
32–33 0.989 0.989 0.987
34–35 0.993 0.991 0.992
36–37 0.994 0.993 0.993
38–39 0.995 0.994 0.994
a * = Cumulative hazard rate significantly different from control group in a two-tailed
test at the 90% confidence level; ** = cumulative hazard rate significantly different
from control group in a two-tailed test at the 95% confidence level.
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For the Pennsylvania experiment, the cumulative UI exit rate for
the treatment groups taken as a whole was higher than for the control
group through most of the bonus qualification period.  Compared with
Illinois, cumulative impacts appeared to be smaller, but were neverthe-
less big enough to produce a 0.62-week reduction in insured unem-
ployment (as reported in Table 4.1).  The cumulative impacts for the
high bonus/long qualification treatment in Pennsylvania were modestly
larger over the first 14 weeks following the start of UI benefits (Table
4.5, Pennsylvania, high bonus/long qualification). 
In the Washington experiment, there is scant statistical evidence
that bonus-offered workers gave up their UI benefits at a faster pace
than did the control group.  When all treatments are taken together, UI
exit rates were higher for bonus-offered workers than for controls only
by the week 28–29 period.  This is consistent with the small (and statis-
tically insignificant) 0.3-week reduction in insured unemployment that
can be seen in Table 4.1 for the mean bonus offer.  Isolating the most
effective treatment in Washington, the high-bonus/long-qualification
treatment (Table 4.5) there is some evidence that UI exit rates of the
bonus-offered workers were higher than the exit rates of the control
group.  These results are consistent with the somewhat larger reduction
in insured unemployment for this group (0.73 week) that can be seen in
Table 4.1.
The basic conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of cumulative
exit rates is that the Illinois and Pennsylvania bonus offers taken as a
whole both acted to increase UI exit rates during their respective bonus
qualification periods.  There is also some evidence that the high bonus
offers in the Washington experiment increased UI exit rates.  These
time patterns of cumulative exit rates for treatment and control subjects
are presented graphically in Figure 4.3.  Treatment impacts on cumula-
tive exit rates are presented graphically in Figure 4.4, where the esti-
mated impact is equal to the difference between the cumulative exit
rate for the treatment group and the cumulative exit rate for the control
group.  
Cumulative UI exit rates are also useful for examining the extent to
which the workers who took advantage of bonus offers were individu-
als who otherwise would have exhausted their benefits.  For potential
benefit exhausters, each bonus offer accepted would generate a large
reduction in observed unemployment.  In Illinois, for example, the
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reduction would be from 27 weeks of insured unemployment to at most
11 weeks.  On the other hand, for workers who would have otherwise
had relatively short durations of UI benefit receipt, each bonus offer
accepted might generate only a relatively small reduction in observed
unemployment.
After 11 weeks, 37.2 percent of the claimants in the Illinois control
group had stopped receiving UI benefits, whereas 42.7 percent of the
Illinois treatment group had stopped receiving benefits (Table 4.5).  In
other words, at the end of the bonus qualification period, an additional
5.5 percentage points (42.7 – 37.2) of the bonus-offered workers had
ended their UI receipt as compared with the controls.  Moreover, this
5.5 percentage point difference diminishes only slightly after the end of
the bonus qualification period.  Even immediately before exhaustion of
regular UI benefits (weeks 24–25), the difference is nearly 4 percent-
age points.  In other words, the control group fails to catch up with the
treatment group in terms of exit from UI.  This failure of the control
and treatment cumulative exit rates to converge suggests that a large
proportion of the workers who responded to the Illinois bonus offer
would have had long spells of insured unemployment in the absence of
the bonus offer.  These results are consistent with estimates in Table
4.1, which show that the Illinois bonus reduced the UI benefit exhaus-
tion rate by over 3 percentage points overall (and by over 5 percentage
points among FSC-eligibles).  Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate that cumu-
lative UI exit rates for treatment subjects remain above controls at 26
weeks and at 38 weeks for the FSC-eligible group.  We conclude that
the Illinois bonus reduced the duration of UI spells among workers
who tended to have relatively long expected durations of UI receipt.
The evidence from Pennsylvania exhibits a different pattern.  The
difference between the control and combined treatment cumulative exit
rates peaks at between 2 and 3 percentage points during weeks 6–7 and
12–13 (Table 4.5 and Figures 4.3 and 4.4).  These peaks in cumulative
UI exit coincided with the end of the short (6-week) and the long (12-
week) bonus qualification periods.  For the high bonus/long qualifica-
tion treatment alone, the difference is larger, peaking at about 4 per-
centage points in weeks 12–13.  Unlike for Illinois, however, the
control and treatment cumulative exit rates do converge near the end of
the qualification period.  In terms of leaving UI, the control group
caught up with the combined treatment groups by weeks 24–25 (the
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative UI Exit Rates by Treatment and Control Groups
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Figure 4.3 (cont.)
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Figure 4.3 (cont.)
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Figure 4.4 Simple Treatment Impacts on Cumulative UI Exit Rates
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Figure 4.4 (cont.)
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Figure 4.4 (cont.)
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time period before exhaustion), but not until weeks 28–29 (just after
benefit exhaustion) for the high-bonus/long-qualification treatment in
Pennsylvania.
The decaying impact of the Pennsylvania treatments on the cumu-
lative UI exit rate shows that much of the bonus-induced reduction in
UI receipt occurred because the bonus effect was concentrated among
claimants who would have had relatively short spells of UI receipt.
The exception is the high bonus/long qualification treatment in Penn-
sylvania, which reduced the probability of a worker exhausting UI ben-
efits by 2.6 percent as reported in Table 4.1.  The point can also be seen
in Table 4.5, which shows that in weeks 24–25 there is still a 2.3 per-
centage point difference between the cumulative exit rates of the con-
trol group and the high bonus/long qualification treatment group.
Overall, though, the Pennsylvania treatments appear to have affected
the behavior mainly of workers with relatively low expected durations
of UI receipt.
The cumulative UI exit rate results for Washington show a weaker,
but similar, pattern to that seen in Pennsylvania.  For all treatments
combined, the bonus initially creates an insignificant difference
between the cumulative UI exit rates of the control and the experimen-
tal groups which diminishes before weeks 28–29 (the period before
exhaustion).  The exception is the high bonus/long qualification treat-
ment, for which the cumulative UI exit rate remains 2.4 percentage
points greater than controls in weeks 28–29 (Table 4.5).  This is con-
sistent with the significant 2.3 percentage point reduction in UI
exhaustion reported in Table 4.1 for those with the high bonus/long
qualification offer.  The evidence indicates that the average Washing-
ton bonus offer reduced the UI receipt of workers who would have
experienced relatively short spells of UI receipt in any event.  The
exception presented for Washington is the high bonus/long qualifica-
tion offer, which reduced benefit exhaustion.
136 Decker, O’Leary, and Woodbury
IMPACTS OF THE BONUS OFFER ON 
POPULATION SUBGROUPS
There are two main reasons for examining treatment impacts by
population subgroup.  One is to provide information to policymakers
who may consider targeting a reemployment bonus program to certain
groups, such as dislocated workers or older UI claimants.  Another is to
identify possible biases in the effects—a program that benefits only
one gender or certain ethnic groups may not be considered good policy
even if it is cost-effective.  
This section reports on treatment impacts for 12 subgroups defined
by binary variables for six characteristics: gender, age, race, industry,
area unemployment, and the WBA level.  The dummy variables speci-
fied for the analysis were a variable indicating whether a claimant was
female; an age variable indicating whether the claimant was 35 years
old or over; a race variable indicating whether a claimant was black; an
industry variable indicating whether the claimant’s previous job was in
manufacturing; an unemployment variable indicating whether the local
unemployment rate was below 5 percent; and a variable indicating
whether the claimant qualified for the maximum WBA. 
It is standard practice to examine program impacts by gender, age,
and race.  We investigated differential treatment impacts by industry,
area unemployment, and WBA for various reasons.  Because manufac-
turing is a shrinking sector, workers leaving manufacturing are more
likely than others to be displaced workers.  Accordingly, examining
impacts for manufacturing workers separately from others may shed
light on the value of the reemployment bonus as a way of aiding dis-
placed workers.  Because the reemployment bonus could be imple-
mented either as an ongoing or as a countercyclical program, it was
important to examine whether the bonus had an impact only when
reemployment prospects were good.  Finally, existing evidence sug-
gests that the disincentive effects of UI are greatest for workers whose
prior earnings were relatively low; these claimants who typically have
WBAs below the state maximum receive benefits which tend to replace
a larger share of lost earnings.  Accordingly, it seemed important to
examine whether workers below the maximum WBA had greater treat-
ment impacts than other workers.  If so, then the reemployment bonus
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might be an effective way of mitigating the disincentive effects of the
UI system for workers who are most adversely affected.
We estimate all subgroup treatment impacts in a single regression
model.  This means that the treatment response for each subgroup is
estimated controlling for the influence of all other subgroup character-
istics.  For example, the model estimates the treatment impacts associ-
ated with being black controlling for the fact that blacks are less likely
to be at the maximum WBA, less likely to claim benefits in areas with
unemployment rates below five percent, and so on.  If we did not pro-
ceed in this way, any differential impact associated with being black
might be a result not of being black but rather of other characteristics
that blacks possess.
The equation estimated for each outcome of interest is a straight-
forward generalization of Equation 4.2:
(4.5) Y = a + TB + ZC + GD + GTE' + GZF' + ZTH' + u
where Y is the outcome measure (either weeks of insured unemploy-
ment, dollars of UI compensation, or the UI benefit exhaustion rate); T
is the matrix of treatment dummies; Z is a matrix of concomitant vari-
ables in deviation form; G is the matrix of dummy variables which
code for membership in a subgroup; a is the intercept; B, C, D, E, F,
and H are conformable parameter vectors, and u is a normally distrib-
uted random error term with mean of zero.  Note that Equation 4.5 is
written to include concomitant variables, Z, that may have been corre-
lated with assignment to treatment and control groups.  In the models
estimated for all three experiments, the concomitant variables, Z, were
entered linearly and interacted with all subgroup dummies.16 
Equation 4.5 specifies a complete one-way interaction model—that
is, all first-order products of subgroup dummy variables, treatment
indicators, and concomitant variables with each other are included.
This model allows simultaneous estimation of all subgroup treatment
impacts, but imposes linear restrictions on those estimates.17
Table 4.6 displays the estimated bonus impacts on weeks of
insured unemployment, dollars of UI benefits received, and the UI
exhaustion rate for each of the 12 subgroups.  Inspection of these
results reveals one main finding: there is virtually no difference
between any pair of subgroups shown that is both statistically signifi-
138Table 4.6 Impacts of the Treatments on UI Receipt by Subgroupa
Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
Subgroup
Benefit 
weeks
$ of UI 
compensation
Exhaust. 
rate
Sample 
size
Benefit 
weeks
$ of UI 
compensation
Exhaust. 
rate
Sample 
size
Benefit 
weeks
$ of UI 
compensation
Exhaust. 
rate
Sample 
size
Males –0.94** 
(0.36)
–135** 
(55)
–0.029* 
(0.015)
4,519 –0.40 
(0.29)
–90* 
(49)
0.001 
(0.012)
7,237 –0.69** 
(0.28)
–98** 
(47)
–0.012 
(0.011)
 9,471
Females –1.37** 
(0.40)
–207** 
(61)
–0.029* 
(0.017)
3,619 –0.91** 
(0.36)
–123** 
(61)
–0.015 
(0.015)
4,845 0.06 
(0.35)
4
(51)
–0.018 
(0.014)
 6,063
Aged <35 yr. –1.18** 
(0.34)
–177** 
(51)
–0.031** 
(0.014)
5,045 –0.87** 
(0.30)
–136** 
(51)
–0.010 
(0.012)
6,682 –0.29 
(0.30)
–30
(47)
–0.012 
(0.012)
 8,169
 
Age 35 yr. 
and over
–1.04** 
(0.44)
–151** 
(66)
–0.026 
(0.018)
3,093 –0.29 
(0.32)
–63
(55)
0.000 
(0.014)
5,544 –0.52* 
(0.31)
–82* 
(49)
–0.017 
(0.012)
  7,365
Black –0.89* 
(0.53)
–197** 
(80)
–0.017 
(0.022)
2,122 –1.37** 
(0.63)
–202* 
(108)
–0.015 
(0.026)
1,412 –0.48 
(1.01)
45 
(160)
–0.011 
(0.040)
695
Non-black –1.21** 
(0.31)
–156** 
(47)
–0.033** 
(0.013)
6,016 –0.50** 
(0.23)
–90** 
(39)
–0.004 
(0.009)
10,670 –0.39* 
(0.21)
–59* 
(34)
–0.015* 
(0.008)
14,839
Manufacturing –0.74 
(0.53)
–134* 
(81)
–0.015 
(0.022)
2,084 –1.81**## 
(0.43)
–257**#
(74)
–0.027 
(0.018)
3,111 –0.71 
(0.45)
–104
(71)
0.000 
(0.016)
 3,505
Nonmanu-
facturing 
–1.26** 
(0.31)
–178** 
(47)
–0.034** 
(0.013)
6,054 –0.19 
(0.25)
–50 
(43)
0.002 
(0.010)
8,971 –0.31 
(0.24)
–40
(38)
–0.019** 
(0.009)
  12,029
Low unemploy-
ment
–1.33** 
(0.63)
–209** 
(96)
–0.040 
(0.026)
1,459 –1.05**# 
(0.33)
–167** 
(56)
–0.015 
(0.014)
5,332 –1.04** 
(0.37)
–203**## 
(58)
–0.048**## 
(0.015)
 5,328
Not low 
unemploy-
ment
–1.08** 
(0.29)
–158** 
(44)
–0.027** 
(0.012)
6,679 –0.25 
(0.29)
–52
(50)
0.002 
(0.012)
6,750
 
–0.06 
(0.26)
23 
(41)
0.003 
(0.010)
  10,206
139
Maximum 
WBA 
–1.34** 
(0.65)
–236** 
(99)
–0.032 
(0.027)
2,780 –1.03 
(0.70)
–195 
(120)
–0.010 
(0.029)
2,377 0.99* 
(0.53)
155* 
(83)
0.001 
(0.021)
 5,252
Not maximum 
WBA 
–1.02** 
(0.40)
–132** 
(62)
–0.027* 
(0.017)
5,358 –0.50* 
(0.27)
–81* 
(46)
–0.004 
(0.011)
9,849 1.11** 
(0.33)
–161**## 
(51)
–0.022* 
(0.013)
10,282
a Standard errors in parentheses.  *  = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level for a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95% con-
fidence level for a two-tailed test; # = statistically different from the complementary subgroup at the 90% confidence level for a two-tailed test; ## = sta-
tistically different from the complementary subgroup at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.
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cant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three
experiments.  The implication of this finding is quite striking.  The
reemployment bonus has a remarkably even impact on various sub-
groups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age, race, sector of
employment, local unemployment rate, or maximum WBA eligibility. 
The evidence suggests some differences that may be worth noting,
however.  For example, the evidence from Illinois and Pennsylvania
(but not from Washington) suggests that women may be slightly more
responsive than men to the reemployment bonus.  This is consistent
with research on female labor supply, which has found higher labor
supply elasticities for women than for men, meaning that women’s
attachment to the labor force is more flexible than men’s. 
Results from Illinois and Pennsylvania (but again not from Wash-
ington) also suggest that younger workers may be somewhat more
responsive than older workers to the reemployment bonus.  An expla-
nation for younger workers’ relatively larger response is similar to that
given for women—younger workers’ labor force attachment is more
flexible than older workers’.
There is no evidence to suggest that the reemployment bonus had a
different impact on African Americans compared to other racial or eth-
nic subgroups.  Impact estimation for each experiment was also done
using a further disaggregation by race and ethnicity.  The results sug-
gested that the response of blacks differed from the overall mean
response to a bonus offer by more than any other racial or ethnic sub-
group.  Yet, there were no significant differences between any of the
more finely defined groups.  In short, the impact of the reemployment
bonuses did not vary by race or ethnicity.
In Pennsylvania and Washington, claimants whose previous jobs
were in manufacturing had a stronger response to the bonus offer than
workers whose previous job was not in manufacturing, with the differ-
ence in impact across groups being statistically significant in Pennsyl-
vania.  It may be the case that claimants who had lost a job in
manufacturing tended to wait longer for recall, so that the bonus has
more possibility to alter search behavior.  However, this result is not
obtained in Illinois, where the impact was even slightly greater for
workers whose previous jobs were outside of manufacturing.  Overall,
there is no clear evidence for differential impacts across these sub-
groups.
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The results from both the Pennsylvania and Washington experi-
ments (although not from Illinois) suggest that UI claimants in low
unemployment areas tended to respond more strongly to the bonus than
did claimants in high unemployment areas.  We have defined low
unemployment as a 5 percent rate of total unemployment or lower,
since this is at or below the rate previously considered to be associated
with nonaccelerating inflation.18 
That the bonus response appears to be greater in areas of low
unemployment suggests that the bonus offer is more effective when
increased search effort is more likely to generate additional job offers.
This is an issue of labor demand and appeals to the notion that, in a
labor market in which job prospects are neither good nor improving,
the bonus impact can be expected to be low.  That the bonus was effec-
tive in Illinois, where the unemployment rate was relatively high on
average, may be a result of the improving labor market in northern Illi-
nois during the experiment.  We return to this issue in Chapter 6, which
addresses the problems of interpreting the implications of experimental
results for policy implementation.
It was expected that because the earnings replacement rate is rela-
tively higher for those below the WBA maximum, the initial intensity
of job search would be correspondingly low, and the reemployment
bonus would have a greater impact.  There is no evidence from the
three experiments that claimants below the maximum WBA responded
more strongly to the bonus than did claimants at the maximum WBA.
In fact, in the Pennsylvania experiment (where the greatest difference
in impact between the two groups occurred), those at the maximum
WBA reduced weeks of insured UI by twice as much as those below
the maximum.
SUMMARY
Field experiments were conducted in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
Washington in the 1980s to test the theory that the average duration of
insured unemployment could be shortened if cash reemployment
bonuses were offered to unemployment insurance beneficiaries.
Claimants who were randomly assigned to treatment were told they
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would be given a lump sum cash payment if they started a new job by a
certain date and stayed working full time for at least four months.  In
each of the three experiments, a randomly selected control group was
compared with the various treatment groups.  
While the first experiment, conducted in Illinois, yielded very
encouraging results, the subsequent field tests provided less support
for the bonus idea.  The relatively weak response to the bonus offer in
Pennsylvania and Washington led to a reexamination of the powerful
Illinois results.  It was discovered that within the designed experiment,
a second experiment had unintentionally taken place.  In 1984 as Illi-
nois was recovering from a major recession, the availability of Federal
Supplemental Compensation was terminated.  This resulted in about
half of the claimants studied having 38 weeks of UI benefit eligibility,
with the remainder being eligible for only 26 weeks of regular UI ben-
efits.  It turns out that the mean bonus response of –1.15 weeks in Illi-
nois was made up of a response of –1.78 weeks for those FSC-eligible
and –0.54 weeks for those FSC-ineligible.  The average response of
–0.54 for the FSC-ineligible sample in Illinois is close to the response
observed in Pennsylvania and Washington where the entitled duration
of benefits was also similar.
Among the individual treatments, the impact on weeks of UI bene-
fits ranged from –0.05 for the low bonus/short qualification offer in
Washington to –1.78 for the bonus offer to FSC-eligible claimants in
Illinois.  Impacts for Pennsylvania tended to fall between those for Illi-
nois and Washington.  Overall a cash bonus can be expected to mod-
estly shorten spells of insured unemployment—the mean effect of the
offers made in the three states yielded about a one-half week reduction
in weeks of UI benefits.  
Evidence from a sample created by pooling data from Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Washington indicated that either lengthening the
duration of the search period or increasing the bonus amount would
lead to a greater reduction in weeks of UI benefits collected.  Simula-
tions based on data pooled from the three experiments suggest that
offering a reemployment bonus with a $1,000 dollar amount, a 12-
week qualification period, and a four-month reemployment period
would result in an average reduction of 0.66 weeks of UI benefits. 
The degree of response to the bonus offer was also examined for
important subgroups within the sample.  Results from Pennsylvania
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and Washington suggest that UI claimants in low unemployment areas
and claimants whose prior employment was in manufacturing tended
to respond more strongly to the bonus.  However, close inspection of
subgroup results reveals one main finding: there is no difference
between any pair of subgroups shown that is both statistically signifi-
cant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three
experiments.  The implication of this finding is quite striking—the
reemployment bonus has a remarkably even impact on various sub-
groups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age, race, industrial
sector of employment, level of local unemployment, or level of the
weekly benefit amount.   
Notes
1. Decker and O’Leary (1992) used the continuous variables model to analyze
pooled Pennsylvania and Washington data.  A summary article on the pooled anal-
ysis is Decker and O’Leary (1995).
2. One week was added in the computation of the qualification period in Washington
to adjust for the presence of a waiting week.  The waiting week is the first week
after filing for benefits that a claimant would otherwise be eligible for compensa-
tion.  It does not reduce total entitlement but does postpone payment, thereby dis-
couraging casual entry into the system.  The Washington experiment added a
week to the qualification period because the treatments were intended to have
qualification periods which were 20 and 40 percent of the compensable period.
3. The New Jersey UI reemployment experiment tested a declining bonus.  A similar
treatment was tried as part of the Pennsylvania experiment, but it is not reported in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 because it is not comparable to other treatments in Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.  The impact of the Pennsylvania declining bonus
offer, which started at 6 × WBA and declined by 10 percent of the original amount
per week, had insignificant point estimate of a 0.2 weeks reduction in UI benefits. 
4. See Chapter 6, p. 199, for an explanation of why the FSC-eligible and FSC-ineli-
gible responses differ.
5. Netter and Wasserman (1974, Chapter 22) give a concise discussion of covariance
analysis.
6. The effect of centering around the mean is that the intercept takes the value of the
outcome measure for a hypothetical person in the sample who was not exposed to
the experimental treatment and whose exogenous characteristics are at the mean
value for each of the characteristics across the total sample (control and experi-
mental groups combined).  Therefore, the control group means reported in Table
4.2 are slightly different from the unadjusted values given in Table 4.1.  Control
group means may also differ because sample sizes differ due to missing data on
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concomitant variables for some observations.  The treatment effect is the impact
of the treatment on the outcome measure for that hypothetical individual. 
7. The appendix table (Table A4.1) presents complete regression results for each
experiment from a model of weeks of UI benefits with a single treatment indicator
and all concomitant variables.  The full final project reports are Corson et al.
(1992) for Pennsylvania, Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992) for Washington,
and Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987) for Illinois.
8. Because of the upper limit on dollars and weeks of UI compensation, a type of
censoring is at work.  Tobit models which explicitly accounted for censoring were
therefore estimated.  Tobit models yielded virtually the same results as the ordi-
nary least squares models and are therefore not reported.  Since the outcome in the
exhaustion equation is a zero/one binary variable, a probit model for exhaustion
was estimated.  Again the results were extremely close to those computed by ordi-
nary least squares. 
9. The concomitant variables included when computing the estimates reported in
Table 4.3 were gender, age, race, previous industry, the WBA, entitled maximum
duration of benefits, base period earnings, work-search exempt status, enrollment
site, and (for Pennsylvania) the quarter of enrollment into the experiment.
10. In Pennsylvania, 10.6 percent of 8,864 bonus offers were paid; in Washington,
14.6 percent of 12,452 offers were paid. 
11. The mean WBA for the treatment-assigned beneficiaries was $166 in Pennsylva-
nia and $154 in Washington.  
12. While the design of the Illinois experiment prevents formal testing of differences
in the parameters across all three samples, the “two-sigma rule” suggests the
response is unchanged by adding the Illinois data since the parameter estimates
are within twice the standard error of those estimated on the combined Pennsylva-
nia and Washington data alone.  Formal analysis of variance tests were performed
by separately removing Pennsylvania and Washington from the full sample of
data combined from the three experiments, and the parameter estimates were not
found to be statistically different in either case.  These tests also provide some jus-
tification for the exercise of estimating a bonus response surface on pooled data.
13. Estimation of a quadratic response surface for the pooled sample suggested that,
for low dollar bonus amounts or very long qualification periods, the bonus could
lead to increased UI benefit durations.  The quadratic model included the dollar
bonus amount, weeks in the qualification period, the bonus amount squared, the
qualification period squared, and the bonus amount multiplied by the qualification
period along with the concomitant variables included in the linear continuous
variables model.  Results from the quadratic model suggest that Figure 4.2 is an
appropriate representation of response when the bonus amount is in the range
$700 to $1,700 and the qualification period is between 5 and 12 weeks.  The qua-
dratic model suggests the minimum response occurs for a bonus amount of $700
with a 9.7-week qualification period.
14. More formally, the cumulative exit rate is computed by what Kiefer (1988)
referred to as an integrated hazard function.  In the present application, the hazard
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function yields conditional UI exit rates which are not examined here since they
are subject to selection bias resulting from response to the bonus offer by treat-
ment group members.  The cumulative hazard is not subject to such bias since the
base for computation, the initial risk pool, does not change between periods.  
15. The UI exit rates for the Illinois controls are roughly 50 to 70 percent of the UI
exit rates in Pennsylvania and roughly 40 to 60 percent of the UI exit rates in
Washington.
16. The concomitant variables, Z, included when performing subgroup impact estima-
tion were WBA, entitled duration of benefits, base period earnings, work-search
exemption status, an industry missing indicator, and five indicator variables for
the quarter of enrollment in Pennsylvania.
17. Treatment impacts for a particular subgroup were computed as the sum of the
parameter estimated on the product of the subgroup dummy variable and the treat-
ment indicator added to the sum of estimates of parameters on subgroup dummies
interacted with treatment indicators multiplied by their respective population
shares (i.e., the proportion of the population having that characteristic).  In each
computation, parameter estimates for the complement to the subgroup of interest
were omitted.  For example, expressing population shares as the expected value of
the subgroup dummy variables, E(G), the subgroup impacts would be computed
as ß + E(G)Ê, where ß and Ê are the least squares estimates of B and E from Equa-
tion 4.5.
18. Rosen and Quandt (1988, p. 54) estimated the nonaccelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU) as 5.6 percent over the period 1932 to 1983, using a dis-
equilibrium model of the aggregate labor market and setting the inflation rate at 5
percent. 
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Appendix
 
Definitions of variables in Appendix Table A4.1.  Site indicators differ
acrossthe experiments (see site definitions below).
 
 
Site 1 - Illinois, Springfield South; Pennsylvania, Coatesville; Washington, Auburn
Site 2 - Illinois, Springfield North; Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (North); Washington, 
Renton
Site 3 - Illinois, Danville; Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (Uptown); Washington, 
Lynnwood
Site 4 - Illinois, Kankakee; Pennsylvania, Reading; Washington, North Seattle
Site 5 - Illinois, Rockford East; Pennsylvania, Lewistown; Washington, Rainier
Site 6 - Illinois, Rockford West; Pennsylvania, Butler; Washington, Everett
Site 7 - Illinois, Peoria; Pennsylvania, Connellsville; Washington, Bellevue
Site 8 - Illinois, Moline; Pennsylvania, McKeesport; Washington, Bellingham
Site 9 - Illinois, Galesburg; Pennsylvania, Erie; Washington, Bremerton
Site 10 - Illinois, West Town; Pennsylvania, Pittston; Washington, 
Mt. Vernon
Site 11 - Illinois, Mt. Prospect; Pennsylvania, Scranton; Washington, Olympia
Site12 - Illinois, Waukegon; Pennsylvania, Lancaster; Washington, Lewis County
Site 13 - Illinois, Villa Park; Washington, Aberdeen
Site 14 - Illinois, Aurora; Washington, Cowlitz County
Site 15 - Illinois, Woodlawn; Washington, Spokane
Intercept constant term
Treatment dummy variable 1 if treatment assigned, else zero
WBA weekly benefit amount
Female dummy variable 1 if female, else zero
AGELT35 dummy variable 1 if less than 35 years, else zero
AGEGT54 dummy variable 1 if greater than 54 years, else zero
Black dummy variable 1 if Black, else zero
Hispanic dummy variable 1 if Hispanic, else zero
Other non-White dummy variable 1 if not White, Black or Hispanic, else zero
Entitled duration Illinois, dummy 1 if 26 weeks; Pennsylvania, dummy one if 
15 weeks; Washington number of weeks of UI entitlement
BPE base period earnings
Manufacturing dummy variable 1 if prior job in manufacturing, else zero
SIC missing dummy variable 1 if SIC code missing, else zero
Search exempt dummy variable 1 if search exempt, else zero
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Site 16 - Illinois, South Chicago; Washington, Moses Lake
Site 17 - Illinois, Chicago Heights; Washington, Wenatchee
Site 18 - Illinois, Bedford Park; Washington, Yakima
Site 19 - Illinois, Chicago Hotel and Restaurant workers; Washington, Sunnyside
Site 20 - Illinois, Chicago Professional and Sales workers; Washington, 
Tri-cities
Site 21 - Illinois, Ravenswood; Washington, Walla Walla
Site 22 - Illinois, Evergreen Park 
Site missing - Illinois
NQ1 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in third quarter 1988
NQ2 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in fourth quarter 1988
NQ3 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in first quarter 1989
NQ4 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in second quarter 1989
NQ5 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in third quarter 1989
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Table A4.1 Regression-Adjusted Treatment Impact Equations
 
Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
Variable
Parameter 
estimate
Std. 
error
Parameter 
estimate
Std. 
error
Parameter 
estimate
Std. 
error
Intercept 20.00** 0.19 14.91** 0.18 14.35** 0.19
Treatment –1.04** 0.26 –0.58** 0.21 –0.40* 0.21
WBA 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
Female 0.38 0.27 1.04** 0.21 1.41** 0.19
AGELT35 –2.00** 0.28 –1.52** 0.21 –1.91** 0.18
AGEGT54 — — 3.19** 0.34 1.27** 0.31
Black 3.96** 0.40 –1.90** 0.39 1.77** 0.45
Hispanic 1.86** 0.57 –1.57** 0.55 –0.09 0.40
Other non-White 0.82 0.93 –1.81 1.25 –0.34 0.40
Entitled duration –2.83** 0.27 –1.82** 0.91 0.15** 0.02
BPE 0.08** 0.02 –0.07** 0.01 –0.03** 0.01
Manufacturing 0.68** 0.32 –0.48** 0.23 –1.61** 0.21
SIC missing 1.19** 0.42 0.16 0.34 0.87 1.98
Search exempt — — –0.60* 0.31 –3.77** 0.22
Site 1 –2.46** 0.86 –1.15** 0.52 –1.99** 0.95
Site 2 –2.15** 0.88 1.36** 0.49 –2.44** 0.97
Site 3 2.35** 0.87 — — –3.80** 0.99
Site 4 0.04 0.95 –1.75** 0.51 –1.36 0.95
Site 5 –0.25 1.01 0.38 0.59 –0.90 0.92
Site 6 –0.74 0.94 1.00* 0.54 –2.06** 0.96
Site 7 0.55 0.78 1.85** 0.55 –2.79** 0.96
Site 8 0.14 0.82 1.12** 0.52 –1.45 1.01
Site 9 1.15 1.45 0.60 0.52 –0.30 1.04
Site 10 0.44 0.80 1.83** 0.58 –2.03** 1.00
Site 11 –5.78** 0.68 –0.10 0.52 –0.60 1.01
Site 12 –1.08 0.95 –2.38** 0.52 –3.01** 1.08
Site 13 –2.85** 0.79 — — –1.10 1.05
Site 14 –2.74** 0.84 — — –3.45** 1.06
Site 15 –0.69 0.70 — — –0.69 0.94
Site 16 –0.16 0.67 — — –2.92** 1.05
Site 17 0.37 0.78 — — –1.95** 0.99
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Table A4.1 (continued)
 
Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
Variable
Parameter 
estimate
Std. 
error
Parameter 
estimate
Std. 
error
Parameter 
estimate
Std. 
error
Site 18 0.40 0.71 — — –1.01 0.94
Site 19 2.30 3.41 — — –0.15 1.02
Site 20 0.02 0.70 — — –0.62 0.99
Site 21 –0.51 0.77 — — — —
Site missing 0.87 1.48 — — — —
NQ1 — — –2.13** 0.97 — —
NQ2 — — –1.44** 0.41 — —
NQ3 — — –1.98** 0.40 — —
NQ4 — — –1.80** 0.41 — —
NQ5 — — –1.49** 0.40 — —
Sample size 8,138 12,106 15,534
 
R
 
2
 
0.08 0.05 0.06
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5
Impacts on Employment 
and Earnings
 
Paul T. Decker
Christopher J. O’Leary
and
Stephen A. Woodbury
 
The findings presented in the previous chapter demonstrate that the
reemployment bonus offers in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washing-
ton bonus experiments generally reduced unemployment insurance
(UI) receipt.  Presumably, the reductions in UI receipt occurred
because the bonus offers induced claimants to return to work more
quickly than they would have in the absence of the bonus offer.  To
receive a bonus, claimants not only needed to stop receiving UI, they
also needed to prove that they held a job and that they held that job for
a minimum period of time.  We therefore expected, given the impacts
on UI receipt, to also observe an increase in employment and earnings
among claimants who received a bonus offer.  In this chapter, we exam-
ine employment and earnings during the year following claimants’
benefit applications to determine whether this impact occurred.
Although we expected the bonus offers to have positive impacts on
average earnings among all claimants, the reemployment incentives
generated by the bonus offers may have had potentially negative
impacts on the characteristics of new jobs held by claimants who found
a job.  Because the UI system provides financial assistance to claimants
who are looking for work, they can presumably be more selective in
taking a new job than they would be in the absence of UI.  Hence, UI
may lead claimants to spend more time unemployed because they are
searching for the best possible match between their skills and available
jobs.  The reemployment bonus creates an incentive to shorten search
time, however, which may cause claimants to be less selective in their
search, potentially resulting in a relatively less desirable match
between the claimant and the job.
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One way in which a less desirable job match might manifest itself
is through a lower rate of earnings on the subsequent job.  We therefore
extend our analysis of employment and earnings to examine the rate of
earnings among reemployed claimants and to test whether the bonus
offers, by promoting rapid reemployment, induced claimants to accept
lower-paying jobs.
Impacts of the bonus on the job match may also manifest them-
selves through changed rates of attachment to employers or to indus-
tries.  To speed reemployment, UI claimants who received a bonus
offer may have been more inclined to search for and accept jobs with
new employers or in different industries.  Greater employer or industry
switching might imply that job-specific or industry-specific human
capital possessed by claimants at their previous jobs was being aban-
doned to take advantage of the bonus offer.  If the specific human capi-
tal was still potentially productive, the abandonment of it would
represent a loss due to the reemployment bonus offer.  On the other
hand, if the specific human capital was no longer potentially produc-
tive, or if its potential productivity was not large enough to justify
longer unemployment spells, employer and industry switching may be
a benefit of the reemployment bonus offer.  This would be especially
true if claimants who switch employers or industries have more stable
employment in the long run than if they had not switched.  In this chap-
ter we test for the effects of the bonus offers on employer and industry
attachment by comparing the rates at which the treatment and control
groups returned to their previous employers or industries.
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
 
Our analysis of the impacts of the bonus offers on employment and
earnings is based on two quarterly measures drawn from UI wage
records: 1) whether claimants reported earnings and 2) the amount of
earnings received.  The state UI wage records also contain direct data
on employment for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments.
The Pennsylvania wage records report weeks of work in a quarter, and
the Washington wage records report hours of work in a quarter.  Using
these data, we constructed an employment indicator that specifies
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whether a claimant had either positive weeks of work in the quarter
(Pennsylvania) or positive hours of work (Washington).  Because the
Illinois records contain no direct employment data, we chose to use the
earnings indicator as a proxy for an employment indicator for most of
our analysis, so that we could investigate employment probabilities for
all three experiments.
For all three experiments, we have a full set of wage records data
on claimant earnings for the three calendar quarters following the
claimants’ entry into the UI system.
 
1
 
  We also examined data for the
quarter in which claimants filed their initial UI claims.  Although earn-
ings data for this quarter partly reflect claimants’ experience with pre-
UI employers, random assignment implies that pre-UI earnings during
this quarter should not vary significantly across treatment groups
within each demonstration.  Hence, any significant cross-group differ-
ences in earnings in the quarter of benefit application should be attrib-
utable to the impact of the treatment on postapplication earnings.  We
can also control for any remaining cross-group differences in pre-UI
earnings by controlling for base period earnings in our regression esti-
mates.
UI wage records were used because these data were available for
all three experiments.
 
2
 
  Although we believe that UI wage records are a
useful source of earnings data, they do have some shortcomings for our
analysis.  One important deficiency is that they are organized by calen-
dar quarter and thus cannot be used to isolate the impacts that occurred
immediately after the benefit application date.  This inflexibility may
be an important constraint, because previous studies of a reemploy-
ment bonus in the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration
Project showed that the impact of the bonus offer occurred soon after
the benefit application date (see Corson et al. 1989; Corson and Decker
1990).   In the present analysis, we attempt to address this shortcoming
by reporting estimates for the quarter in which claimants applied for
benefits, which encompasses the period immediately after the benefit
application date.
Another shortcoming is that a variety of factors may have affected
the accuracy of the wage records data.  For example, the wage records
exclude the earnings of claimants who were employed outside the state
or outside the UI-covered sectors (such as those who were self-
employed).  Because our analysis of earnings would include such indi-
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viduals as if their earnings were zero, the impact estimates would be
biased toward zero.  Furthermore, the UI wage records report earnings
when they are received, not when they are earned.  Claimants may have
received severance pay or pension payouts from their pre-UI employer
after they applied for UI benefits.  These payments could be misinter-
preted as earnings from a post-UI job, overstating the earnings received
by claimants following their benefit application date.
 
3
 
 
We attempted to minimize the effect of potential shortcomings of
the wage records data by excluding extreme outliers—claimants whose
earnings were greater than $100,000 in any quarter of observation.
This restriction was intended to exclude high values that are caused by
severance payments or pension payouts.  The outliers may also be
caused by coding errors in the wage records.  The restriction on earn-
ings values affected the Washington data much more than the Illinois or
Pennsylvania data.  In Washington, 66 observations were excluded
from the data set because of this earnings restriction, compared with
only one observation each in Illinois and Pennsylvania.
 
4
 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS AMONG 
CONTROL GROUP MEMBERS
 
In the absence of the reemployment bonus, the control group
claimants in Washington had the highest employment rates after their
initial UI claims, followed by the Pennsylvania claimants and then the
Illinois claimants.  Because we had no direct employment information
on the Illinois claimants, we used the presence of individual earnings
during a period as a proxy for employment during the period.  The use
of earnings as a proxy for employment allows us to calculate employ-
ment rates for each experiment (Table 5.1).  The Washington control
group members were employed more than the Pennsylvania control
group members, who in turn were employed more than the Illinois con-
trol group members throughout the observation period.  We also
present the direct employment indicators for Washington and Pennsyl-
vania in Table 5.1.  They are consistent with the proxy measure in dem-
onstrating that the Washington control group tended to have higher
employment rates than the Pennsylvania control group.
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Table 5.1 Mean Employment and Earnings among Control Groups
 
a
 
The Washington control group members also had higher earnings
than the Illinois and Pennsylvania control group members.  Over the
four-quarter observation period, Washington control group members
earned an average of about $12,000, compared with $9,300 earned by
the Pennsylvania control group members and $7,400 earned by the Illi-
nois control group members.
 Two factors help to explain the differential earnings of the control
groups in the three demonstrations.  First, on average, the Washington
claimants were more highly paid than the Pennsylvania claimants prior
to their respective layoffs, and the Pennsylvania claimants were more
highly paid than the Illinois claimants (Table 2.5 in Chapter 2).
 
5
 
  We
 
Period of observation
Quarter
 
b
 
Total (all 
four 
quarters)
of initial 
UI claim 1 2 3
Sample 
size
Claimants with reported 
employment (%)
Illinois ND
 
c
 
ND ND ND ND
Pennsylvania 84.1 59.0 67.3 70.6 3,353
Washington 81.7 65.9 70.5 72.0 3,082
Claimants with 
reported earnings (%)
Illinois 86.0 53.7 56.0 61.9 3,866
Pennsylvania 88.1 63.4 71.1 74.4 3,392
Washington 88.6 71.5 76.2 77.3 3,064
Earnings ($)
 
d
 
Illinois 2,446 1,231 1,676 2,070 7,422 3,866
Pennsylvania 2,648 1,711 2,357 2,606 9,322 3,392
Washington 3,057 2,613 3,120 3,269 12,059 3,064
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
 
a
 
The sample means presented in this table are not regression adjusted.
 
b
 
Quarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after the UI
claim.
 
c
 
ND = no data available.
 
d
 
Excludes observations with earnings greater than $100,000 in any quarter.
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would expect that this difference in earnings would continue to exist as
claimants become reemployed, since the difference in base period
earnings at least partly reflects inherent differences in characteristics
(such as differences in skill levels) between the claimants in the differ-
ent states.  Second, Washington claimants appear to have become
reemployed more quickly than the Pennsylvania or Illinois claimants.
As shown in Table 5.1, the rate of employment for the three quarters
following the initial claim was highest for Washington claimants and
lowest for Illinois claimants.
 
6
 
  Since unemployed claimants received
zero earnings, the relatively low employment rates for the Pennsylva-
nia and Illinois claimants contributed to the relatively low earnings lev-
els experienced by these claimants.
 
ESTIMATED IMPACTS ON EMPLOYMENT 
AND EARNINGS
 
Estimates based on data from the UI wage records provide only
weak evidence that the bonus offers enhanced the employment of
claimants following their initial claim.  The clearest evidence of posi-
tive employment impacts can be seen for Illinois (Table 5.2).  The esti-
mated impact of the Illinois bonus offer on the probability of
employment is positive in each of the four quarters of observation.  The
impact is largest and statistically significant in quarter 2 (the second
full calendar quarter after the initial claim)—the bonus offer increased
the probability of employment by 3.9 percentage points, or by 7.0 per-
cent of the control group employment rate (56 percent) shown in Table
5.1.  The finding that the Illinois experiment had the clearest and larg-
est employment impacts is consistent with the findings on UI receipt
presented in the previous chapter, which showed that the Illinois exper-
iment had the largest impact on UI receipt.
The estimated impacts of the Pennsylvania and Washington bonus
offers on employment provide no strong evidence that the bonus offers
increased the probability of employment in those two states.  In Penn-
sylvania, only about half of the estimated impacts on the probability of
employment have a positive sign, and none of the impacts is signifi-
cantly greater than zero.  The combined impacts of the Pennsylvania
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Table 5.2 Estimated Impacts of the Bonus Offers on Probability of 
Employment
 
a,b
 
 
 
(percentage points)
 
 Quarter
 
c
 
Treatment
Bonus amt./
duration
 of initial 
UI claim 1   2  3
Illinois
IT $500/11 weeks 0.8
(0.7)
1.6
(1.1)
3.9***
(1.1)
2.1
(1.1)
Impact (as % of 
control group mean)
 
d
 
0.9 3.0 7.0 3.4
Pennsylvania
PT1 3 
 
×
 
 WBA
 
e
 
/ 
6 weeks
–1.2 
(1.0)
–2.2 
(1.5)
–1.4 
(1.4)
–3.8*** 
(1.4)
PT2 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/
 6 weeks
–0.4 
(0.9)
1.0 
(1.4)
0.7 
(1.3)
0.7 
(1.2)
PT3 3 
 
×
 
 WBA/ 
12 weeks
0.5 
(0.9)
1.0
 (1.3)
–0.7 
(1.2)
–2.4** 
(1.1)
PT4 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/ 
12 weeks
–0.9 
(0.8)
0.6 
(1.2)
0.6 
(1.1)
–0.7 
(1.1)
Combined
treatments
–0.4 
(0.7)
0.4 
(1.0)
0.0 
(0.9)
–1.4 
(0.9)
Impact of combined 
treatments (as % of 
control group mean)
 
d
 
–0.5 0.6 0.0 –1.9
Washington
WT1 2 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI duration) 
+ 1 week
–0.9 
(0.9)
–0.9 
(1.2)
–2.9**
(1.2)
–0.7
(1.1)
WT2 4 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI duration) 
+ 1 week
–1.3 
(0.9)
–1.5 
(1.2)
–2.0*
(1.2)
–0.9 
(1.1)
WT3 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI duration) 
+ 1 week
–0.5 
(1.0)
0.2 
(1.4)
–1.1 
(1.3)
2.0 
(1.3)
WT4 2 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI duration) 
+ 1 week
–0.6
 (0.9)
0.3 
(1.2)
–0.9 
(1.2)
–0.4 
(1.1)
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Table 5.2 (continued)
 
 Quarter
 
c
 
Treatment
Bonus amt./
duration
 of initial 
UI claim 1   2  3
WT5 4 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI duration) 
+ 1 week
–0.3
 (0.9)
0.2 
(1.2)
–0.2 
(1.2)
0.1 
(1.1)
WT6 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI duration) 
+ 1 week
–0.7 
(1.0)
1.9
 (1.4)
0.6 
(1.3)
1.1 
(1.3)
Combined
treatments
–0.7
 (0.6)
–0.1 
(0.9)
–0.9 
(0.8)
0.0
 (0.8)
Impact of combined 
treatments (as % of 
control group mean)
 
d
 
–0.8 –0.1 –1.2 0.0
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
 
a
 
Individuals are treated as being employed in a quarter if the wage records contain
earnings data in that quarter.  The estimates are based on regressions that include
treatment indicators and other explanatory variables to control for claimant character-
istics, UI benefit parameters, and local factors. 
 
b
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; *** = statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level in a two-tailed test.
 
c
 
Quarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after the ini-
tial UI claim.
 
d
 
See Table 5.1.
 
e
 
WBA = weekly UI benefit amount.
 
treatments demonstrate that the treatment group members had about
the same probability of employment as did the control group members
in each of the quarters.  In Washington, the majority of the estimated
impacts are negative, and none is significantly greater than zero.  The
combined impacts of the Washington treatments show that treatment
group members and control group members had similar average earn-
ings in each of the quarters.
 The evidence on whether the bonus offers increased earnings is
also mixed (Table 5.3).  In Illinois, the bonus offer clearly caused a
short-term increase in earnings.  Over the full four-quarter observation
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Table 5.3 Estimated Impacts of the Bonus Offers on Earnings
 
a,b
 
 
 
($)
 
Bonus amt./ 
duration
Quarter
 
c
 
Total,
 all four 
quartersTreatment
of initial 
UI claim 1 2 3
Illinois
IT $500/
11 weeks
–6 
(57)
 132*** 
(48)
  120** 
(49)
5 
(55)
   250* 
(148)
Impact (as % of 
control group 
mean)
 
d
 
–0.2 10.7 7.2 0.2 3.4
Pennsylvania
PT1 3 
 
×
 
 WBA/
6 weeks
–11 
(100)
8 
(84)
–77 
(78)
–188** 
(82)
–269 
(235)
PT2 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/
6 weeks
–14 
(89)
113 
(75)
–18 
(70)
52 
(73)
133 
(211)
PT3 3 
 
×
 
 WBA/
12 weeks
105 
(83)
81 
(70)
–15 
(65)
–5 
(68)
166 
(195)
PT4 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/
12 weeks
–28 
(78)
73 
(66)
77 
(62)
53
 (64)
175 
(185)
Combined 
treatments
15 
(63)
74 
(53)
6
 (50)
–2 
(52)
93 
(149)
Impact of 
combined 
treatments (as 
% of control 
group mean)
 
d
 
0.6 4.3 0.2 –0.1 1.0
Washington
WT1 2 
 
×
 
 WBA/
(0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 
1 week
19 
(91)
–213** 
(95)
–58 
(93)
13 
(93)
–239 
(257)
WT2 4 
 
×
 
 WBA/
(0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 
1 week
–25 
(90)
–93 
(94)
–133 
(92)
110
 (92)
–141 
(254)
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Table 5.3 (continued)
 
Bonus amt./ 
duration
Quarter
 
c
 
Total,
 all four 
quartersTreatment
of initial 
UI claim 1 2 3
WT3 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/
(0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 
1 week
–35 
(101)
23
 (106)
–18 
(104)
184* 
(104)
155 
(287)
WT4 2 
 
×
 
 WBA/
(0.4 
 
×
 
  UI 
duration) + 
1 week
–73 
(89)
4 
(93)
–132 
(92)
4 
(92)
–197 
(253)
WT5 4 
 
×
 
 WBA/
(0.4 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 
1 week
–80 
(90)
–82
 (94)
–66 
(92)
36 
(92)
–193 
(254)
WT6 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/
(0.4 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 
1 week
–124 
(102)
57 
(107)
165 
(105)
199* 
(105)
296 
(290)
Combined
treatments
–50 
(66)
–61
 (69)
–55 
(68)
79
 (68)
–88 
(187) 
Impact of 
combined
treatments (as 
% of control 
group mean)
 
d
 
1.6 –2.3 –1.7 2.4 –0.7
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
 
a
 
The estimates are based on regressions that include treatment indicators and other
explanatory variables to control for claimant characteristics, UI benefit parameters,
and local factors.  We excluded observations with earnings greater than $100,000 in
any quarter. 
 
b
 
Standard errors in parentheses.   * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; *** = statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level in a two-tailed test.
 
c
 
Quarters, 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after the ini-
tial UI claim.
 
d
 
See Table 5.1.
 
e
 
WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
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period, the treatment group members earned $250, or 3.4 percent, more
than control group members.  This difference is statistically significant
at the 90 percent confidence level.  The increase in earnings occurred
primarily in quarters 1 and 2.  The quarterly impact estimates represent
an 11 percent increase in earnings in quarter 1 and a 7 percent increase
in quarter 2.  Both of these quarterly estimates are significant at the 95
percent confidence level.
The magnitude and timing of the estimated earnings impacts in
Illinois are consistent with the findings on UI receipt from the Illinois
experiment.  With respect to the magnitude of the impacts, we demon-
strated in Chapter 4 (Table 4.2) that the Illinois bonus offer reduced
average UI receipt by 1.04 weeks.  If we use this impact to derive an
expected impact on earnings based on the assumption that the 1.04-
week reduction in UI receipt translates directly into a 1.04-week
increase in employment, we find an expected impact on earnings of
$258.
 
7
 
  Our estimated impact for the full four-quarter observation
period, $250, is similar to this expected impact.  With respect to the
timing of the impacts, the large and significant earnings impact in the
second quarter after the initial UI claim implies that the bonus reduced
unemployment among sample members who would have otherwise
stayed unemployed into the second quarter.  Hence, the Illinois bonus
had at least some effect on claimants who faced substantial (up to 6
months) unemployment spells.  This finding is consistent with the sig-
nificant reduction in the rate of benefit exhaustion caused by the Illi-
nois bonus offer, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.
 
8
 
The estimates for the Pennsylvania experiment are more modest
than the Illinois estimates and are not statistically significant in most
cases.  All but one of the Pennsylvania bonus offers (the low bonus/
short qualification treatment) have a positive estimated impact on earn-
ings over the four-quarter observation period, but none of the estimates
is statistically significant.  The estimated impact of all of the treatments
combined was to increase earnings by an average of $93, or 1.0 per-
cent, per claimant, but this combined effect is also not statistically sig-
nificant.
Despite the lack of consistently significant findings for earnings
impacts, the estimated Pennsylvania impacts are consistent with the
estimated impacts of the Pennsylvania treatments on UI receipt that
were discussed in Chapter 4.  Specifically, the magnitude of the esti-
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mated earnings impacts are similar to what one would expect based on
the magnitude of the estimated UI impacts.  For example, assuming
that the 0.58-week reduction in UI receipt for the combined Pennsylva-
nia treatments translates directly into a 0.58-week increase in employ-
ment, the expected impact of the combined treatments on earnings is
$158 (0.58 times average pre-UI weekly earnings for the control group
of $272).  This expected impact is within the 95 percent confidence
interval (approximately –$199 to $385) of the estimated combined
treatment impact for Pennsylvania discussed above.
The comparison of the estimated UI impacts and the estimated
earnings impacts demonstrates the difficulty in estimating earnings
impacts for the bonus experiments.  Although the Pennsylvania sample
was large and the estimates relatively precise, the estimates are not pre-
cise enough to detect the modest earnings impact that would be consis-
tent with the UI impacts.  Given the standard errors in Table 5.3, the
impact of the combined Pennsylvania treatments would need to be
equal to about $250 per claimant to be statistically significant at the 90
percent confidence level, considerably higher than the $158 impact that
is predicted based on the estimated UI impact as described above.
The Washington findings provide no evidence that the Washington
bonus offers increased the earnings of claimants.  Over the entire
observation period, the treatment group members in Washington
earned $88 less than did the control group members, as shown in Table
5.3.  The estimated impacts of individual treatments on earnings were
generally modest, both in each quarter and over the entire observation
period, and many of these estimated impacts were negative rather than
positive.  The impacts of the most generous bonus offers on earnings
are more positive than the impacts of the less generous bonus offers,
which is consistent with the estimated impacts on UI receipt.   How-
ever, none of the estimated impacts of the individual treatments on
earnings is statistically significant.
The lack of consistently positive impacts on earnings of the Wash-
ington treatments is probably not surprising given that the estimated
impacts of the Washington treatments on UI receipt are small, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.  As in the case of the Pennsylvania estimates, even
though the Washington sample is large and our earnings estimates are
relatively precise, the estimates shown in Table 5.3 are not precise
enough to detect the small earnings impacts that would be consistent
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with the small estimated UI impacts.  If we generated expected earn-
ings impacts based on the estimated UI impacts, these expected
impacts would fall within the 95 percent confidence intervals around
the actual impact estimates.  For example, using the same method as
we used for Pennsylvania, we generate an expected earnings impact for
the combined Washington treatments of $119.
 
9
 
  This expected impact is
well within the 95 percent confidence interval (approximately –$455 to
$279) of the estimated combined treatment impact on earnings in
Washington (the –$88 impact described in the previous paragraph).
The presence of errors in the Washington data, as demonstrated by the
large number of extreme outliers, also makes it difficult to use the wage
records data to detect impacts on earnings.
 
IMPACTS ON WAGES
 
Claimants may respond to a reemployment bonus offer by intensi-
fying their job search so that they find a new job quickly enough to
receive the bonus.  Alternatively, a claimant may attempt to speed
reemployment not by intensifying the job search but by relaxing stan-
dards for acceptable job offers.  That is, claimants may, in an effort to
receive a bonus, accept jobs that do not quite match their skills or do
not offer the wages or benefits that they would command in the absence
of the bonus offer.  If such an effect were to occur, it should be consid-
ered a potential cost of the bonus offer since claimants would be
matched to jobs in which they are potentially less productive.
Consider the possibility that claimants sacrifice wages in order to
hasten reemployment and qualify for the bonus.  Such an effect would
have negative long-run consequences if it led to a decrease in lifetime
earnings compared to what would occur in the absence of the bonus.
In this section, we attempt to determine whether the bonus offers
decreased wages at reemployment.  We examine the sample of all
claimants who reported earnings in two consecutive calendar quarters
after their initial UI claim.  This approach is intended to focus our anal-
ysis on a sample of claimants who found reemployment.  We used this
sample of reemployed claimants to estimate the impacts of the treat-
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ments on quarterly wages in the second quarter, or first full quarter, of
employment after the initial UI claim.
In all three experiments, the reemployed treatment group members
had quarterly wages that were similar to the earnings of reemployed
control group members, suggesting that claimants who received a
bonus offer did not sacrifice wages to become reemployed quickly.
The estimated impacts of the combined treatments on wages based on
the differences of means (model 1 in Table 5.4) are modestly positive
but not statistically significant in the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments.  The estimate for the Illinois experiment is negative, but it
is also small and statistically insignificant.
Because the reemployed claimants are not a random sample of all
claimants, the differences in wages between the reemployed treatment
group members and the reemployed control group members do not
necessarily provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of the bonus
offers on wages.  The impact estimates in model 1 of Table 5.4 may
therefore be subject to selection bias because the wage equations can
be estimated only with reemployed claimants.  Selection bias occurs in
the treatment/control comparisons if the reemployed claimants in the
treatment group were either a more or less “select” group than the
reemployed claimants in the control group, who became reemployed in
the absence of the bonus offer.  If the bonus offers induced relatively
high-wage workers to become reemployed more quickly, the difference
in wages between the treatment and control groups would represent an
upwardly biased estimate of the impact of the treatments on wages.  On
the other hand, if the bonus offers induced relatively low-wage workers
to become reemployed more quickly, the difference in wages between
the groups would represent a downward biased estimate of the impact
of the treatments on wages.
 To control for the inherent differences between the reemployed
treatment group members and the reemployed control group members,
we estimated two additional wage models.  The first of these models
(model 2 in Table 5.4) includes additional explanatory variables to con-
trol for race, gender, age, weekly benefit amount (WBA), and base
period earnings.  The second of these models (model 3 in Table 5.4) is
similar to model 2, but the dependent variable is defined as the differ-
ence between post- and pre-layoff quarterly earnings.
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Table 5.4 Estimated Impacts of the Bonus Offers on Earnings among 
Reemployed Claimants
 
a
 
 ($
 
)
 
Bonus amt./
duration
Model
 
b
 
Treatment 1 2 3
Illinois
IT $500/11 weeks –18.0 
(73.0)
8.0 
(65.0)
37.0 
(65.0)
Control group mean 
of depend. variable 3,326 3,326 69
Sample size 4,441 4,441 4,441
Pennsylvania
PT1 3 
 
×
 
 WBA
 
c
 
/6 weeks 7.0 
(104.0)
–39 .0 
(81.0)
–43.0 
(86.0)
PT2 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/6 weeks 28.0 
(92.0)
–40.0 
(72.0)
–7.0 
(76.0)
PT3 3 
 
×
 
 WBA/12 weeks 130.0 
(86.0)
28.0 
(67.0)
–9.0 
(71.0)
PT4 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/12 weeks 162.0 **
 
b
 
 
(80.0 
52.0 
(63.0)
40.0 
(66.0)
Combined treatments 100.0 
(66.0)
11 .0 
(51.0)
3.0 
(54.0)
Control group mean 3,560 3,560 114
Sample size 8,442 8,442 8,442
Washington
WT1 2 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1 week
109.0 
(119.0)
71.0 
(100.0)
48.0 
(104.0)
WT2 4 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1 week
66.0 
(117.0)
8.0 
(99.0)
–6.0 
(102.0)
WT3 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.2 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1 week
–33.0 
(131.0)
–6.0 
(110.0)
23.0 
(114.0)
WT4 2 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1 week
–8.0 
(116.0)
–114.0 
 (98.0)
–107.0 
(101.0)
WT5 4 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1 week
–39.0 
(116.0)
–95.0 
(98.0)
–116.0 
(106.0)
WT6 6 
 
×
 
 WBA/ (0.4 
 
×
 
 UI 
duration) + 1 week
221.0 * 
(132.0)
90.0 
(111.0)
73.0 
(115.0)
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Table 5.4 (continued)
 
Bonus amt./ 
duration
Model
 
b
 
Treatment 1 2 3
Combined treatments 46.0 
(86.0)
–15.0 
(72.0)
–23.0 
(75.0)
Control group mean 4,281 4,281 454
Sample size 11,454 11,454 11,454
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
 
a
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test.
 
b
 
Model 1 uses earnings in the second quarter of earnings after the initial UI claim as
the dependent variable and treatment indicators as explanatory variables.  Model 2 is
identical to model 1, but adds additional explanatory variables to control for race,
gender, age, base period earnings, and WBA.  Model 3 uses the change in quarterly
earnings between the base period before the layoff and the second quarter of earnings
receipt after the layoff as the dependent variable.
 
c
 
WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
 
Based on these alternative models, it appears that claimants who
received a bonus offer did not accept lower wages, on average, to
become reemployed more quickly.  The estimated impacts of the com-
bined treatments are negative in Pennsylvania and Washington, but the
estimates are small and statistically insignificant.  The estimated
impact of the combined Pennsylvania treatments is either positive or
negative, depending on the model, but the estimates are consistently
small and statistically insignificant.
 
IMPACTS ON EMPLOYER AND INDUSTRY ATTACHMENT
 
The bonus offers may have affected the probability that claimants
returned to their previous employer.  Claimants who had the opportu-
nity to receive a reemployment bonus may have foregone the chance of
returning to their previous employer in an effort to become reemployed
within the qualification period.  In addition, the Washington and Penn-
sylvania experiments paid bonuses only to reemployed claimants who
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were not recalled to their old jobs.10   This restriction provided an addi-
tional incentive to break any existing employer attachment.
Evidence from the experiments suggests that the bonus offers gen-
erally reduced the probability of returning to the previous employer.11
Table 5.5 contains the estimated impacts on probability of recall based
on two alternative models: model 1 is based on simple comparisons of
reemployed treatment and control group members, while model 2 con-
trols for other factors, including race, gender, age, previous industry,
base period earnings, WBA, potential benefit duration, recall expecta-
tions, and local office.  Approximately 40 percent of reemployed
claimants in the control group in any of the states had returned to their
previous employer.  Surprisingly, the findings presented in Table 5.5
suggest that the Illinois bonus offer had a larger impact on the proba-
bility of returning to the previous employer than the combined Wash-
ington or Pennsylvania bonus offers.  This finding is surprising because
the Illinois experiment was the only one of the three experiments that
did not have an explicit restriction on bonus payments to claimants
who returned to their previous job.12  Despite this factor, the estimated
impact of the Illinois bonus was to decrease the probability of recall by
an estimated 3 or 4 percentage points, significant at the 95 percent con-
fidence level (model 2 in Table 5.5).
The estimated impact in Pennsylvania was smaller—the combined
treatments reduced the probability of returning to the previous
employer by 1.6 percentage points—and not statistically significant.
Among the individual Pennsylvania treatments, the high bonus (6  ×
WBA) treatments had the largest estimated impacts on employer
attachment (all significant at the 90 or 95 percent confidence level).
Hence, in Pennsylvania the more generous bonus offers appear to have
induced some claimants to take new jobs rather than wait to be recalled
to their previous employer.  The estimated impact of the combined
treatments in Washington was similar to the Pennsylvania impact and
was statistically insignificant in both models.13,14 
The bonus offers may induce claimants to not only find jobs with
new employers but also find jobs in new industries.  Such an impact
would occur if the financial incentive inherent in the bonus offer led
claimants to search for jobs in other industries more intensively or
accept jobs in other industries more readily than they would in the
absence of the bonus offer.  Industry codes were available to investigate
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Table 5.5 Estimated Impacts on the Probability
of Return to Previous Employera (percentage points)
Treatment
  Bonus amt./
duration
 Model
1 2
Illinois
IT $500/11 weeks –4.0***
(1.3)
–3.9**
(1.3)
Control group mean 39.9 39.9
Pennsylvania
PT1 3 × WBAc/6 weeks 0.0
(1.8)
0.4
(1.7)
PT2 6 × WBA/6 weeks –2.7*
(1.6)
–2.6*
(1.5)
PT3 3 × WBA/12 weeks –0.4
(1.5)
0.1
(1.4)
PT4 6 × WBA/12 weeks –2.5*
(1.4)
–2.7* 
(1.3)
Combined treatments –1.6
(1.1)
–1.4
(1.0)
Control group mean 41.4 41.4
Washington
WT1 2 × WBA/ (0.2 × UI 
duration) + 1 week
–1. 6
(1.5)
–1.0
(1.4)
WT2 4 × WBA/ (0.2 × UI 
duration) + 1 week
–3.6**
(1.5)
–2.6* 
(1.4)
WT3 6 × WBA/ (0.2 × UI 
duration) + 1 week
1.8 
(1.7)
2.9* 
(1.5)
WT4 2 × WBA/ (0.4 × UI 
duration) + 1 week
0.9 
(1.5)
1.5 
(1.4)
WT5 4 × WBA/ (0.4 × UI 
duration) + 1 week
–2.3 
(1.5)
–1.4 
(1.4)
WT6 6 × WBA/ (0.4 × UI 
duration) + 1 week
–1.9
 (1.7)
–1.6 
(1.6)
Combined treatments –1.2 
(1.1)
–0.5 
(1.0)
Control group mean 40.2 40.2
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Table 5.5 (continued)
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; *** = statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level in a two-tailed test.
b All estimates are based on linear probability models.  Model 1 includes only treat-
ment indicators as explanatory variables.  Model 2 includes treatment indicators and
other variables to control for race, gender, age, base period earnings, and WBA.
c WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
this issue in the Illinois and Washington experiments.  These codes
were derived from the employer identification numbers from the wage
records and UI administrative records.15  We based our investigation on
the two-digit level of industrial classification.
Findings from the Illinois and Washington experiments provide
generally weak evidence that the bonus offers may have reduced the
probability that claimants returned to their previous industry.  About
half of the control group members in either experiment returned to
their previous industry, with the rate being somewhat higher in Wash-
ington.  The impacts of the Illinois treatment and the combined Wash-
ington treatments on the probability of returning to the previous
industry were small and negative (Table 5.6).  In model 2, which
adjusts for individual characteristics, the Illinois treatment reduced the
probability of return to industry by an estimated 1.7 percentage points,
and the combined Washington treatments reduced the probability of
return by 1.0 percentage point.  Neither of these estimates, however, is
significant at conventional confidence levels.   Two of the individual
Washington treatments, WT2 and WT5 (Table 5.6), had significant
impacts on the probability of return, but neither of these treatments is
the most generous treatments in Washington, and neither has a signifi-
cant impact on duration of UI receipt (Chapter 4).  Hence, these data
provide only weak evidence that claimants reduced their UI duration
and received a bonus by increasing their industrial mobility slightly.
 Whether the decreased employer and industry attachment that may
be attributable to the bonus experiments would be considered undesir-
able is unclear.  The effect is undesirable only if claimants, in their
effort to receive the bonus, were so shortsighted in their reemployment
decisions that they lost lifetime earnings by taking jobs that did not
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Table 5.6 Estimated Impacts on the Probability of Return to Previous 
Two-Digit Industrya (percentage points)
Treatment
 Bonus amount/ 
duration
 Model
1 2
Illinois
IT $500/11 weeks –2.2* 
(1.4)
–1.7 
(1.3)
Control group mean 51.9 51.9
Washington
WT1 2 × WBA/6 weeks –0.7 
(1.5)
–0.2 
(1.5)
WT2 4 × WBA/6 weeks –3.2** 
(1.5)
–2.6* 
(1.4)
WT3 6 × WBA/6 weeks –0.2
 (1.7)
0.5
 (1.6)
WT4 2 × WBA/12 weeks –0.2
 (1.5)
–0.1 
(1.4)
WT5 4 × WBA/12 weeks –3.1** 
(1.5)
–2.4* 
(1.4)
WT6 6 × WBA/12 weeks –1.1 
(1.7)
–0.8
 (1.6)
Combined
treatments
–1.5 
(1.1)
–1.0
 (1.0)
Control group mean 56.4 56.4
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in a
two-tailed test.
b All estimates are based on linear probability models.  Model 1 includes only treat-
ment indicators as explanatory variables.  Model 2 includes treatment indicators and
other variables to control for race, gender, age, base period earnings, and WBA.
c WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
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reward the employer- or industry-specific capital accumulated on their
previous jobs.  Presumably, rational claimants would only switch
employers or industries to receive the bonus if the amount of the bonus
compensated for any loss in lifetime earnings inherent in the switch.
CONCLUSION
Although the evidence is somewhat mixed, the three reemploy-
ment bonus experiments generally appear to have increased employ-
ment and earnings modestly.  The clearest impacts on employment and
earnings occurred in Illinois, where the $500 bonus offer increased
earnings by an average of $250, or 3.4 percent, per claimant over the
year following the initial UI claim.  This finding is not surprising given
that the Illinois experiment also had substantial impacts on UI receipt.
The employment and earnings impacts in Pennsylvania were smaller
than in Illinois and not statistically significant.  Finally, the estimated
earnings impacts in Washington were not consistently positive,
although the estimated impacts of the most generous bonus offers were
more positive than the impacts of the less generous offers.
Overall, the findings with respect to employment and earnings are
consistent with the impacts on UI receipt presented in Chapter 4.  The
estimated employment and earnings impacts were modest, as would be
expected given the modest impacts on UI receipt.  In addition, the
experiment with the largest impact on UI receipt (Illinois) also had the
largest impacts on employment and earnings, while the experiment
with the smallest impact on UI receipt (Washington) had the smallest
impacts on employment and earnings.
We found no evidence that claimants responded to the bonus offers
by sacrificing wages to speed their reemployment.  In all three experi-
ments, the reemployed treatment group members and the reemployed
control group members had similar wages on their new jobs, other
things being equal.
 Finally, some claimants appear to have broken attachments with
previous employers or industries to speed their reemployment.  The
clearest effects on employer and industrial mobility occurred in Illi-
nois, where the bonus offer decreased the probability of returning to
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the previous employer by 3 to 4 percentage points and decreased the
probability of returning to the previous industry by about 2 percentage
points.  Similar findings with respect to employer attachment were
found in Pennsylvania, where the most generous bonus offers signifi-
cantly reduced the probability of returning to the previous employer.
The Washington bonuses had negative estimated impacts on both the
probability of returning to the previous employer and the probability of
returning to the previous industry, but the estimates were smaller than
in Illinois and tended to be insignificant.
Notes
1. Earnings data for later quarters are available but not for the full samples.
2. Interview data on earnings were also available for the Pennsylvania experiment
but not for the Washington and Illinois experiments.  Corson et al. (1992) used
both wage records and interview data to investigate earnings in the Pennsylvania
experiment and found that wage records provide adequate information for evalu-
ating the impacts of the bonus offers on earnings.  See Appendix D of Corson et
al. (1992) for a direct comparison of interview and wage records data on earnings.
3. Decker (1989) discussed these and related shortcomings of UI wage records data
based on data from the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration.  He esti-
mated that 9 percent of the claimants in the New Jersey demonstration sample
lived outside New Jersey (and therefore may have been likely to find work outside
New Jersey) at the time of the demonstration, 3 percent became self-employed in
the year after their initial UI claim, and 28 percent received severance pay or a
pension payout from their previous employer.  
4. Investigation of the outliers in the Washington data suggested that they reflect
errors in the data rather than actual receipt of earnings or other forms of compen-
sation.  The outliers for given individuals in given quarters were extremely incon-
sistent with the earnings reported in other quarters for those individuals.
5. Earnings are not adjusted for differences in price levels, so some of the earnings
differences may not represent differences in real earnings.
6. The higher reemployment rates for Washington were due partly to the inclusion of
stand-by recall claimants in the Washington experiment.  Since these claimants
expected to be recalled by their pre-UI employer after a brief period of unemploy-
ment, the inclusion of these claimants in the Washington experiment increased the
overall employment rates for Washington claimants compared with the Illinois
and Pennsylvania experiments, which excluded stand-by recall claimants.  See
Chapter 2 for a full discussion of eligibility requirements in the three experiments.
7. We calculate the expected impact on earnings by multiplying 1.04 weeks by aver-
age weekly earnings in the base period for the control groups, $248.
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8. Decker (1994) examined in detail the impacts of reemployment bonuses on the
short-term and long-term unemployed in the Illinois experiment and the New Jer-
sey UI Reemployment Demonstration.
9. We calculated the expected impact by multiplying the combined treatment impact
on UI weeks (0.40) by average weekly earnings in the base period ($298) in
Washington.
10. In the Washington experiment, bonuses were paid to claimants hired by their pre-
vious employers only if they were hired for different jobs.  In Pennsylvania,
claimants recalled by their previous employers did not receive bonuses, regardless
of the job.
11. Claimants were treated as returning to their previous employer if the identification
number of the employer in the first quarter of earnings matches the identification
number of the separating employer.  If a claimant had multiple employers in the
first quarter of earnings, we used the employer that paid the most earnings in the
quarter.
12. Among those Illinois claimants who eventually received a bonus payment, 21 per-
cent had returned to their previous employer.
13. Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992) also used data from a follow-up interview
to investigate the probability of returning to the previous employer.  Estimates
based on these interview data suggest that the bonus offers significantly reduced
the probability of recall by 6 percent.  As pointed out by Spiegelman, O’Leary,
and Kline, the interview data differ from the wage records by explicitly identify-
ing the previous and new employers, instead of relying on the matching of codes
from the wage records.  Interview data may be less accurate due to errors in self-
reporting, however, and the sample of survey respondents is a smaller and proba-
bly nonrandom subset of the claimant population.  
14. Anderson (1992) considered the impact of a reemployment bonus on recall in her
study of the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstra-
tion.  She found that the bonus offer in New Jersey did not reduce recall rates sig-
nificantly.
15. In Illinois and Washington, the industry code is part of the employer identification
number.  In Pennsylvania, the employer identification number does not contain an
industry code.
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6
From Social Experiment 
to Program
 
The Reemployment Bonus
 
Carl Davidson and Stephen A. Woodbury
 
This chapter examines the problem of transferring the results
obtained in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington reemployment
bonus experiments to an actual reemployment bonus program.   The
results presented in the preceding three chapters suggest that a reem-
ployment bonus program could reduce the duration of insured unem-
ployment without adverse consequences for workers offered the bonus.
On the whole, the results appear to be “internally valid”—that is, com-
parisons between the treatment and control groups generally provide
unbiased estimates of the bonus impacts.
Experimental results alone, however, do not indicate whether
implementing a  reemployment bonus program would be desirable.
Important questions still exist about the extent to which bonus experi-
ments are “transferable” and give an accurate picture of what would
happen if a bonus program were actually adopted.   In any social exper-
iment, whether experimental results are transferable to an actual pro-
gram (“externally valid”) is distinct from whether the results are valid
on their own grounds (internally valid).   The first section of this chap-
ter develops a model-based classification of the problems that impede
the transfer of experimental results to a policy setting.   
In the second section, we characterize an equilibrium-matching
model of the labor market that provides an organizing framework for
analyzing the problems of transferring the reemployment bonus exper-
iments’ results to the setting of an actual program.  (The full model is
presented in the chapter appendix.)  This section also presents the main
results on spillover effects, classification changes, and behavioral
changes that could follow adoption of a bonus program.   The third sec-
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tion explores how the outcomes of a program that offered a bonus only
to dislocated workers could differ from those observed in the bonus
experiments.  We also discuss how exogenous changes in economic
and labor market conditions may alter the effectiveness of a reemploy-
ment bonus program.   The final section summarizes the chapter’s
methods and main results.
 
THE TRANSFERABILITY PROBLEM IN THE 
REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENTS
 
A well-designed social experiment can offer a high degree of con-
trol over the variables that influence outcomes such as unemployment
duration and earnings after reemployment, and as a result can yield
unbiased, readily understandable, and convincing estimates of the
impact of an economic incentive on behavior.  A variety of problems
may hamper the transfer of experimental results to what could be
expected of an actual program, however.  Existing treatments of the
transferability of experimental results include Aigner (1985), Spiegel-
man and Woodbury (1990), Garfinkel, Manski, and Michalopoulos
(1992), Moffitt (1992a), Davidson and Woodbury (1993), and Meyer
(1995).  However, there is no generally accepted categorization of
problems underlying the transferability of experimental results.
Accordingly, we offer the following catalog of transferability prob-
lems, based on the labor market model that we use to investigate those
problems.
Briefly, the results of implementing an actual program may differ
from the effects of a treatment as estimated in a social experiment for
five reasons.  
1) Spillover effects—the possibility that workers who respond to the
bonus program would make it more difficult for other workers to
find employment (that is, would crowd out or displace other
workers from employment).
2) Classification changes without efficiency implications—in partic-
ular, the possibilities that if a program were adopted, more bonus-
qualified workers would actually collect a bonus and more work-
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ers eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) would claim bene-
fits in order to collect a bonus.
3) Behavioral changes with efficiency implications—the possibility
that under an actual bonus program, an increasing share of bonus-
offered workers would participate and respond to the bonus offer
by increasing their job-search intensity.
4) Scale effects—the possibility that program outcomes would differ
from experimental outcomes if a bonus program were offered to a
different population or adopted on a different scale than the
experiments.
5) Exogenous economic changes—the possibility that different eco-
nomic or labor market circumstances, which may not have been
adequately controlled for in the experiments, would yield pro-
gram outcomes that differed from the experimental outcomes.
Table 6.1 lists these five transferability problems and notes the features
of the model that allow us to account for them.  Each problem is dis-
cussed in turn.  
 
Spillover Effects
 
Experimental impacts are usually estimated only for the subgroup
of the population that would be eligible for the program, but a program
may have indirect or spillover effects on other groups of workers.  For
example, an experimental training program to upgrade the skills of
workers could improve the employment and earnings of the program’s
participants at the expense of workers who don’t participate and who
would have gotten jobs in the absence of the program.  This “crowding
out” of nonparticipants by participants is especially likely if the train-
ing program were implemented in a local labor market where there
were few job vacancies.
A reemployment bonus has the clear potential for a spillover or
crowding-out effect.  Reemployment bonuses are intended to increase
the search intensity of the UI claimants who have been offered
bonuses.  An effective bonus offer would drive bonus-offered claimants
to find job vacancies earlier (on average) than otherwise.  As a result,
part of the improved labor market performance of bonus-offered work-
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ers would be at the expense of workers who were not offered bonuses.
Some non-offered workers would, in effect, be crowded out of employ-
ment as a result of the bonus program and would experience longer
spells of unemployment and a higher unemployment rate.
 
1
 
 
Because of the difficulties in estimating crowding out in an experi-
mental design, we have modeled the crowding out of a reemployment
bonus program using an equilibrium search and matching model
(Davidson and Woodbury 1993, 2000).  In the model discussed in the
appendix, which is based on our earlier work, the crowding-out effects
of the reemployment bonus differ across various groups of job seekers.
In particular, we distinguish among crowding out of job seekers who
are offered the bonus but don’t respond to it, job seekers who have
been offered a bonus but whose bonus qualification period has expired
(that is, UI-eligible job seekers whose spells of unemployment extend
beyond the bonus qualification period), and job seekers who are never
offered the bonus (both UI-eligible nonclaimants and UI-ineligible job
seekers, such as new labor force entrants and re-entrants).  We also
check the sensitivity of the crowding-out estimates to variation in the
 
Table 6.1 Transferability Problems and Features of the Model that Allow 
Them to Be Analyzed
 
Effect or change considered Features of the model
Spillover effects Multiple groups of workers/parameters 
characterizing workers’ behavior and 
responses to changing incentives
Classification changes without 
efficiency implications
Multiple groups of workers
Behavioral changes with 
efficiency implications
Parameters characterizing workers’ 
behavior and responses to changing 
incentives
Scale effects Multiple groups of workers/parameters 
characterizing workers’ behavior and 
responses to changing incentives
Exogenous economic changes Parameters characterizing the labor 
market and constraints facing workers
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UI take-up rate
 
 and the 
 
bonus take-up rate
 
—that is, to changes in the
proportion of UI-eligible workers who claim their benefits and changes
in the proportion of bonus-qualifiers who actually collect a bonus for
which they qualify.
Spillover effects have real consequences for employment, unem-
ployment, resource allocation, and efficiency.  That is, spillovers imply
that the economic prospects of those who do not participate in a pro-
gram are harmed by the improved situation of program participants.
For that reason, spillover effects are more serious than, for example,
classification changes (such as changes in the bonus take-up rate, the
proportion of bonus-qualified workers who collect a bonus), which
have measured impacts but do not have economic or efficiency
impacts.  Spillover effects are discussed further on pp. 188–190.
 
Classification Changes without Efficiency Implications
 
A program’s take-up rate may differ from the take-up rate observed
in an experiment; that is, a greater percentage of individuals who are
eligible to receive a benefit may choose to collect the benefit once a
permanent program is implemented.  These are classification changes
without efficiency implications because they represent changes in the
way workers classify themselves but require no change in underlying
economic behavior (such as a change in job-search intensity).
Although they will change the government’s cost of financing a pro-
gram, classification changes have no effect on economic outcomes or
resource allocation.
It is well-known that less than 100 percent of the individuals who
are eligible to collect benefits under social programs actually do so.
For example, available estimates suggest that only between 55 and 75
percent of workers who are eligible to claim UI benefits do so, and it
was seen in Chapter 3 that only one-half to two-thirds of the workers
who qualified for a bonus in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington
experiments actually collected a bonus.
The concern is that some workers would reclassify themselves in
one of two ways if a bonus program were adopted.  Consider first UI-
eligible workers with short expected durations of unemployment who
used to find that the costs of claiming UI outweighed the benefits.
After adoption of a bonus program, these UI-eligible nonclaimants
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could, with no change in job-search intensity or timing of reemploy-
ment, become UI-eligible claimants and receive both UI benefits and a
bonus.  This would be observed as increases in the UI take-up rate  (the
proportion of UI-eligible workers who claim benefits), the bonus take-
up rate, and the financial cost of providing benefits and bonuses to
claimants.  Second, once a bonus program were adopted, a higher per-
centage of workers who qualify for a bonus might collect one.  This
would be observed as increases in the bonus take-up rate and the finan-
cial cost of providing bonuses.  Both of these are “classification
changes” because either could occur if workers reclassified them-
selves; that is, if they claimed benefits or collected a bonus 
 
without any
change in job-search behavior or the timing of reemployment
 
.
Classification changes pose a problem for the validity of experi-
mental estimates of the financial cost of a bonus program.  If either the
UI take-up rate or the bonus take-up rate increased after program adop-
tion, the government’s cost of the UI program would increase.  In other
words, classification changes would lead to measurable differences
between the financial cost of the experiments and the financial cost of a
program.
However, classification changes would not lead to differences
between the employment and unemployment outcomes of an experi-
ment and those of a bonus program.  The reason, as already noted, is
that no change in economic behavior—job-search intensity or timing
of reemployment—would be required in order to effect these classifica-
tion changes.  Unlike spillover effects and the other effects considered,
classification changes have only measured impacts on the govern-
ment’s cost of the program.  They have no consequences for resource
allocation and efficiency.  Classification changes without efficiency
implications are discussed further on pp. 191–195.
 
Behavioral Changes with Efficiency Implications
 
The responses of workers to an actual program may differ from
their responses during an experiment for several reasons (which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive).  First, social experiments are inevita-
bly of limited duration.  If participants’ planning horizons exceed the
length of an experiment, then the behavior of participants during the
experiment may differ from what it would be if the program were
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adopted.  This can be thought of as a time-horizon effect.  Time-hori-
zon effects posed a concern for the income maintenance experiments of
the 1960s and 1970s because participants may have been reluctant to
give up jobs and adjust their labor supply in response to an experimen-
tal (and hence short-term) negative income tax system.  If a negative
income tax program were adopted, participants might make long-term
adjustments that differed from the short-term adjustments observed
during the experiment.
The time-horizon problem could be a concern in transferring the
results of the reemployment bonus experiments to an actual program.
For example, it is possible that bonus-offered claimants viewed the
experimental bonus offer as evanescent—an offer that would be avail-
able only during the current spell of unemployment and never again.  If
so, then claimants might be prone to respond to and collect a bonus
under the experiment, whereas they might not do so under a bonus pro-
gram.  As a result, the bonus effects estimated in an experiment could
be larger than those in an actual program, although it is difficult to
gauge by how much.
A second reason for differences between behavior during an exper-
iment and under an actual program is the learning effect.  Learning
effects are changes in behavior that may occur as program participants
learn more about the workings of a program.  Such changes may occur
as participants become more convinced of the authenticity and perma-
nence of a program, as they become increasingly aware of the conse-
quences of their behavior under the program, or because it takes time
for participants to make adjustments and rearrangements in response to
new incentives.
 
2
 
  
If a program is subject to learning effects, then a short-term experi-
ment may be an incomplete guide to what could be expected under an
actual program.  In general, the existence of learning effects implies
that experimental results will underestimate the long-run response to a
fully implemented program because, under an actual program, partici-
pants would have enough time to understand fully and respond to the
incentives created by a program.  There is some evidence that learning
effects may have been a problem in the Illinois bonus experiment.  In a
follow-up survey of a random sample of UI claimants who were
offered the Illinois bonus, about one-third of those who refused to par-
ticipate in the experiment indicated that failure to understand or trust
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the experiment was the reason for refusal (Spiegelman and Woodbury
1987, Chapter 7).  This was the case even though the bonus offer was
simple to understand, its credibility was easily established, and partici-
pants needed little time to adapt or respond to the program.
A third reason for behavioral changes after adoption of a program
would be changes in norms that occur over time after adoption of a
program.  Especially with an income transfer program like welfare,
social norms may make it difficult for many individuals to participate,
at least when a program is first adopted.  It is possible that some bonus-
offered claimants chose not to respond to the bonus offer because they
felt some stigma attached to doing so—they would be taking a bribe to
accept a job, perhaps.  However, there is little evidence of such stigma
in the responses to follow-up questions that were put to bonus-offered
workers in Illinois (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987, Chapter 7).
As with spillover effects, behavioral changes have consequences
for employment, unemployment, and efficiency.  For example, if a
higher proportion of bonus-offered workers responded to a bonus by
increasing their job-search intensity, then bonus-offered workers as a
group would experience shorter spells of unemployment and increased
employment.  Such behavioral changes with efficiency implications are
discussed further (pp. 192–195).
 
Scale Effects
 
There may be differences between an experiment and a program
that result because a program is adopted on a different scale (either
larger or smaller) than the scale on which the experiment was con-
ducted.  Scale effects could result because a program is adopted across
a wider (or narrower) geographical area than in an experiment or
because it is implemented for different groups of individuals (or more
or fewer groups of individuals) than in an experiment.  Such differ-
ences in scale may again result in differences between experimental
results and the outcomes of an actual program.
Typically, the scale of an actual program is larger than that of an
experiment, as would occur if bonus offers were made to all new UI
claimants rather than only to randomly assigned claimants in certain
geographic areas.  Increased scale could affect the outcomes of a reem-
ployment bonus program, for example, by changing the likelihood of
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crowding out, or by extending the bonus offer to groups of workers
who had been ineligible for experimental bonus offers and whose
behavioral responses differed from the groups who were tested.
However, a reemployment bonus program could also be adopted
on a smaller scale than the experiments.  For example, it would be fea-
sible (and consistent with the goals of a bonus offer) to limit bonus
offers to dislocated workers or workers who are believed to be potential
UI exhaustees.  An important feature of the Washington reemployment
bonus experiment was to test whether dislocated and other workers
responded differently to the bonus offer.  The results suggested no
important difference between the two groups (Spiegelman, O’Leary,
and Kline 1992), but there could be scale effects if, by offering the
bonus to a relatively small group of workers, the overall increase in
job-search intensity induced by the bonus program were relatively
small.  A small increase in search intensity would lead to a relatively
small increase in overall employment and the possibility of greater
crowding out of workers who are not offered a bonus.  These implica-
tions are developed further on pp. 195–198.
 
Exogenous Economic Changes
 
The economic conditions under which a program is implemented
may differ from the economic conditions that prevailed during an
experiment.  Fully controlling for differences in economic conditions
during an experiment may be difficult or impossible, but failing to do
so may lead to experimental estimates that differ from the outcomes of
the program.
In terms of the model used below, exogenous economic changes
amount to changes in parameters that characterize the labor market.  In
principle, adequate data and modeling should allow us to explain dif-
ferences across the experiments in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington and to predict the circumstances under which the bonus will be
most effective.  
Results presented in Chapter 4 of this volume (Table 4.6) suggest
that, in Pennsylvania and Washington, the effect of a reemployment
bonus offer was greater at sites where labor market conditions were
good.  This finding poses a puzzle—the bonus impact was greater in
Illinois than in either Pennsylvania or Washington, even though labor
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market conditions appear to have been worst in Illinois.  The issue of
labor market conditions and the efficacy of the reemployment bonus
are discussed further on pp. 198–201.
 
Remarks on Internal Validity
 
The five problems discussed above all come under the heading of
external validity or transferability.  Other pitfalls in social experimenta-
tion involve internal validity; that is, ensuring that the comparison
between the control and experimental groups is unbiased.  Internal
validity is prior to the questions of transferability; it is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for transferability of experimental results to a
program setting.  The most commonly cited problem of internal valid-
ity is the so-called Hawthorne effect, which occurs if subjects respond
to an unintended treatment rather than to the designed treatment.  The
Hawthorne effect takes its name from experiments at the Hawthorne
plant of Western Electric Company (in Chicago), where changes in
lighting and room color were made to determine their effects on pro-
ductivity.  The experimenters found that productivity improved, but
they discovered that the improvements resulted from the increased
attention that was paid to workers whose work spaces were changed
rather than from the tested changes in lighting and color.
A Hawthorne effect could have existed in the reemployment bonus
experiments if participants increased the intensity of their job search
because they felt they were being watched or wanted to please those
conducting the experiment, rather than in response to the bonus offer.
A Hawthorne effect seems unlikely in the reemployment bonus experi-
ments for two reasons.  First, in the Illinois bonus experiment, there
were actually two treatments: the claimant bonus (in which new UI
claimants were offered a $500 bonus to become rapidly reemployed)
and an employer bonus, in which a random sample of new UI claim-
ants was instructed to tell each prospective employer that he or she (the
prospective employer) would receive a $500 bonus for hiring the
claimant within 11 weeks of the initial claim.  This employer bonus
showed quite small effects, whereas the bonus offer to claimants
showed significant effects (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).  If the
impacts of the bonus offer to claimants were merely a Hawthorne
effect, then the employer bonus should have turned up significant
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effects.  Hence, the Illinois experiment itself provides evidence that the
impacts of the bonus offer to claimants were not the result of a Haw-
thorne effect.  Second, in both the Pennsylvania and Washington exper-
iments, several treatments were offered, with various bonus amounts
and qualification periods.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the bonus treat-
ments were related to outcomes in predictable ways that suggest that
economic incentives, rather than Hawthorne effects, were at work in
the experiments.
 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS, CLASSIFICATION CHANGES, 
AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGES FOLLOWING ADOPTION 
OF A BONUS PROGRAM
 
In the chapter appendix, we develop a model that provides a frame-
work for evaluating and quantifying the differences between the out-
comes of the reemployment bonus experiments and what could be
expected in an actual program.  The model considers four well-defined
groups of workers who exhibit optimizing behavior.  It includes param-
eters characterizing the labor market and various constraints facing
workers and parameters characterizing the preferences of workers and
governing their responses to changed incentives.  Changes in behavior
that were observed in the reemployment bonus experiments are used to
calibrate the model; that is, the behavioral impacts of the bonus experi-
ment are used to gauge important and otherwise unobservable behav-
ioral parameters.  Once the model is calibrated, it is possible to
simulate how various outcomes—such as unemployment duration and
employment—would be altered if groups other than bonus-offered
workers were affected by a bonus program or if bonus-offered workers
behaved differently in a program than during the experiment.  Direct
observation of these effects, were it possible, would be preferable to
the modeling approach taken here.  Absent direct observation, however,
the model provides a framework for analyzing the transferability prob-
lem and for roughly quantifying impacts that cannot be observed in an
experiment.
 
3
 
   
In the model, the bonus offer increases the opportunity cost of
unemployment for bonus-offered workers, and some bonus-offered
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workers respond by increasing the intensity of their job search.  This
increase in search intensity has the following implications.  First, there
is an increase in overall steady-state employment.  That is, more of the
total available jobs are filled as the bonus-offered workers who respond
to the offer search harder for jobs and accept jobs that would otherwise
have remained vacant.  Second, reemployment probabilities and
employment levels rise for bonus-offered workers who respond to the
offer, and they fall for all other workers, who are beaten to vacancies
and crowded out of the labor market by the more aggressive workers
who respond to the bonus offer.  In general, the larger the increase in
overall steady-state employment, the less crowding out will occur.
 
4
 
   
These impacts of the bonus offer can be thought of respectively as
a 
 
gross employment effect 
 
and
 
 a crowding-out effect
 
.  Note that the
gross employment effect is an increase in total employment that is
driven by the increase in search effort of workers who respond to the
bonus offer.  The increase in employment of these responders is offset
at least partially by decreases in employment of other groups of work-
ers—the crowding-out effect.
From the standpoint of analyzing the transferability of the bonus
experiments’ results to an actual program, the model has three main
features.  First, it breaks workers into four groups: 1) UI-ineligibles, 2)
UI-eligibles who claim their benefits and respond to the bonus, 3) UI-
eligibles who claim their benefits and fail to respond to the bonus, and
4) UI-eligible nonclaimants (see Figure 6.A1 and the accompanying
discussion in the appendix).  This breakdown lets us consider the
impact of the bonus on groups other than those offered the bonus (UI-
ineligibles and UI-eligible nonclaimants) and on workers who,
although offered the bonus, do not respond.  As a result, the model pro-
vides a way of understanding spillover effects.  In the case of the reem-
ployment bonus, crowding out is the most important spillover; that is,
the bonus program tends to prolong the unemployment spells and
reduce the employment of workers who are not offered or do not
respond to the bonus.
Second, the model allows for variation in the UI take-up rate,
defined as the proportion of UI-eligible unemployed workers who
claim their benefits (denoted by 
 
k
 
 in the model).  A concern raised
about a reemployment bonus program is that it could lead to an
increased UI take-up rate, which has hovered around 65 percent for the
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past 20 years.  Increased UI take-up would involve the reclassification
of workers, increasing the government’s cost of the reemployment
bonus program but leaving the real economic outcomes of the program
unchanged.  Because the UI take-up rate is a parameter in the model,
the model provides a way of showing that the real economic outcomes
of a bonus program would be unchanged if the UI take-up rate were to
rise.
Third, the model specifies and distinguishes between the reem-
ployment bonus response rate (defined as the proportion of bonus-
offered workers who respond to the bonus by increasing their search
intensity, denoted by 
 
ρ
 
 in the model) and the reemployment bonus
take-up rate (defined as the proportion of workers who qualify for a
bonus who actually collect it, denoted by 
 
τ
 
 in the model).  The bonus
response rate cannot be observed, but inclusion of the bonus take-up
rate (which is observable) in the model allows us to identify and solve
for the bonus response rate.  Once solved for, the bonus response rate
can be varied exogenously to gauge how the outcomes of a bonus pro-
gram would differ if the bonus response rate increased.  This allows
examination of how an important behavioral change would affect the
outcomes of a bonus program.
Because we refer to the above three parameters frequently in the
following discussion, their definitions are repeated here: 
 
k
 
—the UI take-up rate, defined as the proportion of UI-eligible
unemployed workers who claim their UI benefits;
 
ρ
 
—the reemployment bonus response rate, defined as the propor-
tion of bonus-offered workers who respond to the bonus by
increasing their search intensity;
 
τ
 
—the reemployment bonus take-up rate, defined as the proportion
of workers who qualify for a bonus who actually collect it.
Distinctions among these three parameters are important and worth
highlighting.  A change in the bonus response rate (
 
ρ
 
) represents a
change in behavior that has implications for employment, unemploy-
ment, and earnings—that is, implications for real economic outcomes
and efficiency.  In other words, changes in 
 
ρ
 
 are behavioral changes
with efficiency implications.  Changes in the UI and bonus take-up
rates (
 
k
 
 and 
 
τ
 
), on the other hand, result in measured changes only,
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such as changes in bonus payouts and (consequently) the government’s
cost of financing UI or a reemployment bonus program.  In other
words, changes in 
 
k
 
 and 
 
τ
 
 are classification changes without efficiency
implications.
 
Spillover Effects
 
In the context of a reemployment bonus, the main spillover effect
that has concerned policymakers is crowding out.  Our goal is to gauge
the seriousness of crowding out and to illustrate the extent to which
variations in the UI take-up rate (
 
k
 
) and the bonus take-up rate (
 
τ
 
)
affect estimates of crowding out.  To do so, we solve the model for var-
ious values of
 
 k
 
 and 
 
τ
 
 and compare the results.  The results are reported
in Table 6.2.
Column 1 of Table 6.2 shows the model’s predictions of how a
bonus program would affect employment and the duration of unem-
ployment, assuming that all UI-eligible workers claim benefits and all
who qualify for a bonus collect it.
 
5
 
   Both of these underlying assump-
tions are clearly unrealistic.  In this case, for every job gained by UI-
eligibles, 0.39 job is lost by UI-ineligibles (138/351 = 0.39).  We refer
to this as the 
 
crowding-out ratio
 
—the ratio of employment losses suf-
fered by groups that lose employment to employment gains of the
group that benefits from the bonus offer.  Note also that the average
spell of unemployment of UI-ineligibles would lengthen by 0.27 week.
These results suggest that, although a bonus program would entail
some crowding out, the amount would be rather small.
Column 2 reports results when we assume (more realistically) that
the UI take-up rate is 65 percent, and (still unrealistically) that the
bonus take-up rate is 100 percent.  Column 2 suggests that crowding
out is now more serious: for every job gained by UI-eligible claimants,
0.60 job is lost by the losers (i.e., the crowding-out ratio is now (96 +
78)/292 = 0.60).  Note that the employment losses suffered by those
not offered the bonus are split about equally between UI-eligible non-
claimants and UI-ineligibles.
Column 3 reports results when we again assume a UI take-up rate
of 65 percent but now assume a bonus take-up rate of 55 percent (as
occurred in the Illinois bonus experiment).  Crowding out is now even
greater: for every job gained by bonus-offered workers who respond to
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the bonus, 0.76 job is lost by bonus-offered workers who ignore the
bonus offer, UI-eligible nonclaimants, and UI-ineligibles (that is, the
crowding-out ratio is [118 + 103 + 94]/415 = 0.76).  Again, the
employment losses suffered by those not offered the bonus are split
about equally among the three groups of losers.
Why does the crowding-out ratio progressively increase as the
assumptions are made more “realistic”?  Consider first column 1.  In
 
Table 6.2 Changes in Employment and in Duration of Unemployment 
Resulting from a $500 Reemployment Bonus
 
a
 
UI take-up rate (
 
k
 
) 100% 65% 65% 65%
Bonus take-up rate 
 
(τ)
 
 100% 100% 55% 55%
Worker group (1) (2) (3) (4)
UI-eligibles 351*
 (–0.741)
196 
(–0.398)
194 
(–0.393)
328 
(–0.482)
Claimants — 292* 
(–0.714)
297 
(–0.714)
455 
(–0.877)
Respond to bonus — — 415* 
(–1.718)
599* 
(–1.652)
Ignore bonus — — –118 
(0.223)
–144 
(0.286)
Nonclaimants — –96 
(0.188)
–103 
(0.204)
–127 
(0.251)
UI-ineligibles –138 
(0.269)
–78 
(0.152)
–94 
(0.185)
–115 
(0.228)
Net increase in 
employment 
 
(J
 
)
213 118 100 213
Crowding-out ratio
 
b
 
0.39 0.60 0.76 0.64
 
ρ
 
 (bonus response 
rate)
 
c
 
— — 0.488 0.55
 
a
 
The top number in a pair of values is the change in employment per 100,000 labor-
force participants; the number in parentheses is the change in unemployment duration
in weeks.  The group that gains from the reemployment bonus offer in each case is
shown by an asterisk (*).  Values are based on simulations described in the text.
 
b
 
The crowding-out ratio is the ratio of employment losses suffered by groups that lose
employment to employment gains of the group that benefits from the bonus offer. 
 
c
 
In column 3, the bonus response rate (
 
ρ
 
) is retrieved from the observed bonus
impacts; in column 4, it is set to 0.55, the calibration from column 3 is retained, and
the employment changes and changes in duration of unemployment are solved.
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this case, we assume that all UI-eligible workers claim their benefits
and respond to the bonus.  This means that 40 percent of all unem-
ployed workers increase their search effort during the first six 2-week
periods of unemployment.  A direct result of this increase in search
effort is an increase in overall employment; that is, more of the econ-
omy’s total available jobs (
 
F
 
) are filled—
 
J
 
 rises and 
 
V
 
 falls.  This
increase in employment allows the UI-eligibles to obtain jobs with rel-
atively little crowding out of UI-ineligibles.
The results in column 2 suggest that crowding out would be larger
in the presence of a UI take-up rate of only 65 percent.  Because, in this
case, 35 percent of UI-eligibles do not claim their benefits, fewer work-
ers are offered the bonus, and there is less scope for the bonus offer to
alter behavior.  In other words, fewer workers have increased their
search effort as a result of the bonus offer.  When fewer workers claim
their UI benefits and respond to the bonus offer, employment increases
by less as a result of the bonus offer (that is, 
 
J
 
 rises by less and 
 
V
 
 falls
by less), and more of the increase in UI-eligible employment must
come at the expense of other workers.
Finally, in column 3, it is again the case that 35 percent of UI-eligi-
ble workers do not claim their benefits (and hence are never offered the
bonus).  In addition, of the UI-eligible workers who do claim benefits
and qualify for a bonus, only 55 percent collect the bonus.  This
implies that even fewer workers increase their search effort as a result
of the bonus, and employment increases relatively little as a result.  It
follows that even more (over 75 percent) of the increase in employment
for bonus recipients comes at the expense of other workers.  The results
reported in column 3 indicate that the UI-eligible claimants who do not
respond to the bonus suffer the largest drop in employment.  Why?
Because these workers are receiving UI, they do not search as hard as
UI-ineligibles.  Also, they face a harder time finding a job than UI-eli-
gible nonclaimants (because, by assumption, UI-eligible nonclaimants
have higher reemployment probabilities).  Thus, the workers who make
the least effort to find a job are harmed the most.
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Changes in the UI Take-Up Rate: 
Classification Change without Efficiency Implications
 
Only 55 to 75 percent of the unemployed workers who are eligible
to receive UI benefits actually claim them (Blank and Card 1991; Vro-
man 1991).  Meyer (1995, pp. 108–110) argued that adoption of a
bonus program could induce more UI-eligible workers to claim their
benefits and hence would increase the UI take-up rate.  In particular,
for a worker expecting a short spell of unemployment and facing a low
UI replacement rate, the existence of the bonus for rapid reemployment
might make it worthwhile to claim benefits where, in the absence of a
bonus, the benefits of claiming UI benefits might not outweigh the
costs.  Meyer referred to this as an “entry effect” because workers
would in effect enter the UI program in response to a change in the pro-
gram.  He suggested that a bonus the size of the Illinois bonus would
lead to a 7 to 12 percent increase in the UI take-up rate.
 
6
 
   
We previously referred to such effects generally as classification
changes without efficiency implications.  This is because workers who
newly chose to claim UI benefits (that is, reclassified themselves from
UI-eligible nonclaimants to UI-eligible claimants) in order to take
advantage of the bonus offer would behave no differently after the
change than they did before.  Workers who claimed UI benefits in
response to the bonus would generally be workers with short expected
durations of unemployment for whom the advantages of claiming ben-
efits were previously not enough to outweigh the costs.
 
7
 
  For such
workers, the bonus offer tips the benefit-cost balance in favor of claim-
ing benefits, but no change in behavior (apart from claiming benefits) is
needed for these workers to receive benefits and collect a bonus—they
would behave as they would have in the absence of a bonus, experienc-
ing a short spell of unemployment.
 
8
 
 
Another way of viewing this point is to compare columns 1 and 2
of Table 6.2.  The net increase in employment resulting from the bonus
is estimated to be 213 per 100,000 labor-force participants when the UI
take-up rate is 100 percent (column 1) but only 118 per 100,000 when
the UI take-up rate is 65 percent (column 2).  It is tempting to argue
that, if the UI take-up rate increased following adoption of a bonus pro-
gram, then the benefits of the bonus program (in terms of increased
employment) would rise, but that would not be correct.  Workers classi-
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fied as UI-eligible nonclaimants in column 2 would be reclassified as
UI-eligible claimants if they claimed benefits in response to the bonus
offer, but their job-search behavior would be unchanged.  As a result,
employment gains among UI-eligible claimants would fall, as would
employment losses among UI-eligible nonclaimants.  These offsetting
changes would be measured changes only—there would be no real
change in economic outcomes.
It follows that, although the increased UI take-up rate that would
result from adopting a bonus program would increase the total payout
of the UI system (weekly benefits plus bonuses), it would not affect
efficiency or resource allocation.  That is, it would not reduce the real
economic benefits of the bonus program, which stem from employ-
ment increases that are induced by the bonus.  Although the cost of the
UI program would rise as a result of increased UI take-up, the increase
would amount to an income transfer—a cost to the program but not to
society.
 
9
 
 
 
Changes in the Bonus Response and Take-Up Rates
 
Fewer than half of the individuals who are eligible to participate in
social programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and
job training programs actually do so.  Why this is true is one of the
least understood aspects of social programs (Moffitt 1992a,b; Heckman
and Smith 1995).  Similarly, only 55 percent of the workers who quali-
fied for a bonus in the Illinois bonus experiment chose to collect the
bonus.  It is difficult to explain why this should be the case, as was seen
in Chapter 3.  Moreover, there is no way of directly observing the pro-
portion of workers who changed their behavior in response to the
bonus offer and intensified their job search.
These points lead to one of the most difficult issues in analyzing
the transferability of the bonus experiments’ results to an actual pol-
icy—the possibility that the response to an actual bonus program
would be greater (or less) than occurred during the experimental dem-
onstrations.  Changes in response, which we define as changes in the
proportion of workers who show a behavioral response to the bonus
offer, could occur with the adoption of a reemployment bonus program
for a variety of reasons.  If there are learning effects associated with a
bonus offer—for example, it takes time for some UI claimants to
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understand or trust the bonus offer, as suggested by the available sur-
vey evidence—then response to a bonus program might be greater than
response to the experiments.  In our discussion of transferability prob-
lems in the first section of this chapter, these problems came under the
heading of behavioral changes with efficiency implications because in
the context of our model they will take the form of a change in a behav-
ioral parameter, 
 
ρ
 
, defined as the proportion of workers who respond to
the bonus by increasing their job search intensity.
As already noted, the model includes the bonus take-up rate (
 
τ
 
, the
proportion of bonus qualifiers who collect a bonus) as a parameter.
Unlike 
 
ρ
 
 (the bonus response rate), 
 
τ
 
 can be observed.  Inclusion of the
bonus take-up rate in the model allows us to identify the bonus
response rate.  To see this, note first that Equation 27 in the appendix
defines 
 
τ
 
 as the ratio of a) those who responded to and collected the
bonus to b) those who qualified for a bonus by receiving 11 or fewer
weeks of UI benefits.  Next, recall that about 55 percent of the workers
who qualified for the $500 reemployment bonus in Illinois actually col-
lected it.  This observation allows us to impose an additional constraint
on the model that identifies the bonus response rate.
Column 3 of Table 6.2 shows the results of setting the bonus take-
up rate (
 
τ
 
) equal to 55 percent (rather than 100 percent as in columns 1
and 2) and then solving the model to obtain an estimate of 
 
ρ
 
.  The esti-
mate is about 49 percent—that is, roughly half of the UI claimants who
were offered the $500 bonus in the Illinois experiment actually
changed their behavior as a result of the bonus offer.  This is an esti-
mate of the proportion of workers who responded to the bonus offer
whether or not they succeeded in shortening their spell of unemploy-
ment enough to qualify for the bonus.  The estimate also accounts for
(that is, excludes) workers who collected a bonus without respond-
ing—that is, workers who would have been unemployed for less than
11 weeks in any event and for whom the $500 bonus was a windfall.
 
10
 
Column 3 also yields an estimate of the average reduction in unem-
ployment duration of the workers who responded to the bonus.  This
estimated reduction is 1.7 weeks, more than twice the 0.7-week reduc-
tion for all workers who were offered the bonus.  Bonus-offered work-
ers who ignored the bonus offer had slightly longer spells of unem-
ployment, according to the model.
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The model can also be used to gain insight into what would happen
if the bonus response rate were to rise after adoption of a bonus pro-
gram.  To do so, the bonus response rate (
 
ρ
 
) is treated as a parameter
and imposed exogenously rather than solved for as in column 3.  In col-
umn 4, a bonus response rate of 55 percent is imposed—about 6 per-
centage points (or 10 percent) higher than our estimate of 
 
ρ
 
 from
column 3.  The higher bonus response rate significantly changes pro-
gram outcomes.  With a higher response rate, the employment
increases of claimants who respond to the bonus are much larger (599
per 100,000 rather than 415 per 100,000), although in absolute terms
the crowding out of other groups of workers is also greater.  In relative
terms, though, crowding out is less when the bonus response rate is
higher; the crowding-out ratio is 0.64 in column 4 versus 0.76 in col-
umn 3.
Note also that, with the 10 percent increase in the bonus response
rate, the net increase in jobs more than doubles from 100 per 100,000
to 213 per 100,000.  These gains occur because, when the response to
the bonus is larger, job vacancies are filled more quickly and steady-
state employment increases.  All of these gains go to UI claimants who
respond to the bonus.
Note that existing data provide no way of estimating how (or
whether) either the bonus take-up rate (
 
τ
 
) or the bonus response rate (
 
ρ
 
)
would change if a bonus program were adopted.  Nevertheless, some
observations can be made about what would occur if either 
 
τ
 
 or 
 
ρ
 
changed following adoption of a bonus program.  First, a change in the
 
τ
 
 is a classification change without efficiency implications.  An
increased bonus take-up rate implies that more of the workers who
qualify for the bonus actually collect it.  It implies no change in the job-
search intensity or timing of reemployment of bonus-offered workers
and hence has no effect on “real” program outcomes, such as employ-
ment or crowding out.  An increase in the bonus take-up rate increases
the payout of bonuses to UI claimants, leads to additional income trans-
fers, and increases the UI system’s costs.  In other words, increases in
the bonus take-up rate are like the increases in the UI take-up rate (
 
k)
 
—
they have implications for the finances of the bonus program but no
implications for efficiency or resource allocation.
In contrast, an increase in the bonus response rate is a behavioral
change with efficiency implications; that is, an increase in 
 
ρ
 
 changes
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real program outcomes.  An increased response to the bonus leads to
larger increases in net employment and reduced crowding out (com-
pare columns 3 and 4 in Table 6.2).  In other words, the results suggest
that increases in the bonus response rate would improve the function-
ing of the program by leading to both greater employment gains and
reduced crowding out.
 
DISLOCATED WORKERS AND 
EXOGENOUS ECONOMIC FACTORS
Limiting a Bonus Program to Dislocated Workers
 
If a bonus program were implemented, one likely option would be
to offer bonuses only to specific groups of workers, such as dislocated
workers (that is, workers who had seniority of at least three years with
the employer who laid them off).  Indeed, administrative rules pro-
posed by the Clinton Administration in 1994 enabled state employment
security agencies to offer a reemployment bonus to workers who meet
the state’s “profiling” criteria—that is, to workers predicted to have a
high probability of exhausting their UI benefits.
 
11
 
 
Implementing a bonus program on such a restricted basis poses a
potentially serious problem for transferring the results of the bonus
experiments to actual policy.  In all three of the bonus experiments,
bonuses were offered to most new UI claimants.  To restrict a bonus
program to dislocated workers would imply significant changes in the
type of workers eligible to participate in the program, since dislocated
workers tend to be older and earn higher wages than the average UI
claimant.  Also, restricting a bonus program to dislocated workers
would mean implementing the program on a smaller scale than
occurred during the experiments.
 
12
 
 
A variant of the model developed in the previous section can pro-
vide insight into whether a bonus program that was available only to
dislocated workers would yield different results than were observed in
the reemployment bonus experiments.  That is, it is possible to model
both the change in the population of workers who would be offered the
bonus and the change in the scale of the program (relative to the exper-
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iment) by adding appropriate subgroups to the model and assuming the
bonus is offered only to a specific (and relatively small) group of work-
ers.
To consider dislocated workers, we use a model similar to that
developed in the appendix, but with one main difference.  Rather than
assume that the labor market has a single sector, we assume the exist-
ence of two employment sectors—high wage and low wage.  Worker
dislocation is treated by assuming that the economy experiences a one-
time shock that causes part of the high-wage sector to shut down.  Dis-
located workers in the model are former employees of the high-wage
sector who must now seek low-wage employment.  In contrast, high-
wage workers who experience a regular layoff search for (and eventu-
ally find) a high-wage job.  Hence, in this model, there are three groups
of UI-eligible claimants: 1) low-wage UI-eligible claimants, 2) high-
wage UI-eligible claimants, and 3) dislocated UI-eligible claimants.
 
13
 
In this modified model, the bonus offer to dislocated workers
increases the opportunity cost of unemployment for dislocated workers
and results in increased search effort on their part.  For example, in a
model in which half of all UI-eligible claimants are high-wage workers
and 15 percent of all initial claimants for UI are dislocated, the search
effort of dislocated workers increases by approximately 30 percent.
This increase in search effort of dislocated workers has the same
employment and crowding-out effects that were discussed on pp. 185–
186.  However, the employment effect is smaller than when the bonus
is offered to all UI claimants because the group being offered the
bonus—dislocated workers—is a relatively small portion of the labor
force.  The model’s results suggest that the crowding-out effects of a
bonus program for dislocated workers would be far greater than the
crowding-out effects of a bonus program for most UI claimants pre-
cisely because of this smaller employment effect.
Table 6.3 shows the impacts of a reemployment bonus targeted on
dislocated workers (column 1) and comparable results from a bonus
offer to all UI claimants (column 2).  In both sets of results, we
assume that 60 percent of all unemployed workers are ineligible for UI
(
 
q
 
 = 0.6) and that 65 percent of UI-eligible workers claim their bene-
fits (
 
k
 
 = 0.65).  The results in column 1 are based on the assumptions
that half of all workers are high-wage workers and that 17.6 percent of
low-wage UI-eligible claimants were dislocated from the high-wage
 From Social Experiment to Program 197
 
sector.  As we have shown in Davidson and Woodbury (2000, Tables
7A and 7B), the results in column 1 are robust to significant variation
in both the percentage of the labor market that is high wage and the
percentage of workers who are dislocated.  Note that we have not
divided dislocated workers into those who respond to the bonus offer
and those who do not respond.  This could be done at a cost of consid-
erable added complexity, but the main points made presently would
not change.
The main result is that a reemployment bonus targeted on dislo-
cated workers would increase employment of dislocated workers (by
447 per 100,000 labor force participants) and decrease their unemploy-
ment duration (by about 0.9 week), but these gains for dislocated work-
 
Table 6.3 Changes in Employment and in Duration of Unemployment 
Resulting from a $500 Reemployment Bonus Offered Only to 
Dislocated Workers
 
a
 
 
 
Worker group (1)b (2)b
UI-eligible claimants 202 
(–0.116)
292* 
(–0.714)
Dislocated 447* 
(–0.894)
— 
High wage –93 
(0.016)
—
Low wage –152 
(0.025)
—
UI-eligible nonclaimants –93 
(0.015)
–96 
(0.188)
UI-ineligibles –105 
(0.017)
–78 
(0.152)
Net increase in employment (J) 4 118
SOURCE: Figures in column 1 come from Davidson and Woodbury (2000, Tables 7A
and 7B).  Figures in column 2 are repeated from Column 2 of Table 6.2.
a The top number in a pair of values is the change in employment per 100,000 labor-
force participants; the number in parentheses is the change in unemployment duration
in weeks.  The group that gains from the reemployment bonus offer in each case is
shown by an asterisk (*). 
b In column 1, the bonus offer is made to dislocated workers only.  In column 2, the
offer is made to all UI claimants.
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ers come almost entirely at the expense of other groups of workers, all
of whom suffer employment reductions as a result of the bonus offer to
dislocated workers.  The net increase in employment resulting from a
bonus offered only to dislocated workers is just 4 jobs per 100,000 in
the labor force, as  compared with a net gain of 118 per 100,000 when
the bonus is offered to all UI claimants.  Crowding out is virtually com-
plete in the case of a bonus program targeted on dislocated workers
(the crowding-out ratio equals 0.99).
Crowding out is nearly complete in this case because the employ-
ment gains that result from offering a bonus to a small percentage of
unemployed workers (in this case, dislocated workers) are correspond-
ingly small.  Recall that, in this model, employment gains occur
through increases in the search intensity of workers who are offered an
inducement (such as a bonus) to search harder.  When search intensity
increases, vacancies disappear and more of the total available jobs in
the economy are filled.  If only a few workers are offered a bonus,
employment rises only modestly.14
If the crowding-out effects of the bonus to dislocated workers are
as large as our results suggest, then such a bonus fails miserably the
Pareto criterion.  However, for three reasons, we would not conclude
that a bonus program for dislocated workers should be ruled out.  First,
worker dislocation results from structural changes in the economy that
presumably benefit the majority of workers and society at the expense
of dislocated workers.  It is the burden of structural change, which
itself fails the Pareto criterion, that the reemployment bonus is intended
to redress.  Second, as discussed in detail elsewhere (Davidson and
Woodbury 2000, section III.E), the crowding-out results outlined above
are quite sensitive to the assumption that full employment (or the total
number of available jobs, F) is fixed and exogenous.  Specifically, we
find that if employers responded to a bonus for dislocated workers by
increasing labor demand by just 0.025 to 0.03 percent, there would be
no crowding out of nondislocated workers.  
Exogenous Economic Factors and Differences among the Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington Experiments
Chapter 4 showed that the reemployment bonus experiments in
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington produced varied results.  In Illi-
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nois, a $500 cash bonus offer for finding reemployment within 11
weeks of claiming unemployment benefits resulted in a reduction of
the expected duration of unemployment of 0.7 week for claimants eli-
gible only for state regular benefits (that is, ineligible for FSC).  In the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, similar bonus offers
reduced the expected duration of unemployment by 0.6 and by 0.34
week, respectively.  Also, in the Illinois experiment, the impact of the
bonus offer varied greatly depending on the potential duration of UI
benefits.  For workers eligible for 38 weeks of benefits as a result of
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC), the bonus offer reduced
the expected duration of unemployment by 1.75 weeks, whereas for
otherwise similar workers eligible only for state regular benefits, it
reduced unemployment duration by only 0.7 week (Davidson and
Woodbury 1991).
The model developed in this chapter can provide some limited
insight into why the bonus offers in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington had such varied impacts.  The exogenous economic factors that
determine the efficacy of a bonus offer can be divided into supply and
demand factors.  On the supply side, we have anything that influences
the job-search behavior of unemployed workers.  The size of the bonus
offer (and qualification period), the level and potential duration of UI
benefits, and the expected reemployment wage all influence the search
intensity of jobless workers.  These supply factors provide at least a
partial explanation of why the bonus offer had such a large impact on
FSC-eligible workers in Illinois.  When the potential duration of UI
benefits is extended from 26 to 38 weeks (other things equal), as it was
by the FSC program, optimal search intensity of UI recipients falls
(that is, expected utility maximizing search intensity is reduced).  This
follows because an increase in the potential duration of UI benefits
reduces the opportunity cost of being unemployed.  If the marginal cost
of search intensity increases with search intensity (that is, the opportu-
nity cost of leisure is increasing), then in the absence of a bonus pro-
gram, FSC-eligible workers would search less hard and face a lower
marginal cost of search than workers who were eligible for only 26
weeks of benefits.  Because FSC-eligible workers face a lower mar-
ginal cost of search, a bonus offer should induce a larger increase in
their search intensity.  The larger bonus-induced increase in search
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intensity of the FSC-eligibles implies a larger bonus impact for these
workers.15
On the demand side of the model, we have the job separation rate
(s) and the total number of available jobs (F).  Low separation rates (s)
and rising availability of jobs (F) are both consistent with lower equi-
librium unemployment rates, but low separation rates and rising avail-
ability of jobs have opposite implications for the effectiveness of a
bonus program.  When s is low, jobs do not turnover rapidly, so there
are few vacancies (that is, unemployment is low because expected job
duration is high).  With few vacancies, it is difficult to find a job.  So
when s is low, a bonus offer will have a relatively small impact (David-
son and Woodbury 1993, Tables 1 through 4).  On the other hand, when
F grows, unemployment falls because there are a growing number of
vacancies; so, jobs are easy to find and the increase in search effort
induced by the bonus program should lead to a large reduction in
unemployment duration (see again Davidson and Woodbury 1993,
Tables 1 through 4).
So how can the differences across and within the Illinois, Pennsyl-
vania, and Washington bonus experiments be explained?  Across states,
the bonus response was larger in Illinois, where the unemployment rate
was high, than it was in Pennsylvania and Washington, where the
unemployment rate was much lower.  A possible explanation is that the
Illinois experiment was conducted during the early stages of the 1980s
recovery, whereas the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments took
place after the recovery had matured.  In Illinois, then, the separation
rate (s) was falling from a high level and the number of available jobs
(F) was growing as the recovery progressed.  The high but falling sepa-
ration rate would be consistent with a large but declining bonus impact,
and the ready availability of jobs would be consistent with a large
bonus impact.  In Pennsylvania and Washington, on the other hand,
separation rates were low and the number of available jobs, although
high, was no longer growing rapidly.  The low separation rate and slow
growth of available jobs would both be consistent with a smaller bonus
impact.
Within all three experiments, the bonus response was larger in
areas with low unemployment.  A plausible explanation is that differ-
ences in local unemployment rates are due to the massing of vacancies
rather than to differences in local turnover rates.  That is, within Illi-
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nois, Pennsylvania, or Washington, differences in unemployment rates
would result more from variation in the availability of jobs (F) across
local labor markets than from variation in the separation rate (s).  If so,
then we would expect a larger bonus impact in local labor markets with
low unemployment rates because low local unemployment rates reflect
ready availability of jobs (rather than low turnover rates).
Although these explanations of the differences within and across
the three experiments are connected to a consistent labor market
model, they must be viewed as speculative in the absence of local labor
market data on separation rates and job vacancies.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Designers of social experiments often pay little attention to
whether the results of an experiment will be “externally valid” or trans-
ferable to a program setting.  Clearly, the reason for devoting public
funds to social experiments is to learn what would be the actual effects
of programs that might be adopted.  To ignore the transferability of an
experiment is to invite experimental results that may say little about
what policymakers want and need to know.
This chapter has examined the pitfalls in applying the results of the
reemployment bonus experiments to what might be expected under a
reemployment bonus program.  The first section provides a model-
based catalog of the problems that impede direct application of the
results of an experiment to an actual program: spillover effects, classi-
fication changes without efficiency implications (including increases in
the UI and bonus take-up rates), behavioral changes with efficiency
implications (including changes in the bonus response rate), scale
effects (including targeting a program on a specific group), and exoge-
nous economic changes.  
In the second section, we apply a model that is fully described in
the chapter appendix to the five issues that are most important to trans-
ferring the results of the bonus experiments to a program setting.  We
examine the crowding-out effects of the bonus and find that increas-
ingly realistic assumptions about the UI take-up rate and the bonus
response rate suggest increasing degrees of crowding out.  For exam-
202 Davidson and Woodbury
ple, if all UI-eligible workers claim benefits and respond to the bonus,
then for each job gained by bonus-offered claimants, only 0.39 worker
who was not offered the bonus is crowded out of employment (we refer
to this as a crowding-out ratio of 0.39).  But, if we assume more realis-
tically that only 65 percent of UI-eligible workers claim benefits and
only 49 percent of the bonus-offered workers respond to the offer, the
crowding-out ratio rises to 0.76.  That is, the estimate of the crowding-
out effect of the bonus program nearly doubles when we make realistic
assumptions about the UI take-up rate and the bonus response rate.
The reason for this increase in crowding out is that a reduced take-up
of UI and less response to the bonus offer imply that fewer workers
increase their search intensity as a result of the bonus offer.  It follows
that the net increase in employment resulting from the bonus offer is
less, and the scope for crowding out is greater.
Pages 191–192 provide a fuller explanation of how an increase in
the UI take-up rate would increase the government’s cost of financing a
bonus program but would have no implications for employment, unem-
ployment, or the timing of reemployment.  Accordingly, we refer to it
as a classification change without efficiency implications.  We also sug-
gest that an increase in the UI take-up rate should not, in itself, be
viewed as an adverse outcome of a bonus program.  
On pages 192–195, we provide an estimate of the bonus response
rate (ρ), which cannot be observed directly, but which can be solved for
in the model.  The estimate suggests that about half of all bonus-
offered claimants responded to the bonus offer by increasing the inten-
sity of their job search.  Also, we estimate that these “bonus respond-
ers” shortened their unemployment spells by about 1.7 weeks on
average, compared with an average reduction of 0.7 weeks among all
workers who were offered the bonus.  We also obtain results suggesting
that a modest increase in the bonus response rate of about 10 percent
(that is, from 49 percent to 55 percent) would greatly improve the out-
comes of a bonus program: the net increase in jobs resulting from the
bonus program would roughly double and the crowding-out ratio
would drop from 0.76 to 0.64.
We also provide estimates of the likely impacts of a bonus program
that targets dislocated workers (pp. 195–198).  The results suggest that
a bonus program for dislocated workers would increase the employ-
ment and reduce the duration of unemployment (by 0.9 week per spell)
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of dislocated workers, but these gains for dislocated workers would be
almost wholly at the expense of other (nondislocated) workers (crowd-
ing-out ratio = 0.99).  The reason for this virtually complete crowding-
out is that the net increase in employment resulting from a bonus pro-
gram for dislocated workers would be negligible because dislocated
workers are a relatively small group.  That is, because a bonus program
for dislocated workers would induce only a small group of workers to
increase their job-search intensity, the resulting employment increases
would be correspondingly small.  
Finally, we attempt an explanation of the differences in observed
bonus impacts across and within the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington bonus experiments (pp. 198–201).  First, similar bonus offers
produced larger effects in Illinois (where the unemployment rate was
high) than in Pennsylvania or Washington (where the unemployment
rates were low).  Second, within each state, better labor market condi-
tions (lower unemployment rates in a local labor market) were associ-
ated with larger bonus impacts.  We explain these two apparently
conflicting observations by referring to the model and noting that a low
job separation rate (s) and growing number of available jobs (F) are
consistent with a low unemployment rate, but a high job separation rate
(s) and a growing number of available jobs (F) are consistent with a
large bonus impact.  We speculate that the relatively large bonus effect
in Illinois was due to the high (albeit falling) separation rate and grow-
ing availability of jobs during the Illinois experiment, which occurred
during the most robust part of the expansion of the 1980s.  Both the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments were conducted later in the
expansion, when the separation rate would have been low and job
growth relatively slow.  Both conditions would be consistent with rela-
tively small bonus effects.  Also, we speculate that the inverse relation
between the size of the bonus effect and the unemployment rate within
each of the experiments is a result of variation in the availability of job
vacancies across the experimental sites.  That is, growth in the avail-
ability of jobs would be the main reason for the relatively large bonus
effects that occurred in local areas where the unemployment rate was
low.
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Notes
1. In fact, crowding out could compromise the internal validity as well as the trans-
ferability of experimental results.  In the bonus experiments, if the reemployment
prospects of control group members were harmed by the increased search inten-
sity of bonus-offered claimants, then the experimental results would overstate the
effect of the bonus program.  Because the number of bonus-offered claimants was
small in relation to the labor markets in which bonus-offered workers were
searching, and because there was no incentive for employers to hire bonus-offered
claimants rather than other applicants, it seems unlikely that crowding out would
have compromised the internal validity of the bonus experiments.
2. Learning effects and time-horizon effects, although related, are distinct.  For
example, an experiment could be long enough for participants to be convinced of
the experiment’s legitimacy, to understand the consequences of their behavior,
and to have all the time needed to make adjustments.  If their planning horizons
exceed the experiment’s duration, however, time-horizon problems could arise.
Learning effects may also occur as a result of changes in the behavior of program
administrators.
3. The model imposes three simplifying assumptions that need to be recognized.
First, the total number of jobs available in the economy (or the demand for labor)
is considered fixed; that is, there is no attempt to model employers’ demand for
labor.  This could be an important shortcoming if a policy change could have a
significant impact on labor demand.  Second, the size of the labor force (L) is
exogenous; that is, we do not model the labor force participation decision,
although one could do so.  Third, the wage rate is exogenous in the models we use
below, although again one could endogenize the wage rate if thee were reasons for
doing so.  In an early version of the model, we did endogenize the wage in a bar-
gaining framework (Davidson and Woodbury 1990).
4. There is also a third, relatively subtle effect: as the reemployment probabilities of
workers who are not offered the bonus (or do not respond) change, their optimal
search effort changes.  As it becomes more difficult for the workers who are not
offered the bonus (or do not respond) to find jobs, their search effort adjusts.  We
refer to this as the rivalry effect but do not discuss it in detail here because it turns
out to be extremely small (see Davidson and Woodbury 2000).
5. With both take-up rates equal to 100 percent, the model is identical to the one
used in Davidson and Woodbury (1993).  The results reported in Table 6.2, col-
umn 1 are the same as in Table 2, column 4 of that paper.
6. Meyer (1995) also suggested three additional reasons for increased UI take-up in
response to a bonus program.  First, he wrote that voluntary job changers would
claim UI benefits and prolong their jobless spells in order to receive the bonus
(p. 109).  However, since voluntary separations with reemployment within 3
months (the longest bonus qualification period that has been considered) are not
eligible for UI, these workers would not be eligible for either UI or a bonus.
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Second, Meyer was concerned about the significant number of dislocated
workers who arrange a new job without an intervening spell of unemployment.
The concern is that, with a bonus program, these workers would arrange for the
new job to start a week or two after the old job ends, in order to receive a week of
UI benefits and collect a bonus.  This would be a clear abuse of the system
because these workers could have obtained work earlier but chose not to.  In
effect, these workers would not satisfy the work-search test for UI—they would
not be able, available, and searching for work—and hence should not be eligible
for UI or a bonus.
Third, he wrote that firms would alter their temporary layoff behavior in
response to implementation of a bonus (pp. 109–110).  However, since recalled
individuals would not receive a bonus by design, temporary layoff behavior would
not be influenced by the presence of a bonus.  (Meyer pointed out that about one-
third of layoffs that start out as temporary end up as permanent, but the purpose of
temporary layoff with recall is to keep the temporarily laid-off workers—workers
with specific skills who the employer wants to rehire when demand recovers—
from taking alternative employment.  In cases where the employer’s expectations
were wrong, and the workers are not recalled, the bonus qualification period
would have expired.)
The first two points above do raise issues of enforcement and fraud prevention.
The existence of a bonus program would increase the importance of ensuring that
workers who quit voluntarily did not receive benefits (and, possibly, a bonus).
Also, the UI agency would need to verify that a worker who applied for a bonus
had not arranged to delay a new job start so as to receive UI benefits and a bonus.
Employers would generally be willing to cooperate in this kind of enforcement,
since their payroll taxes are experience rates (that is, linked to the extent to which
laid-off workers receive UI benefits).  Clearly, these are real costs of administer-
ing a bonus program that require consideration.
7. This is consistent with existing evidence on take-up of UI.  See, for example,
Bland and Card (1991), Vroman (1991), and Anderson and Meyer (1994).
8. It is possible that some UI-eligible nonclaimants with an expected duration of
unemployment of slightly longer than the qualification period might claim bene-
fits and increase their job-search intensity in order to qualify for the bonus.  This
increased search intensity would imply an added real economic benefit of
increased UI take-up, in return to the bonus expense.  In contrast, it would make
little sense for a UI-eligible nonclaimant with a long expected duration of unem-
ployment (for example, a professional worker facing a low UI replacement rate)
to become a claimant after adoption of a bonus program, since the bonus offer
would not change the payoff to claiming UI benefits.  (If the payoff to claiming
were changed by the bonus offer and this worker did claim benefits, then the
implication would be that the bonus offer would raise job-search intensity and
have real economic benefits.)
9. There would be a social cost of the added transfers if the taxes levied to finance
them distorted economic incentives in some way.  The UI payroll tax may well
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create such incentives (see, for example, the review by Topel 1990), but the
amount of the transfers in question is not great in this case.
10. The estimate of 0.49 is similar to the proportion of bonus-offered workers in Illi-
nois who found reemployment within 11 weeks and filed a Notice of Hire, which
was 0.56 (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987, Chapter 7).  In Illinois, workers were
asked to submit a Notice of Hire at the time of reemployment if they wanted to
collect a bonus.  The Notice of Hire was mainly a monitoring device that helped
the experimenters to track the progress of the experiment and ensure that the
bonus budget would not be exceeded.  It also may have some behavioral content,
however, as suggested by the correspondence between the proportion submitting a
Notice of Hire and the estimated ρ.
11. The correspondence between workers who meet likely profiling criteria and dislo-
cated workers is incomplete.  In the model, dislocated workers are those who have
lost high-wage jobs and have little expectation of returning to such jobs.  Hence,
they have long expected durations of unemployment and would meet most con-
ceivable profiling criteria.
12. Nevertheless, Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992) found no difference
between the bonus responses of dislocated and nondislocated workers in the
Washington Reemployment Bonus experiment.
13. For a full description of the model, see Davidson and Woodbury (2000).
14. Recall that the bonus offer can increase employment even though full employment
(or the total number of available jobs, F) is fixed in the model.  Because F = V + J
(total available jobs equal the sum of vacancies and jobs that are filled), induce-
ments to search harder cause V to fall and J to rise.
15. By similar reasoning, workers who receive large weekly benefits and those who
expect lower wages after reemployment would be expected to search less hard
than workers who receive small weekly benefits or who face high wages after
reemployment.  Accordingly, the impacts of a bonus offer should increase with
the weekly benefit amount and decrease with expected wages after reemployment.
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Appendix: A Model for Transferring Experimental 
Results to an External Setting
 
This appendix provides a statement of the model that underlies the estimates
given in Chapter 6.  Following a discussion of our reasons for choosing the
model we use, three sections offer a narrative development of the model.  The
final section is a full statement of the model’s equations and notation.
The model we use is patterned after the “trade frictions” models of Diamond
(1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1984, 1990), among others.  In such
models, the number of contacts between workers and firms is determined by
search effort, a matching (or search) technology, and equilibrium conditions
stating that in steady state, the rate of job creation must equal the rate at which
jobs break-up.  In most models of this kind, job offers are never rejected (but
see Diamond and Maskin [1979] for an exception).
The trade frictions approach we take contrasts with the approach to job
search used more frequently in labor economics, in which unemployed workers
choose a reservation wage and receive job offers that they are free to accept or
reject.  Job offers arrive randomly at an average rate (
 
λ
 
, say) and the wage of-
fers come from a stationary cumulative distribution function 
 
F
 
(
 
w
 
).  The rate of
offer arrival and the distribution of wage offers are both exogenous, so that no
attempt is made to model the firm’s side of the labor market or to characterize
the full labor market equilibrium.  Because they consider only labor supply,
models that rely on the reservation wage are commonly referred to as “partial-
partial” models.  In such models, unemployment is tied to the reservation wage
and the rate of job rejection, whereas in the trade frictions approach, unemploy-
ment is determined by search effort and the matching technology.
We have two main reasons for choosing the trade frictions approach.  First,
it is relatively easy to incorporate institutional details of the UI system into a
trade frictions model because this approach offers a natural way to model the
progress of job search over time and to model changes in incentives that occur
over the course of a spell of insured unemployment.  The reemployment bonus
and the UI system in which it is embedded both generate exogenous changes
in search incentives that occur at discrete times during the unemployment spell,
and it is essential that these be captured in our model.  Atkinson et al. (1984)
and Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) have also noted the difficulty of incor-
porating institutional detail in partial-partial models.
Second, it is very difficult to implement the partial-partial approach empir-
ically because it places severe demands on our knowledge of the labor mar-
ket—for example, knowledge of the wage-offer distribution, 
 
F
 
(
 
w
 
).  In
particular, quantitative predictions of partial-partial models are highly sensitive
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to the wage-offer distribution and other underlying parameters.  (See Marshall
and Zarkin [1987] for a discussion of the importance of distinguishing the un-
observable wage-offer distribution from the observable wage distribution.)  Al-
though in the trade frictions approach, different assumptions about underlying
parameters (both observable and unobservable) generate different quantitative
predictions, we show below that it is possible to estimate the underlying unob-
servable parameters.  We find that the model’s implications are quite robust to
variations in those parameters.
 
ASSUMPTIONS, DEFINITIONS, AND NOTATION
 
This section gives a description of the variables and notation included in the
full model, focusing on its main features.  In describing the model, we make
frequent reference to Figures 6A.1 and 6A.2, which depict the groups of work-
ers treated in the model and the labor market flows analyzed in the model.  
We begin by dividing all workers into four classes:
1) Employed workers—denoted by 
 
J
 
.
2) Unemployed UI-ineligible workers—
 
U
 
i
 
.  This group (about 60 percent
of unemployed workers) includes mainly new entrants and re-entrants to
the labor force and workers who have too little work experience during
the last year or so to make them eligible for UI.  The group also includes
workers who are ineligible for UI benefits because they voluntarily quit
their previous job or were terminated for cause.
3) Unemployed UI-eligible nonclaimants—
 
U
 
k
 
.  These job seekers are eligi-
ble for UI benefits but choose not to claim them.  This group appears to
have grown dramatically over the past 15 years, and it has been the sub-
ject of considerable research and debate (Blank and Card 1991; Vroman
1991).
4) Unemployed UI-eligible claimants—
 
U
 
j, t
 
 
 
and 
 
U
 
j, x
 
.  Four groups of UI-
eligible claimants are considered in the model (see the upper left quad-
rant of Figure 6A.1).  First, there are UI eligibles who respond to the
bonus offer by increasing their search intensity and qualify for the bonus
by gaining reemployment within 11 weeks.  We denote these responders
who qualify for the bonus by 
 
U
 
r, t
 
 
 
(
 
t 
 
≤
 
 6).
 
1
 
   Second, there are UI-eligi-
bles who fail to respond to the bonus offer (that is, do not increase search
effort) but qualify for the bonus nonetheless by gaining reemployment
within 11 weeks.  We denote this group by 
 
U
 
nr, t
 
 (
 
t
 
 
 
≤
 
 6).  Third, there are
UI eligibles who respond to the bonus but fail to qualify because they
don’t gain reemployment within 11 weeks.  We denote this group by 
 
U
 
r,t
 
(
 
t
 
 > 6).  (A subcategory of this third group is made up of workers who
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respond to the bonus but fail to qualify for the bonus and ultimately
exhaust their UI benefits.  We denote these workers by 
 
U
 
r,x
 
.)  Finally,
there are UI eligibles who neither respond to the bonus offer nor find
reemployment within 11 weeks, denoted by 
 
U
 
nr, t
 
 (
 
t
 
 > 6).  (A subcate-
gory of this last group is made up of workers who don’t respond to the
bonus and ultimately exhaust their UI benefits, denoted by 
 
U
 
nr,x
 
.)
The latter three categories of workers are depicted and summarized in Figure
6A.1.
Three issues relating to unemployed workers who are UI-eligible and claim
their benefits (class 4 above) deserve further mention.  First, note that all UI-
eligible claimants are offered a cash bonus for rapid reemployment.  To actu-
ally qualify for the bonus, a UI-eligible claimant must gain reemployment
within 11 weeks of filing his or her UI claim.  (In practice, a worker also needed
to hold the job for four months in order to qualify for the bonus.)
Second, in modeling the reemployment bonus, we want to pay attention to
two issues.  The first is that the response to the reemployment bonus program
was less than 100 percent, in that not all workers who were offered the bonus
responded to the offer by increasing their search intensity.  We denote the pro-
portion of bonus-offered workers who did respond to the bonus offer by 
 
ρ
 
; this
 
bonus response rate
 
 cannot be observed, but can be solved for in the model.  In
Figure 6A.1, 
 
ρ
 
 equals the number of claimants in the upper two quadrants of
UI-eligible claimants divided by all UI-eligible claimants.  The second issue is
 
Figure 6A.1 Groups of Unemployed Workers Considered in the Model
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that not all workers who qualified for the bonus collected it.  That is, the 
 
bonus
take-up rate
 
 was less than 100 percent, as discussed in Chapter 3.  We denote
the bonus take-up rate, which can be observed, by 
 
τ
 
, and set 
 
τ
 
 = 0.55 based on
the Illinois experiment (see Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987, Table 7).  The
parameter 
 
τ
 
 is not shown in Figure 6A.1, but equals the number of bonus recip-
ients divided by the number of claimants in two left quadrants of UI-eligible
claimants.  (Note that it is possible for a worker to collect a bonus without re-
sponding to the bonus incentive.)  As will be seen below, the ability to observe
the bonus take-up rate allows us to identify the bonus response rate.
Third, workers who have exhausted their entitlement to UI benefits are an
important subgroup of UI-eligibles.  We use 
 
U
 
j, x
 
 (where 
 
j
 
 = 
 
r
 
 for workers who
respond to the bonus and 
 
j
 
 = 
 
nr
 
 for workers who fail to respond) to denote the
number of eligible claimants with 
 
t
 
 > 14.  That is, we assume that UI claimants
exhaust their benefit entitlement after a continuous spell of 28 weeks (14 two-
week periods) of unemployment.
 
2
 
   
It is also important to remark further on UI-eligible nonclaimants (class 3
above).  Blank and Card (1991) found that only 65 to 75 percent of the unem-
ployed workers who are eligible for UI benefits actually claim those benefits;
Vroman (1991) obtained an even lower estimate of about 55 percent.  Accord-
ingly, we use 
 
k
 
 to denote the 
 
UI take-up rate
 
 and set 
 
k
 
 = 0.65.  Thus, we make
the appropriate assumption that only 65 percent of all UI-eligible workers
claim their UI benefits.  Also, we assume that the search behavior of UI-eligi-
ble nonclaimants is unaffected by changes in UI policy, such as changes in ben-
efit amounts or the introduction of a bonus.  This should be a relatively
uncontroversial assumption, since it is unlikely that a worker who fails to claim
UI benefits would behave as if he or she were receiving a weekly benefit.  
Finally, we assume that workers who do not collect bonuses for which they
qualify behave as if they were never offered a bonus.  This assumption is more
questionable, since it is possible that a bonus-offered worker might increase
search intensity with the intention of collecting a bonus but never follow
through.
 
EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL
 
The model consists of five sets of equations: accounting identities, steady-
state conditions, reemployment probabilities, expected lifetime income, and
level of search effort.  For reference, these equations are written out on pp.
216–219.  Figure 6A.2 depicts the flows of workers through various labor mar-
ket states that are modeled.  Stocks of workers in different states are shown as
rectangles and the arrows indicate the transition rates of workers from one state
to another.
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Figure 6A.2 Labor Market Flows in the Model
Accounting identities
 
Let 
 
F
 
 denote the total number of jobs available in the economy and let 
 
V
 
 rep-
resent the number of vacancies in the steady-state equilibrium.  Since all jobs
are either filled or vacant, the first identity is 
 
F
 
 = 
 
J
 
 + 
 
V
 
 (Equation 1, p. 216).
The second identity states that all workers must be either employed or unem-
ployed.  Letting 
 
L
 
 denote the total number of workers and 
 
U
 
 total unemploy-
ment, the second identity is 
 
L
 
 = 
 
J
 
 + 
 
U
 
 (Equation 2).  The third identity simply
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states that total unemployment equals the sum of the various subgroups of un-
employed (Equation 3).
 
Steady-state conditions
 
The steady-state equations (p. 216) equate the flows into and out of each
employment state.  If these equations are satisfied, then total unemployment
and its composition remain constant over time.  For example, consider the flow
of workers into state 
 
U
 
i
 
—UI-ineligible unemployment.  We use 
 
s
 
 to denote the
 
separation rate
 
—the fraction of jobs from which workers separate (voluntarily
or involuntarily) in each period.  Thus, 
 
sJ
 
 workers lose their job in each period.
If we let 
 
q
 
 denote the fraction of unemployed workers who are UI-ineligible (
 
q
 
= 0.65), then 
 
qsJ
 
 is the flow of workers into UI-ineligible unemployment, and
(1 – 
 
q
 
)
 
sJ
 
 is the flow of workers into UI-eligible unemployment.  (This latter
group is divided into UI-eligible nonclaimants, UI claimants who respond to
the bonus offer, and UI claimants who fail to respond to the bonus offer.)  To
calculate the flow out of UI-ineligibility (state 
 
U
 
i
 
), let 
 
m
 
i
 
 denote the reemploy-
ment probability for any UI-ineligible worker.  Then 
 
m
 
i
 
U
 
i
 
 unemployed UI-in-
eligible workers find jobs in any given period, and this represents the flow out
of state 
 
U
 
i
 
.  In a steady-state equilibrium, 
 
U
 
i
 
 must remain constant over time.
Therefore, we must have 
 
qsJ
 
 = 
 
m
 
i
 
U
 
i
 
 (Equation 4).
Consider next the three groups of UI-eligible workers.  Again, the total flow
of workers into UI-eligible unemployment is (1 – 
 
q
 
)
 
sJ
 
.  Since the proportion of
UI-eligibles who claim benefits equals 
 
k
 
, the proportion of UI-eligibles who do
not claim benefits equals 1 – 
 
k
 
.  Accordingly, the flow of workers into UI-eli-
gible nonclaimant status (state 
 
U
 
k
 
) is (1 – 
 
k
 
)(1 – 
 
q
 
)
 
sJ
 
 (see again Figure 6A.2).
This flow must equal the flow of workers out of state 
 
U
 
k
 
.  Since the reemploy-
ment probability of UI-eligible nonclaimants is 
 
m
 
k
 
, the flow out of 
 
U
 
k
 
 equals
 
m
 
k
 
U
 
k
 
, and the steady-state condition is (1 – 
 
k
 
)(1 – 
 
q
 
)
 
sJ
 
 = 
 
m
 
k
 
U
 
k
 
 
 
(Equation 5).
Next, some UI claimants (a proportion 
 
ρ
 
) respond to the bonus, whereas oth-
ers (1 – 
 
ρ
 
) do not.  As a result, the number of newly unemployed workers who
respond to the bonus each period is (1 – 
 
ρ
 
)
 
k
 
(1 – 
 
q
 
)
 
sJ
 
, and the number of newly
unemployed workers who do not respond to the bonus is ρk(1 – q)sJ.  These
are the flows into states Ur,1 and Unr,1.  In steady-state, all workers in states Ur,1
and Unr,1 at the beginning of a period flow out by the end of the period.  Work-
ers in state Ur,1 flow either back to J or into Ur,2, and workers in state Unr,1 flow
into either back to J or into Unr, 2.  Hence, the flow out of Ur,1 in each period
[mr,1Ur,1 + (1 – mr,1)Ur,1] equals Ur,1, and the flow out of Unr,1 in each period
[mnr,1Unr,1 + (1 – mnr,1)Unr,1] equals Unr,1.  It follows that the steady-state con-
ditions for these two states are (1 – ρ)k(1 – q)sJ = Ur,1 and ρk × (1 – q)sJ = Unr,1
(Equations 6 and 7).
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The last two steady-state equations (8 and 9) are the analogous steady-state
equations for all of the remaining states of unemployment.
Reemployment probabilities
Equations 10 through 14 define the probability of reemployment for any
given unemployed worker as a function of the search intensity of both the giv-
en worker and all other workers, and the number of vacancies.  We denote the
reemployment probabilities by m (for match probability, with appropriate sub-
scripts).  Each reemployment probability is in turn a product of three other
probabilities: the probability of a worker contacting a firm (this is the work-
er’s job-search intensity), the probability that a contacted firm has a job va-
cancy, and the probability that the worker gets a job offer, conditional on
applying to a firm that has a vacancy.  For example, let pk denote the probabil-
ity that a UI-eligible nonclaimant contacts a firm in the tth period of search (or
the number of firms contacted, if pk > 1).  (The terms pj,t and pi refer to similar
probabilities of UI-eligible claimants [with j = r for claimants who respond to
the bonus and j = nr for claimants who fail to respond to the bonus] and UI-in-
eligibles, respectively.)  Again, these contact probabilities are a measure of a
worker’s search intensity.  Next, assuming that workers choose firms at ran-
dom, the probability that any given firm has a vacancy is V/T.  Finally, if we
let λ denote the average number of applications filed per firm, then the proba-
bility that a worker gets a job conditional on applying at a firm with a vacancy
is (1 – e–λ)/λ (see Davidson and Woodbury 1993 for details).  So the probabil-
ity of an unemployed UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search finding a
job is given by the product mj, t = pj, t(V/T)[(1 – e–λ/λ)].  There is an analogous
reemployment probability equation for each state of unemployment (Equa-
tions 10 through 14).
The probability of reemployment increases with search effort, but increas-
ing search effort is costly.  We assume that the cost of search effort is given by
a cost function—cpz—where z (> 1) and c are search cost parameters.  More
precisely, z denotes the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort
and c is a constant that transforms the number of firm contacts (p) into cost
units.  The form of the cost function implies that search cost increases with
search intensity at an increasing rate.  We assume that c differs between UI-el-
igible and UI-ineligible workers but that z is the same for all groups of workers.
Expected lifetime income and level of search effort
The fourth and fifth sets of equations are used to calculate the optimal search
effort of unemployed workers.  In Equations 15 through 22, we calculate the
expected lifetime income of workers in each possible state of unemployment
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and employment.  Then, in  Equations 23 through 26, we calculate the level of
search effort that maximizes these expected lifetime incomes.
Expected lifetime income is calculated by considering both the current and
future prospects faced by the worker.  For example, let Vr,t denote the expected
lifetime income for a UI claimant (one who responds to the bonus) in the tth
period of unemployment, Vw denote the expected lifetime income for an em-
ployed UI-eligible worker, w the wage, B the bonus amount, and x the per-pe-
riod UI benefit.  This UI claimant in the tth period of search receives x – c(pr,t)z
(that is, UI benefits less the cost of search).  With probability mr, t this worker
finds a job and can expect to earn Vr,w in the future, and if t < 6, this worker
may also collect a bonus.  With probability 1 – mr,t the worker remains unem-
ployed and can expect to earn Vr,t + 1 in the future.  Therefore,
Vr,t = x – c(pr, t)z + [mr, t(Vr, w + B) + (1 – mr, t)Vr, t + 1]/(1 + r).
Note that future income is discounted at interest rate r.  For t > 6, Vr,t takes
the same form as above, except that the worker cannot collect a bonus upon
finding a job.  An analogous condition describes the expected lifetime income
for workers in every other state of unemployment and employment (again, see
Equations 15 through 22).
Finally, for each unemployed worker, search effort is chosen to maximize
expected lifetime income.  Therefore, there is an equation defining optimal
search effort for each possible state of unemployment, with one exception.  The
exception is for UI-eligible nonclaimants.  The most likely reason that some
UI-eligible workers do not file for UI benefits is that they do not expect to be
unemployed for a significant length of time—that is, they expect to be able to
find jobs relatively easily and with little effort.  For these workers, the cost of
claiming benefits may well outweigh the value of the benefits that would be re-
ceived.  Therefore, we treat these workers differently, assigning them high re-
employment probabilities and ignoring their search decision.  Provided that
their reemployment probabilities are set high enough (so that their expected du-
ration of unemployment is roughly half the expected duration faced by UI-eli-
gible claimants), our results are not sensitive to the assumption that their
reemployment probability is high.3
MODEL SOLUTION
To examine the impact of the reemployment bonus program on groups of
workers other than those offered the bonus, we first solve the model with the
bonus amount set to zero (B = 0), then solve it again with the bonus amount set
to $500 (B = 500), and compare the results.  In solving the model, we make use
of the data that were gathered for the Illinois reemployment bonus experiment
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for as many of the model’s variables and parameters as possible and use sec-
ondary data sources where necessary (for a discussion, see Davidson and
Woodbury 2000).  Also, we use the behavioral responses that were observed to
the Illinois reemployment bonus in calibrating the model.  The Illinois experi-
ment was used to calibrate the model because the treatment impacts for FSC-
ineligible workers were essentially similar to the average impacts in the Penn-
sylvania and Washington experiments (Davidson and Woodbury 1996).  The
details of this approach to solving the model follow.
The key endogenous variables in the model are employment (J), the number
of each type of unemployed worker in each state of unemployment (the U
terms), the reemployment probabilities for unemployed workers in each state
of unemployment (the m terms), the search effort of unemployed workers in
each state of unemployment (the p terms), and the proportion of UI-eligible
claimants who respond to the bonus (ρ).  The key parameters are the wage (w),
the interest rate (r), the size of the bonus (B), the level of unemployment ben-
efits (x), total jobs available (F), the total number of workers (L), the job sepa-
ration rate (s), the fraction of unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI
benefits (q), the UI take-up rate (k), and the search cost parameters (z and c).
Except for the search cost parameters, estimates of all of these parameters can
be obtained either from the data collected to analyze the Illinois experiment or
from other sources.
To obtain estimates of the search cost parameters, we follow the procedure
developed in earlier work (Davidson and Woodbury 1993).  First, we note that
in the absence of a reemployment bonus, the expected duration of unemploy-
ment for UI claimants was 22.4 weeks (this was the average unemployment du-
ration for the control group in the Illinois experiment).  We then arbitrarily
choose a value of z and solve the model to find the value of c that is consistent
with the model predicting the expected duration of unemployment (22.4
weeks) that was observed for UI claimants who were not offered a reemploy-
ment bonus (that is, for whom B = 0).  This gives us a pair (z,c) for every z.
Next, we solve the model again, but with B = 500 (the Illinois bonus offer) for
each (z,c) pair and observe the reduction in the expected duration of unemploy-
ment for UI claimants that is predicted by the model.  We then choose the pair
(z,c) that generates a prediction that is consistent with the outcome observed in
the Illinois experiment.4
The model developed and used here resembles models we have used previ-
ously to examine the crowding-out effects of reemployment bonuses and ef-
fects of wage-rate subsidies paid to dislocated workers (Davidson and
Woodbury 1993, 2000).  Two extensions are embodied in the model used here.
First, the introduction of additional groups of workers, such as UI-eligible non-
claimants and UI claimants who fail to respond to the bonus offer, allows us to
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consider spillover effects, classification changes, behavioral changes, and scale
effects that could not be considered in a simpler model.  Second, introducing
the UI take-up rate (k) and the bonus take-up rate (τ) allows us to make appro-
priate assumptions about these rates, both of which are less than 100 percent.
We show on pp. 195–203 that these extensions lead to markedly different pre-
dictions about the outcomes of adopting a reemployment bonus program.  The
introduction of τ is especially useful, because it allows us to identify the pro-
portion of bonus-offered workers who responded to the bonus by increasing
their search effort (ρ), which cannot be observed directly.
COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE MODEL
Identities
(1) F = J + V
(2) L = J + U
(3) U = Σj = r,nrΣt = 1,14Uj, t + Ur, x + Unr,x + Uk + Ui
Steady-State Conditions
(4) qsJ = miUi
(5) (1 – k)(1 – q)sJ = mkUk
(6) ρk(1 – q)sJ = Ur,1
(7) (1 – ρ)k(1 – q)sJ = Unr,1
(8) (1 – mj,t – 1)Uj,t – 1 = Uj,t for j = r,nr  (t = 2, . . . , 14)
(9) (1 – mj,14)Uj,14 = mj,xUj,x for j = r,nr
Reemployment Probabilities
(10) mi = pi(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ]
(11) mk = pk(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ]
(12) mj, t = pj, t(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ] for j = r,nr (t = 2, . . . , 14)
(13) mj,x = pj,x(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ] for j = r,nr
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(14) λ = (1/F)[piUi + pkUk + Σj = r,nrΣt = 1,14 pj,tUj,t + pr,xUr,x + pnr,xUnr,x] 
Expected Lifetime Utility
(15) Vi = – ci(pi)z + [miVi,w + (1 – mi)Vi]/(1 + r)
(16) Vr, t = x – c(pr,t)z + [mr,t(Vr,w + B) + (1 – mr,t)Vr,t + 1]/(1 + r) for t = 1, . . . , 6
(17) Vr,t = x – c(pr, t)z + [mr,tVr,w + (1 – mr,t)Vr,t + 1]/(1 + r) for t = 7, . . . , 13
(18) Vnr,t = x – c(pnr,t)z + [mnr,tVnr,w + (1 – mnr, t)Vnr, t + 1]/(1 + r) for 
t = 1, . . . , 13
(19) Vj,14 = x – c(pj,14)z + [mj,14Vj,w + (1 – mj,14)Vj,x]/(1 + r) for j = r,nr
(20) Vj,x = – c(pj,x)z + [mj,xVj,w + (1 – mj,x)Vj,x]/(1 + r) for j = r,nr
(21) Vi,w = w + [sVi + (1 – s)Vi,w]/(1 + r)
(22) Vj,w = w + [sVj,1 + (1 – s)Vj,w]/(1 + r) for j = r,nr
Optimal Search Effort
(23) pi = arg max Vi
(24) pj,t = arg max Vj, t for j = r,nr (t = 1, . . . , 14)
(25) pj,x = arg max Vj,x for j = r,nr
(26) pk = pnr,x
Observed Bonus Take-Up Rate
(27) τ = Σt = 1,6mr,tUr, t / [Σt = 1,6mr, tUr, t + Σt = 1,6mnr, tUnr, t] 
Summary of Notation
L = the size of the labor force
J = steady-state employment
U = steady-state unemployment
V = steady-state job vacancies
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F = the total number of jobs available
subscripts: r = UI-eligible claimants who respond to the bonus
nr = UI-eligible claimants who do not respond to the bonus 
x = UI-eligible claimants who have exhausted their benefits
i = UI-ineligible unemployed workers
k = UI-eligible nonclaimants
t = the period of search
w = employed workers
Ui = the number of UI-ineligible workers seeking employment
Uk = the number of UI-eligible non-claimants seeking employment
Uj,t = the number of type j UI-eligible workers in their tth period of search 
(j = r,nr)
Uj,x = the number of type j UI-eligible workers who have exhausted their UI 
benefits (j = r,nr)
q = the proportion of unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI
s = the job-separation rate
k = the proportion of UI-eligible workers who claim their benefits (that is, par-
ticipate in the UI program)
ρ = the proportion of UI-eligible claimants who respond to the bonus
mi = the reemployment probability for UI-ineligible workers
mk = the reemployment probability for UI-eligible nonclaimants
mj, t  = the reemployment probability for a type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth 
period of search (j = r,nr)
mj,x = the reemployment probability for a type j UI-eligible claimant who has 
exhausted UI benefits (j = r,nr)
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λ = the average number of job applications received per firm
pi = the search intensity of UI-ineligible workers (that is, the probability that a 
UI-ineligible worker contacts a firm, or if greater than 1, the number of firms 
contacted)
pk = the search intensity of UI-eligible nonclaimants
pj,t = the search intensity of a type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of 
search (j = r,nr)
pj,x = the search intensity of a type j UI-eligible claimant who has exhausted 
UI benefits (j = r,nr)
Vi = expected lifetime utility of a UI-ineligible unemployed worker
Vj,t = expected lifetime utility of a type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth period 
of search (j = r,nr)
Vj,x = expected lifetime utility of a type j UI-eligible claimant who has 
exhausted UI benefits (j = r,nr)
Vj,w = expected lifetime utility of an employed type j UI-eligible worker 
(j = r,nr)
Vi,w = expected lifetime utility of an employed UI-ineligible worker
x = UI benefit per period
c, ci = search cost parameters
z = the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort
r = the interest rate
B = the reemployment bonus amount
w = the wage
τ = the observed bonus take-up rate (that is, of UI claimants who qualify for 
the reemployment bonus, the proportion who actually collect it)
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Appendix Notes
1. In the model, a worker qualifies for bonus if t ≤ 6, because we measure time in
two-week intervals.
2. The assumption of continuous unemployment is not wholly correct because about
10 percent of UI recipients experience multiple spells of unemployment in a ben-
efit year.  Nevertheless, a single spell of unemployment characterizes most of the
insured unemployed, so we maintain the assumption.
3. In other words, a lower reemployment probability could be assigned without sub-
stantially changing the results.  The main point is that these workers don’t respond
to the reemployment bonus offer, so the bonus program raises employment by less
than it would otherwise.
4. A different procedure was used to estimate ci the cost parameter for UI-ineligibles
because the expected duration for UI-ineligibles is not observable.  See Davidson
and Woodbury (1993, pp. 587–588) for details.
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7
A Benefit-Cost Analysis 
of a Bonus Offer Program
 
Robert G. Spiegelman
 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
 
An experiment is run at considerable expense for the purpose of
providing information to guide the government in decisions to launch
or modify programs.  A major advantage of an experiment is that,
despite its expense, it is much cheaper than the alternative of inaugurat-
ing an expensive program and then discovering that it doesn’t work.
The second advantage is that an experiment can generate more reliable
estimates of program effect than other modes of analysis.  To provide
policy guidance, the effects of an experiment must be translated into an
estimate of the benefits that can be expected to accrue to a program that
replicates these experiments.  
The process of assessing the positive and negative effects of a pro-
gram is called benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and involves adding up ben-
efits and costs and providing a present value estimate of the difference,
called net benefits.  It can be said with some assurance that no program
should be launched that doesn’t generate net benefits (i.e., net positive
effects).  However, this statement is not as simple as it seems, since the
answer as to whether or not a program generates net benefits depends
upon the perspective of the interested party.  A benefit to one group
may be a cost to another, and neither a benefit nor a cost to a third
group.  Thus, it will be necessary to compute net benefits from several
perspectives.  
For an unemployment insurance (UI) bonus offer program, there
are five decision-making groups that one should consider: society as a
whole, government as a whole, employers, claimants, and the UI sys-
tem.  The ultimate test of a program should be whether or not the pro-
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gram generates net benefits to society as a whole.  According to the
“Kaldor compensation criteria” as defined in Kaldor (1939), any
project that generates positive net benefits to society should be under-
taken, since winners (those obtaining the benefits) can pay off losers
(those bearing the costs) and leave a net surplus.  Since society is con-
cerned about the distribution of income as well as its total size, it is
probably unjustified to ignore distributional effects in the calculation of
social benefits (see Okun 1981, p. 276).   However, we have no basis
for explicitly assigning monetary values to distributional changes.  At a
minimum it may be stated that no program should be undertaken that
doesn’t meet the criteria of generating net benefits to society.  
Within society, the groups most directly affected by a bonus offer
are employers and claimants.  In an important sense the employer
group is represented by the UI Trust Fund, and a program that benefits
the trust fund (i.e., results in lower payments out of the fund) is benefi-
cial to employers.  Claimants need not be separately considered either.
Because the program is totally voluntary, it may be assumed that claim-
ants would not participate unless they perceived a net benefit.  
Government as a whole, and the UI system in particular, are the
agencies that must implement the program, and they will not do so
unless there are net benefits from their perspective.  Government is a
net beneficiary if the program generates directly or indirectly more rev-
enues than costs.  The UI system is the front line agency.  The ostensi-
ble purpose of a bonus offer program is to reduce the amount of
insured unemployment.  From the perspective of the UI system, a net
benefit arises if the reduction in UI compensation payments exceeds
direct costs of the program.  If it does not directly benefit from the pro-
gram, but the government as a whole does, then a transfer of funds
among government agencies can be carried out. 
The essential structure of benefit-cost analysis from the perspec-
tives of society, government, and the UI system is described more fully
in the sections to follow.
 
Society
 
For there to be net benefit to society as a whole, there must be an
increase in real income greater than the real costs incurred to produce
that income.  Net benefits to society is the sum of all benefits and costs
to the individuals who comprise the society.  As shown in Table 7.1,
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real gains to society occur due to increases in the value of output, best
represented in this program by the increases in earnings of those
responding to the bonus offer by obtaining jobs more quickly. 
The real gains, however, are only the net increase in earnings.  The
additional income due to the more rapid reemployment of participating
claimants may be considered the gross increase.  To calculate net
increase, several deductions should be made.  These include loss in
wages due to poorer paying jobs (if any), lost income due to displace-
ment of nonparticipants, and any loss in earnings due to entry effects
(such loss will only occur if the entry effect results in workers leaving
jobs earlier than they otherwise would).  In addition, many economists
would claim that the benefits to the individual who returns to work
more quickly are less than the additional income by the value of the
home time that is foregone (see Gordon 1973, pp. 133–206).   This
issue is discussed further below.  
The societal costs are the costs of administering the program.
These are the only costs that represent utilization of real resources in
the first round.  Leaving aside the direct benefits or costs of distribu-
tional changes, transfer payments (such as UI compensation and bonus
payments) net out to zero in the first round, since they are benefits to
one group of members (transfer recipients) and costs to another group
(taxpayers).   However, the second round effects of additional transfer
payments may not be so benign.  It is argued by many that increasing
government size has deleterious effects on real income.  If the net ben-
efits to government are negative, this implies a shift in resources from
taxpayers to transfer recipients.  Such a transfer would have income
 
Table 7.1 Reemployment Bonus Benefits and Costs by Perspective
 
Parameter Society Government UI Trust Fund
 
Increased output
 
+
 
Value of home time lost                       
 
–
 
Increased tax receipts
 
+
 
Decreased UI benefit payments
 
+ +
 
Bonus payments
 
– –
 
UI administrative costs
 
– – –
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consequences—which might be positive or negative—that shouldn’t be
ignored.  In this analysis, second round effects are ignored, because the
bonuses are small relative to total UI payments, and most program
options considered here have benefit/cost ratios for the government as a
whole close to 1. 
 
Government
 
Government as a total, not distinguishing either the level of gov-
ernment or any of its functions, represents the whole public body that
collects taxes and dispenses public services.  Any income taxes gener-
ated as a result of additional earnings represents a benefit to govern-
ment.  Any reductions in transfer payments from any of its insurance or
welfare programs that result directly or indirectly from increased
employment of constituents are also benefits.  Thus, a reduction in UI
compensation paid is a direct benefit to government.  Costs to the gov-
ernment include any costs directly or indirectly associated with govern-
ment programs that must increase because of the bonus offer.  Thus,
bonus payments are a direct cost, as is the cost of administering the
bonus offer program.  
 
The UI System
 
We are concerned about the net benefits to the UI system, because
it is the agency of the government that would administer the bonus
offer program.  If such a program does not generate net benefits to this
agency, then the program would not be implemented, regardless of its
benefits to larger entities, without a conscious transfer of resources.
Although the experimental bonus payments were not made from the UI
funds, it is logical to assume that bonuses would be paid from the UI
Trust Fund in a regular bonus offer program.  Thus, costs to the UI sys-
tem are bonus payments and administrative costs, while benefits are the
savings in UI compensation payments to claimants.  
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IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFITS FOR 
A UI BONUS OFFER PROGRAM
 
As previously stated, benefits are defined in terms of the decision-
maker’s perspective.  Under a UI bonus program, increases in output
(or real income) are benefits to society.  Increased tax revenues repre-
sent benefits to government, and reductions in UI compensation pay-
ments are benefits to the UI system and government as a whole.  Each
of these benefits are described in the following sections.
 
Output (Earnings)
 
For a bonus offer program, increases in earnings of those respond-
ing to the bonus offer represent increases in output, if there are no off-
setting losses in output from displacement or entry effects.  These
earnings changes are a result of net increases in employment that
derive from the more rapid return to work, adjusted for any changes in
wage rates.  
For the bonus experiments, earnings change has two components.
The first component is a short-run increase in earnings due to more
rapid reemployment after filing for UI benefits.  The second component
represents earning changes over a longer period of time due to the new
job.  If earnings on the new (post-unemployment) job differ from earn-
ings on the pre-unemployment job, then there is a change in the rate of
earnings that might be attributable to the bonus.  These earnings
changes are attributed to the experimental treatment if the post-unem-
ployment wages of bonus-offered claimants and controls differ.  As
discussed in Chapter 5, if job search had been optimal prior to the
bonus offer, then taking jobs more quickly could imply taking less sat-
isfactory jobs.  This would be expected to show up in participants tak-
ing jobs paying lower wages than those being paid to control group
members.  The overriding evidence presented in Chapter 5 is that the
experimental subjects did not take lower paying jobs. 
For there to be positive societal benefits from a bonus program, it is
essential that there be net positive effects on earnings, since earnings is
our measure of societal output.  The results of the experiment, as
shown in Chapter 5, however, do not encourage us to expect such posi-
tive effects.  Table 5.3 shows that none of the Pennsylvania or Wash-
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ington programs have impacts on earnings that are statistically
significant.  Only the single Illinois treatment shows statistically signif-
icant positive impacts on earnings.   Nevertheless, we make estimates
of net benefits utilizing the expected value of the impacts, and six of
the 10 Pennsylvania and Washington treatment groups have an esti-
mated impact on earnings that is positive. 
Reduction in benefits due to entry effects, displacement, or lost
value of home activity are outside of the experimentally induced
effects and are introduced here in the form of sensitivity tests to show
the effects of including reasonable estimates of values of these parame-
ters in the calculation.  
 
Tax Revenues
 
Any increases in earned income as a result of the bonus offer can
be expected to generate increases in tax revenues collected by federal,
state, or local governments.  These revenues are general to the govern-
mental level and do not automatically accrue to any particular agency,
unless they are user fees, which are not considered in this study.  No
effort is made in this study to precisely estimate income tax burdens,
and no estimate is made of other tax payments that may indirectly
result from high earnings, such as sales taxes.  Most of the bonus recip-
ients would be expected to be in the low (15 percent) federal tax
bracket.  Adding 7.65 percent for FICA and a small amount for state
taxes brings the estimated tax return to about 25 percent of the mar-
ginal increase in earned income.
 
Change in UI Compensation
 
A direct effect of the bonus offer is to reduce UI compensation that
results from the earlier termination of benefit receipts by participating
claimants.  These estimates are directly measured by differences in UI
compensation to experimentals and controls, as described in Chapter 4.
Remember, these estimates are for changes in compensation averaged
over the entire assigned population; they are not confined to the popu-
lation of respondents or claimants who collect bonuses.  There are sev-
eral estimates of this difference.  For the BCA, we chose to use the
adjusted means calculations for Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 to estimate UI
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compensation savings in the programs modeled directly on the experi-
mental treatments. 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF COSTS FOR
A UI BONUS  OFFER PROGRAM
 
The same issues of identification and association exist for costs as
for benefits.  Social costs accrue if real resources are used.  To the
extent that bonus payments exceed the savings in UI compensation
payments, there are transfers of resources from taxpayers or lenders to
bonus recipients.  Distributional effects aside, these do not represent
first-round social costs.  They would represent costs in future rounds if
the redistribution of income resulted in lower real product.  Only the
costs incurred to administer the program utilize resources in the first
round, and thereby represent first-round costs from all three perspec-
tives.  If there were more substantial distributional costs, their effects
on real output in subsequent rounds would need to be addressed. 
Since displacement of nonparticipants (see Chapter 6) reduces the
earnings accruing to society, they must be considered a cost, offsetting
part (or all) of the benefits derived from additional earnings of partici-
pants.  In addition, any entry effects of the bonus offer generate addi-
tional bonus payments and additional payment of UI compensation,
and they therefore represent additional costs to the UI system and the
government.  Entry effects generate social costs only if the greater use
of the UI system is accompanied by a decrease in earned income.  
Lastly, the loss of value of home activity needs to be considered.
Robert Gordon carefully considered this issue in the context of estimat-
ing the revenue costs from job refusal.  He estimated the ratio of value
of home time to previous after tax wage to be 0.206 (Gordon 1973,
Table A-1).   This is equivalent to about 15 percent of pretax earnings.
In calculating net benefits to society, earnings gains will be offset by
the estimated value of lost home time that will occur because of the
more rapid reemployment of program participants. 
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Administrative Costs
 
The relevant costs are those of an anticipated ongoing program, not
the costs of running the experiment or the costs of starting up a new
program.  Administering the experiment had high costs associated with
the research and with an effort to telescope learning time for claimants
to bring their program knowledge up to a point roughly equivalent to
that which could be expected in an ongoing program two to three years
after start-up.  The 5- to 10-minute enrollment interviews were several
times longer than would be expected in an ongoing program.  The addi-
tional time was used to assure that the claimants received and pro-
cessed the information about the program.  For instance, a single-page
information sheet was given to the claimant, then read to the claimant
by the interviewer, who then asked the claimant several questions to
guarantee comprehension.  In a real program, the interviewer might
simply mention the bonus, hand the claimant the explanatory sheet,
and tell the claimant to be sure to read it.  Administrators in Washing-
ton estimate that two minutes per interview would be sufficient.  The
central staff devoted to the bonus offer would be considerably smaller
than that used to operate the experimental program.  It might consist of
an administrator and one or two assistants, whose time would be taken
in processing and auditing bonus claims, assuring that information
sheets are available to the local offices, and occasionally training inter-
viewers.  Other costs include the costs of communicating disallow-
ances to claimants and operating an appeals process.  The estimates of
staffing and costs to administer a simple bonus offer program are quite
small, totaling only $3 in 1988 dollars, based on estimates made by the
staff of the Department of Human Services in the state of Washington
(Table 9-3 in Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992)
 
1
 
 and reproduced
as Appendix Table 7A.1 herein.  The table shows in detail the deriva-
tion of the cost estimates.
 
Bonus Payments
 
For the cost calculation, bonus payments are averaged over the
total experimental population, just as is the change in UI compensa-
tion.  Thus, if 10 percent of the eligible claimants each are paid a $500
bonus, the average cost of the bonus is $50 per claimant.  Chapter 3
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provides estimates of the proportion of the eligible population who col-
lected bonuses.  These proportions are multiplied by the average dollar
value of bonuses paid within each treatment group to provide the esti-
mate of the bonus cost per claimant.  
 
Displacement Costs
 
Another cost that may or may not arise from the bonus offer pro-
gram is the loss of earnings by nonparticipants who are displaced from
jobs by participants, as described in Chapter 6.  
 
Entry Effects
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, entry effects are the increases in UI fil-
ings caused by the bonus offer.  This effect will increase both bonus
payments and UI compensation.
 
AGGREGATION OF THE EFFECTS AND 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS  
 
The last step in BCA is the aggregation of benefits and costs.  Two
methods of calculation are used.  First, net benefits are calculated sim-
ply as the difference between all benefits (
 
B
 
) and all costs (
 
C
 
) (i.e., 
 
B
 
 –
 
C
 
).  The second method is to calculate a benefit/cost ratio (i.e., B/C).
 
2
 
For society as a whole, net benefits is the most appropriate measure.
Even if one doesn’t accept the Kaldor compensation criterion (men-
tioned above) that would result in the acceptance of all projects that
generate positive net benefits, it is true that society is not budget con-
strained and therefore can consider any project generating net benefits.
However, governmental agencies operating within budget constraints
would tend to use the B/C ratio, choosing those projects with the high-
est ratios first, and so on down the line of projects with ratios greater
than one until the appropriate budget is exhausted.  Both calculations
are reported here.  
 232 Spiegelman
 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Bonus Offer 
Program Alternatives from Three Perspectives
 
The BCA is conducted for 11 alternative bonus offer programs that
replicate the bonus offer treatments in the three experiments.  For each
program, the BCA is conducted from the perspective of the UI system,
the government as a whole, and total society.  Each of the benefit and
cost components that are used in various combinations to compute net
benefits from each of the perspectives are described in the section
below.  
Tables 7.2 through 7.4 show the benefit-cost comparisons for the
six Washington, four Pennsylvania (the declining bonus offer treatment
in Pennsylvania is omitted), and one Illinois bonus offer programs.  
For many of the program options, societal net benefits are quite
large, with B/C ratios in some instances—particularly for the high
bonus offer programs—approaching 100 to 1.  Large net social benefits
and very high B/C ratios occur primarily because the denominator in
the ratio is occupied exclusively by administrative costs, which are
very low for a bonus offer program.  These estimates are based on
expected values.  If statistical properties were included, the confidence
in these estimates would be shown to be quite low.  The earnings esti-
mates are particularly weak, because earnings impacts were statisti-
cally significant only in the single Illinois offer.  The next section,
where B/C calculations are made for a set of hypothetical offers mak-
ing use of the combined data from all of the experiments, the results
are much stronger and the impact on UI benefits statistically signifi-
cant, thereby increasing our confidence in the results to some extent.  
The earnings estimates, where they are positive due to increased
employment, may overstate net benefits to society because they do not
take into account reduced utility for loss of home time (Gordon 1973)
and do not show any earnings offset because of displacement of nonpar-
ticipants.  They also do not take into account the potential entry effect
that would result from bonus offers encouraging more job leaving or
more layoffs.  The displacement and entry effects are discussed below.   
For Washington, only the high bonus offers generate net benefits
(Table 7.2).   Earning effects for low and medium-sized bonus offers
were usually negative, although the difference from controls was not
statistically significant (see Table 5.3, pp. 159–160).  
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Illinois shows positive social benefits for its only bonus offer
(Table 7.3), which conforms roughly to the mid-level offer in Washing-
ton and is somewhat larger than the low bonus offer in Pennsylvania.
The Illinois results are consistent with the findings for the long/low-
bonus-offer treatment in Pennsylvania but not with Washington, which
showed negative social benefits for low- and middle-sized bonuses.  
The second perspective is that of total government, including both
state and federal.  Benefits to government mirror those to the UI system
(the third perspective), with the added benefit of tax revenues generated
by the additional earnings of participants.  With regard to benefits
accruing to the government as a whole or the UI system specifically,
there are mixed results.  
In Pennsylvania, positive net benefits accrue to the government in
three of the four programs (Table 7.4).  The short qualification/low
bonus offer generated negative benefits to the government as a whole,
because of the large (though not statistically significant) negative
impact on earnings.  However, this program generated positive benefits
for the UI system, because reduction in UI payments more than cov-
ered bonus and administrative costs.  Only the short duration/high
bonus offer generated positive net benefits to both the government as a
whole and the UI system.  
In Washington, small positive net benefits accrue to the govern-
ment only for the long qualification/low bonus and the short qualifica-
tion/high bonus treatments (see Table 7.2).  The other four offers all
generated negative net governmental benefits.  The small negative
number for the long qualification/high bonus offer was the result of the
large bonus payments outweighing the positive effects on earnings.
For the UI system, positive net benefits were generated by the long
qualification/low bonus offer.  We tend to discount this result because it
is inconsistent with that from all other treatments.  
Only in Illinois do we find positive and large net benefits accruing
to the government in general or the UI system in particular.  Even for
the UI system, the program generates a benefit cost ratio of 2.7/1,
higher than that generated by any program option—even with higher
bonus offers—in Pennsylvania or Washington.  Thus, if the results of
the Illinois program prevailed, every $1 spent on the bonus program
would result in more than $2 in reduced UI compensation payment.  
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Table 7.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Washington Treatments, Four Quarters of Earnings
($ are per eligible claimant; ratios are for total program)
 
Variable Short/Low Short/Med. Short/High Long/Low Long/Med. Long/High
Change in earnings
 
a 
 
($)
 
–239  –141  155  –197 –193  296
 
Change in tax receipts
 
b
 
 ($)
 
 –60  –35  39  –49  –48     74
 
Change in UI benefit 
payments
 
c
 
 ($)
 
   –22 28  117 112  44  135
 Administrative costs  d
 
 ($)
 
     3  3   3   3  3 3
 
Bonus payments
 
e  
 ($)      29  80 142  46 114 215  
Net benefits
 
f 
 
($)
Society
 
–242 –144  152  –200 –196  293
 
Government
 
–114 –90  11  14 –121     –9
 
UI system
 
–54 –55 –28  63 –73 –83
 
Benefit/cost ratio
 
g
 
 
Society negative negative 51/1 negative negative 99/1
Government negative negative  1.1/1 1.3/1 negative 0.96/1
UI system negative 0.33/1 0.8/1 2.3/1 0.4/1 0.6/1
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a
 
Equivalent to earnings increase, calculated as quarterly earnings reported for the treatment group in the quarter of filing plus the quar-
terly earnings in the subsequent three quarters (from Table 5.3, Chapter 5).
 
b
 
Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
 
c
 
From Table 4.2, Chapter 4.  A reduction in benefit payments is shown by a positive value in a cell.
 
d
 
See Table 7A.1, p. 247.
 
e
 
From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 9-2A, p. 191.
 
f
 
The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
 
g
 
The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (
 
∆
 
earnings)/admin. expense
Government: (
 
∆
 
U
 
Ι 
 
comp.
 
 + ∆
 
tax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense
 
)
 
UI system: (
 
∆
 
UI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
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Table 7.3 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Illinois Treatments,
Four Quarters of Earnings ($ per eligible claimant)
 
Variable Total FSC-elig. FSC-inelig.
Change in earnings
 
a
 
 ($) 250
Change in tax receipts
 
b
 
 ($) 63
Change in UI benefit payments
 
c
 
 ($) 150 228 57
Administrative costs
 
d
 
 ($) 3 3 3
Bonus payments
 
e
 
 ($) 68 79 55
Net benefits
 
f
 
 ($)
Society 247
Government 142
UI system 79 146 –1
Benefit/cost ratio
 
g
 
Society 83/1
Government 3.0/1
UI system 2.1/1 2.8/1 1/1
 
a
 
Equivalent to earnings increase, calculated as follows: quarterly earnings reported for
the treatment group in the quarter of filing plus the quarterly earnings in the subse-
quent three quarters.
 
b
 
Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
 
c
 
From Table 4.2, Chapter 4.
 
d
 
From Table 7A.1, p. 247.
 
e
 
From Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987), Table 5.1, and Davidson and Woodbury
(1991).
 
f
 
The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
 
g
 
The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (
 
∆
 
earnings)/admin. expense
Government: (
 
∆
 
U
 
Ι 
 
comp.
 
 + ∆
 
tax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense
 
)
 
UI system: (
 
∆
 
UI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
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Table 7.4 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Pennsylvania Treatments,
Four Quarters of Earnings ($ per eligible claimant)
 
Variable Short/Low Short/High Long/Low Long/High
Change in earnings
 
a
 
 ($)
 
–269 133 166 175
 
Change in tax receipts
 
b
 
 
($)
 
–67 33 42 44
 
Change in UI benefit 
payments
 
c
 
 ($)
 
99 99 67 133
 
Administrative costs
 
d
 
 
($)
 
3 3 3 3
 
Bonus payments
 
e
 
 ($)
 
39 60 95 151
 
Net benefits
 
f
 
 ($)
Society
 
–272 130 163 172
 
Government
 
–10 69 11 23
 
UI system
 
57 36 –31 –21
 
Benefit/cost ratio
 
g
 
Society negative 44/1 55/1 15/1
Government 0.76/1 2.1/1 1.1/1 1.1/1
UI system 2.35/1 1.6/1 0.7/1 0.9/1
 
a
 
Equivalent to earnings increase, calculated as follows: quarterly earnings reported for
the treatment group in the quarter of filing plus the quarterly earnings in the subse-
quent three quarters.
 
b
 
Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
 
c
 
From Table 4.2, Chapter 4.
 
d
 
From Table 7A.1. p. 247.
 
e
 
From Corson et al. (1992), Tables IX/2–IX.5.
 
f
 
The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
 
g
 
The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (
 
∆
 
earnings)/admin. expense
Government: (
 
∆
 
U
 
Ι 
 
comp.
 
 + ∆
 
tax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense
 
)
 
UI system: (
 
∆
 
UI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
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It was the substantial positive net benefits generated for the UI sys-
tem in Illinois that encouraged the U.S. Department of Labor to under-
take additional experiments with the goal of selecting an optimal
program.  The favorable Illinois results were not replicated in Pennsyl-
vania or Washington, however, leaving us with the preponderance of
evidence leaning to a conclusion that none of the observed levels of
bonus offers are likely to generate net benefits to the UI system.  How-
ever, the high bonus offers did generate positive societal benefits in
both Pennsylvania and Washington, and overall governmental benefits
in Pennsylvania.  This opens the possibility of undertaking the program
by either incurring some of the costs outside of the UI system (i.e.,
paying bonuses from general revenues) or by transferring funds into
the UI system to partially pay the bonus costs.  
These results are, however, likely to be optimistic, since they do
not yet include the negative corrections for spillover effects as the
experiment moves into a full program (see discussion in Chapter 6 and
the benefit-cost corrections below).
 
Benefit-Cost Analysis for Four Hypothetical Programs
 
Four hypothetical programs were tested using fixed dollar bonuses
of $500 and $1000 and fixed qualification periods of 6 and 12 weeks.
The combined data from the Pennsylvania and Washington experi-
ments were used to determine the effects of these four programs (as
reported in Decker and O’Leary 1992).  These results provide a some-
what different perspective than the results of the tested treatments that
use weekly benefit amount (WBA) multipliers to generate the bonus
offer.  As noted in the sections above and as seen in Tables 7.2 and 7.4,
the high bonus multipliers generate the largest social benefits and usu-
ally the larger governmental benefits.  
The striking result from combining the data from the two experi-
ments is that all four options produce positive net social benefits.  Fur-
thermore, government as a whole benefits from three of the four
treatment alternatives, and even the UI system benefits from the low
bonus offer (Table 7.5).  In the hypothetical treatment, it is still true
that the high bonus treatments generated the highest social benefits—
because bonus payments are not social costs and administrative costs
are indifferent to the size of the bonus offer.  However, net benefits to
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Table 7.5 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Hypothetical Treatments,
Four Quarters of Earnings ($ per eligible claimant)
6 weeks 12 weeks
Variable $500 $1,000 $500 $1,000
Change in earningsa ($) 75 217 8 150
Change in tax receiptsb ($) 19 54 2 38
Change in UI benefit paymentsc ($) 69 105 101 137
Administrative costsd ($) 3 3 3 3
Bonus paymentse ($) 45 129 72 183
Net benefitsf ($)
Society 72 214 5 147
Government 40 27 28 –11
UI system 21 –27 2 –49
Benefit/cost ratiog
Society 24/1 71/1 1.7/1 49/1
Government 1.8/1 1.2/1 1.4/1 0.9/1
UI system 1.4/1 0.8/1 1.3/1 0.71/1
a Earning increase is positive.  Earnings are the earnings in the quarter of filing plus the
quarterly earnings in the subsequent three quarters.  Source: Decker and O’Leary
(1992), Table IV.7, p. 72.
b Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
c A reduction in UI benefit payments is positive.  Source: Decker and O’Leary (1992),
T.III.5, p. 52.
d From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 9-3.
e From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), T.II.4, p. 32.
f The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
g The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (∆earnings)/admin. expense
Government: (∆UΙ comp. + ∆tax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense)
UI system: (∆UI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
240 Spiegelman
the government as a whole and to the UI system are larger for the low
bonus offer treatments.  The results are not particularly sensitive to the
length of the qualification period.  The low bonus offer dominates
because the larger reduction in UI compensation payments caused by
the higher bonus offer is totally negated by the higher cost of bonus
payments.  In fact, these results suggest that a bonus offer of about
$500, with a relatively short qualification period, is optimal from the
governmental point of view, generating positive benefits to the govern-
ment as a whole and to the UI system.   The more socially beneficial
high bonuses would require some transfer of funds (or additional taxes)
to the UI system in order to compensate for their losses to government. 
ADJUSTMENT TO BENEFIT-COST ESTIMATIONS IN THE 
MOVE FROM EXPERIMENT TO PROGRAM
In Chapter 6, the issue of how the results of the bonus experiments
can be transferred to an actual reemployment bonus program is dis-
cussed.  Two of the issues addressed in that chapter are of particular
importance to an estimate of the net benefits to be derived from the
implementation of a bonus offer program.  These are the take-up rates
for both UI and the bonus, and secondly, the crowding-out effect of
bonus participation.  
The UI take-up rates refer to the proportion of unemployed eligible
for UI benefits who actually file and receive such benefits.  As noted in
Chapter 6, this proportion in the three states conducting the experi-
ments was about 65 percent.  It may be expected that a bonus offer
increases the utility of filing UI claims for eligibles who might not oth-
erwise bother.  We will attempt to estimate the effect on the net benefit
calculation if the UI participation rate among eligible unemployed
increases from 65 to 75 percent.  A 15 percent increase in the UI take-
up rate is consistent with the estimates by Meyer (1995) in his critique
of the bonus experiments.3  In addition, a 75 percent participation rate
is on the high side for most government programs. 
The second participation issue is that of the bonus program itself.
In Chapter 3, it was estimated that only 55 percent of those eligible to
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receive bonuses actually collect them.  We attempt to determine the
effect on net benefits if this proportion increases to 75 percent.
“Crowding out” is what we call the tendency for bonus program
participants to take jobs that would otherwise by occupied by nonpar-
ticipants.  This issue, addressed in Chapter 6, will increase the unem-
ployment rate of these nonparticipants and therefore impose a cost on
both society and the government that is not taken into account in the
benefit calculation for the experiment.  Using the crowding-out param-
eters estimated in Chapter 6, we will estimate the effect on net benefits. 
The Effects on Net Benefits of Increased Take-Up
Our estimates of the effect on net benefits of increasing the UI
take-up rate from 65 to 75 percent is shown in column 2 of Table 7.6.
We start with the assumption that this increase in UI take-up has no
efficiency implications; that is, there is no change in employment or
earnings.  It is simply that unemployed persons file for benefits to
which they are already entitled and do not change their job search
behavior as a consequence.  If such additional filing is accompanied by
decreased exit or increased entry into unemployment, then there will be
additional negative impacts on net benefits.  However, considering only
the additional UI take-up without efficiency changes, there is still a sig-
nificant negative impact on net benefits derived by government or the
UI system.  As seen in Table 7.6, column 2, increasing the UI take-up
rate from 65 to 75 percent reduces the positive changes in UI payments
from $69 to $30 and increases the bonus payment costs from $45 to
$52 per experimental participant (including nonresponders and
responders who do not collect a bonus).  The impact on UI payments
from additional take-up is calculated using the formula derived by
Meyer (1995, Table 7-6).  As a result, the positive net benefits from a
$500 bonus offer with a six-week qualification period turn negative for
the government as a whole and the UI system.   
If the bonus take-up rate increases from 55 to 75 percent without
any changes in the UI take-up rate, the bonus cost naturally increases,
and the net benefits to government and the UI system decline (as shown
in Table 7.6, column 3), but the net benefits to these two constituencies
remain positive.  Naturally, if both take-up rates increase to 75 percent,
the negative effects are larger than either separately (see column 4) and
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Table 7.6 Benefit/Cost of Hypothetical Treatment (6 weeks/$500) with 
Additional UI and Bonus Take-Up
Parameter
UI take-up rate (%) 65 75 65 75
Bonus take-up rate (%) 55 55 75 75
Variable
Change in earningsa ($) 75 75 75 75
Change in tax receiptsb ($) 19 19 19 19
Change in UI payment ($) 69c 30d 69 30
Administrative coste ($) 3 4 3 4
Bonus payments ($) 45f 52g 61h 70i
Net benefitsj ($)
Society 72 71 72 71
Government 40 –7 24 –25
UI system 21 –26 5 –40
a The positive change in earnings is the same as in Table 7.5.  It is the earnings change
generated by the response to the bonus offer.  Source: Decker and O’Leary (1992),
Table IV.7, p. 72.
b As in Table 7.5, tax receipts to all government is estimated at 25% of earnings gain.
c Positive change in UI payment for columns 1 and 3 are the same as in Table 7.5.
Source: Decker and O’Leary (1992), T.III.5, p. 52.
d Positive change in UI payments for columns 2 and 4, responding to the projected
increase in UI take-up rate, is calculated using the formula in Meyer (1995).   The for-
mula is change in UI payment (new) = change in UI payment (old) – (av. WBA × av.
weeks of benefit receipt for recipients terminating benefits before 6 weeks × change
in ratio of new to old UI take-up rate).  The average WBA is calculated as the average
for the control group in the three states of the ratio of dollars of UI compensation to
insured weeks shown in Table 4.1.  The average weeks of benefit receipt for recipi-
ents terminating benefits is derived using the average of the UI hazard rates for spell
lengths less than 6 weeks for the controls in the three states shown in Table 4.5.  The
calculation is: 69 – ($145 × 1.75 × 0.154) = 30.
e From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 9.3.
f From Table 7.5, column 1.
g $45 × ratio of new to old UI take-up rate (i.e., $45 × 75%/65% = $45 × 1.154 = $52).
h $45× ratio of new to old bonus take-up rate (i.e., $45 × 75%/55% = $45 × 1.36 =
$61).
i $45 × ratio of new to old UI take-up rate × ratio of new to old bonus take-up rate (i.e.,
$45 × 1.154 × 1.36 = $70).
j Formulas for calculating net benefits are shown in footnote to Table 7.5.
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result in negative net benefits to government and the UI system.  How-
ever, none of these changes in take-up affect benefits to society, since
we have hypothesized that these changes would take place without any
changes in unemployment and therefore without any earnings impacts.
Thus, it is still true that by raising additional taxes to pay the bonuses,
society would be better off, even if both UI and bonus take-up rates
increase as shown in Table 7.6.  
The Effects on Net Benefits of Crowding Out
Crowding out is the term used in Chapter 6 to describe the reduced
employment probabilities of unemployed workers who do not respond
to the bonus offer.  They are either claimants who ignore the bonus offer
or nonclaimants who may or may not be eligible for UI.  Using column
4 in Table 6.2, we estimate the effect on earnings of crowding out.  For
the BCA, we estimate the crowding out ratio differently from that in
Table 6.2.  Since the negative effect on earnings of those UI claimants
who do not respond to the bonus have already been included in the earn-
ings impacts reported in Chapter 5 and the previous sections of Chapter
7, the numerator of the crowding-out ratio need only include those
workers who are not in the experimental population (i.e., the UI eligible
nonclaimants and the UI-ineligibles).  Thus, the corrected crowding-out
ratio (based on the numbers reported on line 3 of Table 6.2) is (103 +
94)/297 = 0.65.  Since this ratio is based on changes in employment, it
is necessary to weight each of the employment impact numbers by
appropriate rate of annual earnings. We see below that this correction
causes the ratio to fall to 0.5, calculated as follows:
(103 × 5100 + 94 × 7000)/(415 × 8200 – 118 × 8800) = 0.50.
The increased earnings of $75 in column 1 of Tables 7.5 and 7.6 is
reduced to $37.50 due to crowding out.   The change in tax receipts is
appropriately changed for Table 7.7.  Otherwise, the change in UI pay-
ments, administrative costs and bonus payments are as shown in Table
7.6.  As a result of crowding out, all the net benefits are lower than
reported in Table 7.6 due to the reduced positive effects on earnings.
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Table 7.7 Benefit/Cost of Hypothetical Treatment (6 weeks/$500) with 
Additional UI and Bonus Take-Up and Crowding Out
Parameter
UI take-up rate (%) 65 75
Bonus take-up rate (%) 55 75
Variable
Benefits ($)
Increased earningsa 37.50 37.50
Tax receipts 9.38 9.38
UI benefit payments 69 30
Costs ($)
Administrative costs 3 4
Bonus paymentsb 45 70
Net benefits ($)
Society 34.50 33.50
Government 30.38 –34.62
UI system 0 –44
a See text for the calculations.  The earnings impact from Table 7.6, $75, is multiplied
by 1 minus the crowding-out ratio of 0.50.
b Bonus payment from columns 1 and 4, Table 7.6.
CONCLUSIONS   
The benefit-cost analysis certainly does not provide unambiguous
support for a bonus offer program.  Based on the Washington and
Pennsylvania results, societal benefits are strongly positive for the high
bonus program.  This finding is influenced by the very low costs of
administering the program, and these are the only costs that effect soci-
ety as a whole.  The changes in UI compensation and the bonus pay-
ments represent transfer payments and do not enter the benefit-cost
calculation for society as a whole.  These benefits and costs do enter
the calculus for governmental benefits and, in that arena, the bonus
offer rarely generates positive benefits to the UI system, as the
decreases in UI compensation are usually outgunned by higher bonus
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costs.  This undoubtedly reflects the payments of bonuses to a large
number of UI recipients who would return to work quickly without the
incentive of a bonus offer.  However, the addition of tax revenues from
increased earnings does bring about positive overall governmental ben-
efits in 6 of the 11 program offers (6 in Washington, 4 in Pennsylvania
and 1 in Illinois).
By combining all the data in the construction of hypothetical treat-
ments (namely 6- and 12-week qualification periods and $500 and
$1000 bonuses), the results show large social benefits to high bonuses,
and positive benefits to government in three out of four programs, and
to the UI system in two of the four programs.  This is more encourag-
ing.
A problem arises, however, when we recognize that only half of
claimants eligible to receive bonuses actually collect them and when
we attempt to correct for entry and crowding-out effects.   These effects
clearly reduce any net positive benefits from the offer program.  How-
ever, encouragement might be taken from the fact that, using the com-
bined data and one hypothetical treatment (six-week qualification
period and $500 bonus), even allowing for a 50 percent increase in
bonus take-up, 15 percent increase in entry into UI, and a crowding-out
effect due to the reduced employment of those not offered or eligible
for a bonus, there is still positive net benefits to society as a whole for
this bonus offer program. 
Notes
1. This estimate compares with a cost of $31 per claimant estimated in Pennsylva-
nia.  This large difference arises for several reasons.  First, while the Pennsylvania
estimate deducted costs associated solely with experimental operations, all other
demonstration costs were included in the estimates.  Second, these costs included
sizable costs for central and local office Job Service personnel who were used to
make the bonus offer.  Third, all costs were also assumed to be variable and no
assumptions concerning economies of scale were imposed on the estimates.  If,
instead, it is assumed that UI staff rather than Job Service staff will provide infor-
mation on the bonus offer as part of the claims process and if it is assumed that
central office supervisory costs are fixed, administrative costs in Pennsylvania
equal approximately $11 per claimant.
2. In order to add together and compare benefits and costs that occur over time, or
that occur in different years, it is necessary to discount future effects.  In the BCA
for a bonus offer, most, if not all, the benefits and costs occur in a single year.  A
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possible exception would be the longer run earnings effects of accepting less than
optimal jobs in order to become reemployed sooner.  It might take several years to
regain full earning potential.  A key issue in discounting is the selection of the dis-
count rate.  The long-term Treasury Bond rate is often used and is certainly appro-
priate for three perspectives considered in this analysis.
3. Meyer (1995) estimated that a $500 bonus offer with a 10-week qualification
period could be expected to increase UI take-up by at least 7 to 12 percent.  He
claimed that this is an underestimate, making our 15 percent increase reasonable.
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Appendix Table 7A.1 Administrative Costs for an Ongoing Bonus 
Offer Program
Central office cost (1988 $)
1 program administrator and 1 clerical assistant 45,900
Fringe benefits at 28.3% 12,990
Nonpersonnel services at 16% of salary 7,344
Administrative, staff and technical cost at 16.35% 7,505
73,739
Total new intra-state claims, FY90 227,484
Central office cost per new claim 0.32
Job service center costsa
Time per 
operation Units per claim $ per claim
Additional time for the initial claim 2 minutes 1 0.64
Processing bonus payments 4.5 minutesb 0.129c 0.19
Allowance 27 minutesd 0.129c 1.11
Denials 27 minutesd 0.029e 0.25
Appeals
Lower level 34 minutes
Higher level 20 minutesf 0.002g 0.01
2.20
Total cost per claimant 2.52
Total cost per eligible claimant 
(add 16%)
2.92
a Costs per minute: JSC Specialist II at 1,776 per month, plus fringe benefits at 28.3%,
nonpersonnel services at 16%, and AST costs at 16.35% of salary = $1,776 × 1.6065
= $3,705 per month/9600 minutes per month = $0.32 per minute.
b Allowed time for processing a Continued Claim Form.
c Ratio of total bonuses to initial claims in experiment, i.e., 1,816/14,080 (see Table
3.1, Chapter 3).
d Time allowed for a nonseparation denial or allowance.
e Ratio of NOH and bonus denials to initial claims in experiment, i.e., (278 + 130) ÷
14,080 (see Table 3.1, Chapter 3).
f Time allowed for lower and higher level appeals.
g Proportion of nonseparation appeals to initial claims: 0.06 × 0.029 (lower) + 0.01 ×
0.029 (higher) = 0.07 × 0.029 = 0.002.
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8
Summary and Policy Implications
 
Philip K. Robins
 
The previous chapters have presented findings from three unem-
ployment insurance (UI) bonus experiments conducted in the United
States during the 1980s.  This chapter summarizes the findings, pro-
vides an assessment of what they seem to imply for the viability of a
national system of UI bonuses, and compares a bonus system to other
possible UI reform measures.
 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Background of Experiments
 
The UI bonus experiments were conceived just after unemploy-
ment in the United States had reached a post–World War II high.  In
1982 and 1983, for example, the civilian unemployment rate was
nearly 10 percent (Council of Economic Advisers 1999).  During the
1960s, the unemployment rate averaged under 5 percent and during the
1970s, it averaged just over 6 percent.
High unemployment, coupled with a growing consensus among
academics and policy analysts that the UI program exacerbated unem-
ployment by reducing the incentive to become reemployed, prompted
policymakers to search for alternative ways to help lower unemploy-
ment.  Offering a bonus was a novel idea.  It was thought that a bonus,
if structured properly, could partially offset the financial disincentives
of the UI system and reduce unemployment.
Economic theory provided an unambiguous prediction about the
impact of a bonus on the length of an unemployment spell.  Basic job-
search theory implies that if a time-limited offer of a bonus is extended
to UI recipients, a number of them would respond by finding employ-
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ment more quickly than they would if there had been no bonus.  The
reduced unemployment would be the result of the combined effects of
more intensive job searches and a greater incentive on the part of the
unemployed to accept jobs that are offered (because of a lower reserva-
tion wage).
From the policymaker’s perspective, the source of the reduced
unemployment is important.  If the reduced unemployment comes
about as the result of lower reservation wages, then the bonus may
induce workers to accept lower-paying jobs.  On the other hand, if job-
search intensity increases, workers may find jobs that pay at least as
much as they would in the absence of a bonus offer.
The key policy questions that arose then were 1) by how much
would a bonus reduce unemployment, 2) by how much would the
reduced unemployment lead to lower UI payments, 3) would the
reduced unemployment be associated with lower or higher paying jobs,
4) to what extent would the cost of the bonus be offset by reduced UI
benefits, and 5) would the U.S. economy be better or worse off by the
enactment of a bonus program?
These were critical questions that seemed well suited to being
answered definitively by a carefully conceived and operated social
experiment.  In 1984, the Illinois bonus experiment was launched.  It
was followed in 1988 by the Pennsylvania and Washington bonus
experiments.
 
1
 
Features and Main Findings
 
Table 8.1 summarizes the features and main findings from the Illi-
nois, Pennsylvania, and Washington experiments.
 
2
 
  The Illinois experi-
ment tested a single treatment.
 
3
 
  Unemployment insurance recipients
were offered a bonus of $500 if they found a job within 11 weeks of fil-
ing for benefits and if they held the job for at least 4 months.  The
experiment in Pennsylvania tested four treatments.
 
4
 
  Unemployment
insurance recipients were offered bonuses ranging from $105 to $1,596
if they found a job within 6 or 12 weeks of filing for benefits and held
the job for at least 16 weeks.  The experiment in Washington tested six
treatments.  Unemployment insurance recipients were offered bonuses
ranging from $110 to $1,254 if they found a job within 3 to 13 weeks
and held the job for at least 4 months.
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Table 8.1 Summary of Findings from the UI Bonus Experiments
 
a
 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Washington,
1984–1985 1988–1990 1988–1989
Number of sites 22 12 21
Sample size 8,138 12,226 15,534
Treatment 4,186 8,834 12,452
    Control 3,952 3,392 3,082
Average weekly UI benefit 
and range ($)
135
(51–161)
185
(35–266)
153
(55–209)
Average replacement rate
 
b 
 
(%)
36 43 39
Number of bonus 
treatments
1 4 6
Average bonus offer and 
range ($)
500
–
778
(105–1,596)
574
(110–1,254)
Average qualification 
period and range
11 weeks
–
9.8 weeks
(6–12 weeks)
8.4 weeks
(3 –13 weeks)
Reemployment period 4 months 16 weeks 4 months
Percent leaving UI by 
qualification date
43 57 56
Percent fully qualifying for 
bonus
30 34 31
Percent receiving bonus 14 11 15
Average bonus payment
 
c 
 
($)
68 98 95
Average impact on benefit 
weeks, regression-
adjusted
–1.04*
(–1.46** 
FSC-elig.;
–0.65*
FSC-inelig.)
–0.58** –0.40*
Average impact on annual 
benefit amount
 
c 
 
($)
–150 –102 –63
Average impact on 
probability of 
employment, quarter 3
0.021 –0.014 0.00
Average impact on annual 
earnings
 
c  
 
($)
250* 93 –88
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 Each bonus experiment had what seemed to be relatively large
sample sizes, ranging from 8,138 in Illinois to 15,534 in Washington.
However, as will be discussed below, unless a “parameterized” model
is used to estimate impacts, the sample sizes in Pennsylvania and
Washington were not really large enough to detect modest 
 
differential
 
impacts among the various bonus treatments.
 
5
 
The UI programs in the three states provided weekly benefits that
replaced, on average, nearly 40 percent of weekly wages.  The bonuses
represented between two and six times the weekly UI  benefit amount
(WBA).  On the surface, then, the bonuses appeared to have the poten-
tial to provide a significant financial incentive.  However, the bonuses
would have to reduce unemployment by at least 2 to 6 weeks among
those who took up the bonus, otherwise they would not be cost-effec-
tive from the perspective of the UI trust fund.  Because a number of
recipients received “windfall” benefits (that is, they received a bonus
without reducing their unemployment), the reduction in unemployment
 
among those who responded to the offer
 
 would have to be greater than
2 to 6 weeks for the bonus to be cost-effective.
 
Table 8.1 (continued)
 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Washington,
1984–1985 1988–1990 1988–1989
Net annual benefit per 
claimant
 
d 
 
($)
   Claimant 105 66 –33
   UI system 78 1 –36
   Government 142 24 –57
   Society 247 90 –91
 
a
 
For impacts, * = statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = statistically significant
at the 5% level.
 
b
 
Average UI benefit/average wage.
 
c
 
Taken from Chapter 7, Tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4.  For the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments, values are weighted averages across treatment groups.
 
d
 
Claimant net benefits are earnings impact minus reduced UI benefits plus bonus pay-
ment minus estimated taxes.  UI system net benefits are reduced UI benefit minus
bonus payment minus administrative cost of bonus program.  Government net bene-
fits are UI system net benefits plus increased taxes.  Society benefits are earnings
impact minus administrative cost of bonus program.  Administrative cost is assumed
to be $3 per claimant and taxes are assumed to be 25% of earnings impact.
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As Table 8.1 indicates, between 43 and 57 percent of the treatment
group members left UI by the qualification date and, of those, between
half and three-quarters fully qualified for the bonus.  However, the pro-
portion of claimants receiving bonuses was very low in all three exper-
iments, ranging from 11 to 15 percent of eligible treatment group
members.  Surprisingly, almost half of those who fully qualified for the
bonus failed to claim it.  In Illinois, roughly three-quarters of those that
fully qualified for the bonus claimed it, while in Washington and Penn-
sylvania approximately one-half of those fully eligible for the bonus
claimed it.  Such a large number of “no-shows” increases the cost-
effectiveness of the bonus, but the take-up rate by eligible claimants in
a full-scale national program would probably be higher than that expe-
rienced in the experiment.  The administrators of the experiments have
not provided any explanation why so many individuals failed to claim
the bonus.  Certainly the transaction costs involved in filing a claim
would appear to be low relative to the payoff.
Although in some sense each of the 11 treatments in the 3 experi-
ments can be viewed as independent programs, the average experimen-
tal effect in each experiment can be loosely considered the result of a
treatment that is the weighted average of the bonus offers and qualifica-
tion periods in each experiment.  For the most part, it is this “average
treatment” that will be the major focus of attention in what follows.
Each experiment significantly reduced the number of weeks claim-
ants received UI benefits, with Illinois having the largest impact of just
over one week and Pennsylvania and Washington reducing UI benefit
receipt by close to one-half week.  If the Federal Supplemental Com-
pensation (FSC-eligible) treatment group is excluded from the Illinois
calculations, the reductions in UI receipt become similar across all
experiments, ranging from 0.40 week in Washington to 0.65 week in
Illinois.  Although it is not entirely clear why those eligible for FSC
benefits would be more likely to respond to the bonus, one explanation
is presented in Chapter 6 (see p. 199).  In short, because FSC-eligibility
reduces search effort, the marginal cost of increased search is lower,
and the bonus can have an increased impact.
The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested more than
one treatment in order to measure the sensitivity of the impact to the
bonus amount.  The Pennsylvania experiment tested two bonus
amounts and two qualification periods.  The Washington experiment
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Figure 8.1 Results of the Washington and Pennsylvania Experiments
 
tested three bonus amounts and two qualification periods.  Figure 8.1
shows the relationship between the bonus amount in each experiment
and the impact on UI benefits for each qualification period.  This figure
indicates that only in the case of the short qualification period in the
Washington experiment and the long qualification period in the Penn-
sylvania experiment does their appear to be a pattern of increasing neg-
ative impact on UI benefit amount with the size of the bonus.  How-
ever, with the exception of the short qualification period in the Wash-
ington experiment, the differences in impacts across treatments are not
generally very large and are not statistically significant.  Thus, one
must conclude that the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments
were not very successful in measuring the sensitivity of the impact to
the bonus amount.
Because so few members of the treatment group received a bonus,
the bonus amount per treatment group member averaged only $68 in
Illinois, $98 in Pennsylvania, and $95 in Washington.  The average
reduction in UI benefits exceeded the average bonuses (including
administrative costs) in Illinois and equaled the average bonus in Penn-
sylvania, making the bonus cost-effective from the perspective of the
UI trust fund in Illinois and cost-neutral in Pennsylvania.  Only the
Washington experiment was not cost-effective from the perspective of
the UI trust fund.
While seemingly cost-effective in Illinois, a higher take-up rate
would have reversed this conclusion.  As indicated above, it is not
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known why the take-up rate was so low in Illinois (as well as in the
other two experiments).  If bonuses are to remain a serious policy alter-
native, future research needs to investigate and understand the reasons
for the low take-up rate.
In addition to reducing UI benefits, the bonuses also increased
earnings in Illinois and Pennsylvania, but they decreased earnings in
Washington.  Because there was no significant change in the probabil-
ity of being employed in any of the experiments, the increased earnings
in Illinois and Pennsylvania implies that the claimants were probably
not taking lower paying jobs in order to receive the bonus.  Wage rates
may have been somewhat reduced in Washington.
In Illinois and Pennsylvania, the claimants experienced net benefits
from the program.  The net benefits arose because of both the bonus
payments plus the increased earnings (net of taxes).  In Washington,
the net benefits to claimants were slightly negative because earnings
and UI benefits fell by more than the bonus payments.
The Illinois and Pennsylvania experiments also conferred net bene-
fits on society.  The positive net societal benefits arose because of the
increased earnings.  Because the Washington experiment decreased
claimant earnings, net benefits to society were negative.
 
Generalizing the Experimental Findings
 
Chapter 6 described three major concerns that arise in generalizing
the experimental findings to a national program.  First, there is the pos-
sibility that the availability of a bonus would induce more individuals
to apply for UI benefits.  At the time of the experiments, approximately
65 percent of those eligible for UI were applying for benefits.  It would
seem likely that the percentage of eligible persons that apply for UI
would be greater under a national program.  Second, as has been indi-
cated, the take-up rate among persons that were fully eligible for a
bonus was only about 50 percent.  Again, it is likely that the take-up
rate would be higher under a national program, perhaps because of
greater information about the bonuses, less stigma attached to receiv-
ing them, and belief in the credibility of the issuing agent.  Finally,
there is the possibility that bonus recipients would “crowd out” other
workers from jobs that the others would have taken.
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Accounting for each of these concerns affects the net benefits of
the program.  In some cases, net benefits increase, while in others they
decrease.  Table 8.2 shows how net benefits change from each of the
four perspectives (claimant, UI system, government, and society), after
accounting for these concerns.  The first row of Table 8.2 shows the net
benefits under a hypothetical program having a bonus of $500, a quali-
fication period of six weeks, a UI take-up rate of 65 percent, a bonus
take-up rate of 50 percent, and no crowding out.  These conditions
approximate the average conditions prevailing in the three UI experi-
ments.  Under these conditions, net benefits from all four perspectives
are positive.
Increasing the UI take-up rate to 75 percent increases the net bene-
fits to the claimant but decreases the net benefits to the UI system and
the government, making them negative.  Because there is no change in
real output, net benefits to society only change slightly due to higher
administrative costs.  Increasing the bonus take-up rate further in-
creases the net benefits to the claimants and further decreases the net
benefits to the UI system and the government.  Finally, allowing for a
crowding-out ratio of 40 percent reduces net benefits from all perspec-
tives except the UI system.
Of course, it is not known with certainty whether these changes,
which were estimated using a simulation model, would occur under a
 
Table 8.2 Net Annual Benefits per Claimant under a Hypothetical 
National Program ($) 
 
Parameter Claimant UI system Government Society
Base program
 
a
 
32 21 40 72
Increase UI take-up rate 
to 75%
78 –26 7 71
Increase bonus take-up 
rate to 75%
96 –40 –25 71
Increase crowding-out 
ratio to 0.40
68 –44 –35 34
 
NOTE: Taken from results from the Pooled Experimental Samples in Chapter 7, except
for claimant benefit calculation.  Each successive row represents a change from the
previous row.
 
a
 
Bonus = $500, qualification period = 6 weeks, UI take-up rate = 65%, bonus take-up
rate = 50%, crowding out ratio = 0.
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national program.  Nonetheless, the experimental findings strongly
suggest that a national bonus program similar to the ones tested in the
three UI experiments would not be cost-effective from the perspectives
of the UI Trust Fund or the government.  However, claimants and soci-
ety are predicted to experience net benefits from the program, even
after accounting for “macro-effects.”
 
ASSESSING THE EXPERIMENTS
 
There are at least two ways in which to assess the UI experiments.
First, one needs to determine whether they achieved their objective of
providing definitive information about the impacts of a UI bonus sys-
tem.  Second, if the impacts are judged as definitive, one needs to form
a conclusion about whether bonuses are a good idea for national policy.
Regardless of whether or not they are a good idea for national policy,
the experiments may be judged as successful if they provided definitive
answers to the questions originally posed.
From the standpoint of standards for social policy research, the
experiments were quite successful.  As described in Chapter 2, the
experiments were generally carried out as originally designed and the
use of randomized treatments ensured that the results had internal
validity.  Furthermore, the findings were generally consistent across the
experiments; however, there were some differences in the findings that
might limit their generalizability.  UI benefits were significantly
decreased in all three experiments by similar amounts, but average
earnings rose in Illinois and Pennsylvania and fell in Washington
(although the Pennsylvania and Washington earnings impacts were not
statistically significant).  None of the experiments significantly affected
employment, although the estimated impact was positive in Illinois,
negative in Pennsylvania, and zero in Washington.  Overall, however,
the differences across experiments were not large enough to be statisti-
cally significant.  Financial incentives appeared to work the way econ-
omists and policy analysts predicted they would, but the impacts were
not nearly as large as advocates of a bonus would have hoped for.
In addition to some inconsistencies across the experiments, they
were also not entirely successful in pinpointing the differential impacts
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of alternative program features, such as the size of the bonus and the
length of the qualification period.  Given the success of the Illinois
experiment (which tested only a single bonus treatment), the Pennsyl-
vania and Washington experiments were designed to confirm the Illi-
nois results and to provide estimates of the sensitivity of impacts to
various program features.  The Pennsylvania experiment tested four
treatments and the Washington experiment tested six treatments, both
varying the size of the bonus offer and the length of the qualification
period.
 
6
 
 
Within each experiment, there were no statistically significant dif-
ferences across treatments.  In a continuous variable model in which
weeks of UI was regressed on the bonus amount and the length of the
qualification period (plus other control variables), the estimated
impacts were not statistically significant at conventional levels,
although both were of the expected negative sign (see Chapter 4, Table
4.3).  When the Pennsylvania and Washington samples were pooled,
the impact of the bonus amount was statistically significant at the 10
percent level.  When all three experimental samples were pooled, the
length of the qualification period became statistically significant at the
5 percent level, but the impact of the bonus amount was not statistically
significant.
What can the lack of significant differences across treatments be
attributed to?  It appears that the sample sizes were not large enough to
detect differences of the order of magnitude that actually occurred.  Of
course, it could not have been known beforehand what the impacts
would turn out to be, but it appears not enough attention was paid to
identifying differential impacts across treatments.  In retrospect, it
might have been better to have tested fewer treatments in Pennsylvania
and Washington, with greater differences in bonus amounts and qualifi-
cation periods to have possibly generated larger differential impacts.
However, parameterizing the bonus and qualification options was
always considered an acceptable alternative format that generally
requires smaller sample sizes across treatments, although functional
form in a parameterized model is an important issue that needs to be
resolved before determining sample size requirements.
Despite these shortcomings, the experimental approach appears to
have generated credible and definitive findings relative to other evalua-
tion methods.  As noted by Linkz (1999), policymakers were generally
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convinced by the experimental findings, found them simple to compre-
hend, and concluded that the experimental design was the only one that
would have produced credible results.  The only real limitation of the
experimental approach was that it took some time for the results to be
generated and disseminated and by the time they became available (the
late 1980s and early 1990s), the policy agenda had changed somewhat,
with welfare reform overshadowing UI reform and fiscal conservatism
gripping Congress.  By the time the results became fully available, UI
bonuses had become a much less feasible policy option.  Worker profil-
ing had taken center stage as the policy of choice, and the experiments
did not provide any direct evidence on how worker profiling would
work with a system of bonuses (although, as I indicate below, more
recent work has used the experimental data to simulate the effects of
worker profiling in a system with bonuses).
 
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
 
The results presented in this book have suggested that the UI bonus
schemes tested in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington experi-
ments were only marginally cost-effective from the perspective of the
UI Trust Fund and the overall government budget.  If a relatively unre-
stricted bonus scheme does not achieve the kinds of objectives that
were originally hoped for, the natural question arises as to whether
there are alternative policies for encouraging reemployment among UI
recipients that may be more cost-effective.  In this section, I discuss
five alternatives that have been proposed since the UI bonus experi-
ments were undertaken.  Three of these—an earnings supplement,
stricter sanctioning of work-search requirements, and stricter work-
search requirements—have also been evaluated using a randomized
experiment.  The other two—worker profiling and Unemployment
Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs)—have been evaluated using non-
experimental methods.
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An Earnings Supplement
 
One alternative to bonuses is to provide an earnings supplement to
UI recipients who are willing to take a pay cut to become reemployed
more quickly.  The objective of a UI supplement scheme is to cushion
any income losses suffered as a result of the pay cut.  In order to mini-
mize windfall, the supplements should be provided only to individuals
who would otherwise not have become reemployed.  Displaced work-
ers (persons who have lost stable, long-term, and often well-paying
jobs due to technology, increased international competition, or shifting
market demand) and repeat users of UI are groups for whom an earn-
ings supplement might be effective.
Permanent job displacement is a problem throughout North Amer-
ica and Europe.
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  In Canada, between 1981 and 1991, more than one
million persons were permanently laid off from jobs.  Unemployment
insurance in Canada (now officially referred to as Employment Insur-
ance) is the largest source of government assistance to displaced work-
ers.  The UI system in Canada is more generous than it is in the United
States.  It replaces close to 55 percent of wages for most workers and
pays benefits for up to 50 weeks.  As in the United States, much has
been written about the potential for the Canadian UI system to prolong
unemployment.  Because of this, and because of the high cost of the UI
program in Canada, policymakers there have been exploring new kinds
of reemployment policies.
Given the limited success of the UI bonus experiments, Canadian
policymakers were reluctant to test a similar kind of program.  Instead,
they proposed and tested an alternative—an earnings supplement.  An
earnings supplement is designed to make up part of the earnings loss
suffered by displaced workers who are able to find reemployment more
quickly but at wages lower than what they had previously experienced.
In 1995, the Canadian government funded an experimental evaluation
of an earnings supplement program for displaced workers and repeat
users receiving UI.  The experimental program, termed the Earnings
Supplement Project (ESP), was carried out on close to 6,000 persons
(half of which were assigned to a control group and half to a treatment
group) in five Canadian cities.
 
8
 
  
The features and findings of the ESP are presented in Table 8.3.
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To be eligible for the supplement, UI recipients had to find a full-time
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job (30 hours or more of work per week) within 6 months of filing for
UI benefits.  This job could not be with their most recent employer at
their previous work location.  If an eligible job were found, the individ-
ual could receive a weekly payment equal to 75 percent of the differ-
ence between the previously weekly insurable wage and the new wage,
with a maximum supplement equal to Can$250 per week.
 
10
 
  Thus, if
the individual found a job that payed the same, or more, than the previ-
ous job no supplement would be paid.
Individuals were eligible for the supplement for up to two years.
Unlike the U.S. bonus experiments, there was no required preemploy-
ment period—individuals became eligible to receive the supplement
immediately after finding a full-time job.
As Table 8.3 indicates, the average supplement recipient was paid
more than Can$8,700, averaging about Can$137 per week.  Like the
proportion of the treatment group collecting a bonus in the U.S. exper-
iments, however, the proportion of the ESP treatment group receiving a
supplement was extremely low—only 21 percent of the treatment
group received the supplement (compared with between 11 and 15 per-
cent of the treatment group that received a bonus in the U.S. experi-
ments).
 
11
 
  The percentage leaving UI by the qualification date (26
weeks after filing for UI benefits) was similar to the percentage in the
U.S. experiments (48 percent compared with between 43 and 57 per-
cent) and the percentages fully qualifying for the supplement were also
similar (28 percent compared with between 30 and 34 percent).  Fur-
thermore, unlike the U.S. bonus experiments, the ESP supplement had
no perceivable impact on UI receipt.  In fact, the treatment group actu-
ally stayed on UI slightly longer and received slightly more UI than the
control group.  Although the treatment group had a 0.023 higher
employment rate than the control group (similar to the impact in the
Illinois bonus experiment), average earnings were lower, although not
significantly so.  Thus, unlike the U.S. bonus experiments, some ESP
recipients were induced to find lower paying jobs and overall employ-
ment was not increased by enough to result in an overall increase in
average earnings during the first five quarters of the program.
Because of the lack of an impact on UI benefit receipt, ESP was
not cost-effective from the perspective of either the UI system or the
government.  Additionally, because claimant earnings fell, ESP had
negative net benefits for society.  Only claimants benefited from the
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Table 8.3 Summary of Findings from the Canadian UI Earnings 
Supplement Project (ESP) Experiment
 
a
 
Years operated 1995–1997
Number of sites 5
Sample size 5,912
    Treatment 2,960
    Control 2,952
Average weekly UI benefit (Can$) 308
Average UI replacement rate
 
b
 
 (%) 55
Number of treatments 1
Weekly supplement $250 or 75% of lost 
earnings, whichever 
is less
Maximum number of weeks supplement could be paid 104
Average supplement paid over 104 weeks (Can$) 8,705
Average number of weeks supplement was paid 64 
Average weekly supplement (Can$) 137
Qualification period to get full-time job (
 
≥
 
30 hours) 26 weeks
Reemployment period none required
Percent leaving UI by qualification date 48
Percent employed full-time by qualification date 42
Percent qualifying for supplement 28
Percent receiving supplement 21
Average impact on UI benefit weeks, quarters 1–2 0.2
Average impact on UI benefit amount, quarters 1–5 
(Can$)
90
Average supplement paid, quarters 1–5 (Can$) 1,165
Impact on probability of employment, quarters 1–2 0.023*
Impact on earnings, quarters 1–5 (Can$) –682
Net annual benefit per claimant
 
c 
 
(Can$)
Claimant 592
UI system –1,072
Government –1,208
Society –617
 
(continued)
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Table 8.3 (continued)
 
SOURCE: Adapted from Bloom et al. (1999).
 
a
 
For impacts, * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
 
b
 
Weekly UI benefit / weekly wage.
 
c
 
Based on Tables 7.1 and 7.4 of Bloom et al. (1999).  Claimant net benefits are earn-
ings impact plus plus UI benefit impact plus supplement payment minus estimated
tax change.  UI system net benefits are minus UI benefit impact minus supplement
payment minus administrative cost of supplement program.  Government net benefits
are UI system net benefits plus estimated tax change.  Society benefits are earnings
impact minus administrative cost of supplement program.  Administrative cost is $89
per claimant over quarters 1–5 and taxes are assumed to be 25% of earnings impact.
 
program, but by less than their supplement payments (because of the
decreased earnings).  Hence, ESP served primarily to transfer income
from taxpayers to UI recipients, but not in a cost-effective manner.
From the perspective of public policy, an earnings supplement that par-
tially replaces lost earnings appears to be much more costly and much
less effective than a one-time bonus.
 
Stricter Sanctioning
 
In recent years, U.S. social policy has been increasingly using
sanctions, rather than financial incentives, to promote work effort.
Sanctioning consists of penalizing recipients who do not comply with
program regulations.  The greater emphasis on sanctioning has been a
response to claims that recipients of social transfers are abusing the
system.
In the UI program, sanctioning takes the form of reducing benefits
(possibly to zero) for persons who do not comply with the work-search
requirements.  Surprisingly, little is known about the impacts of stricter
sanctioning in the UI program.  Recently, Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and
Deschênes (2000) reported the results of four randomized experiments
that took place during the mid 1980s and tested the effects of stricter
enforcement and verification of work-search requirements in the UI
program.
 
12
 
The UI sanctioning experiments contained several treatments.  One
treatment gave claimants an expanded initial eligibility questionnaire
and emphasized the UI work requirement, including being notified that
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work search is subject to verification and that the claimant might be
disqualified if the requirement wasn’t being met.  In addition, at the ini-
tial visit to the UI office, the claimant completed a work history form
which was used later to review the accuracy of the monetary determi-
nation of eligibility.  A portion of claimants receiving the first treatment
was given a second treatment consisting of an actual verification of job
contacts.  The evaluators compared claimants receiving the second
treatment with those in the treatment group that were not subject to the
verification procedures to infer the impact of the verification proce-
dures.
Table 8.4 presents the results of the experimental evaluation.  In no
case did the verification procedure significantly affect qualification
rates or UI recipiency rates or benefit amounts.
 
13
 
  The authors con-
cluded that sanctions are not cost-effective.
 
Stricter Work Search Requirements
 
In contrast to stricter sanctioning of existing work-search require-
ments, another possible UI policy would be to increase the work-search
requirements themselves.  In 1986, an experiment was undertaken in
Tacoma, Washington, that tested several treatments of differing work-
search requirements.  The design and findings from this experiment are
reported in Johnson and Klepinger (1994).
The Tacoma experiment had four treatments, as indicated in Table
8.5.  Treatment A eliminated the work-search requirements entirely.
Treatment B had the standard work-search requirements and, hence,
served as the control group for the experiment.  Treatment C provided
individualized requirements, by tailoring them to individual circum-
stances, and increased the requirements and provided services for
claimants who didn’t find work within a reasonable period of time.
Treatment D combined intensive job-search assistance with employ-
ability development planning.
Prior to the experiment, members of each treatment group had sim-
ilar characteristics.  They received, on average, a weekly UI benefit of
about $146, which replaced about 63 percent of their pre-UI earnings.
Impacts of the experiment are also presented in Table 8.5.  As indi-
cated by the relative impacts of treatment A, the results strongly sug-
gest that existing work-search requirements reduce UI benefits paid,
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weeks receiving UI benefits, and the percent exhausting benefits, but
have no impact on employment or earnings (the lack of a negative
impact on earnings may be viewed as a positive finding because it
implies that work-search requirements lead to a greater intensity of
search rather than a reduction in the reservation wage).
 Increasing work-search requirements beyond their present levels,
however, had only a modest impact.  Treatment C had no significant
impact on any of the UI outcomes and only modestly increases the
employment rate by 1.7 percentage points.  Treatment D reduced
weeks of UI receipt by about one-half week and had no impact on earn-
ings.  Johnson and Klepinger indicated that Treatment D is cost-effec-
 
Table 8.4 Summary of Findings from U.S. UI Sanctioning Experiments
 
Years operated 1984–1985
Number of sites 4
Sample size 3,877
    Treatment
 
a
 
1,966
    Control 1,921
Average weekly UI benefit entitlement
 
b
 
 ($) 116
Average replacement rate
 
c
 
 (%) 51
Impact of work search verification on
 
d
 
Temporary disqualification rate 0.007
Average weekly benefits 0.85
Observed claim duration (weeks) –0.23
 
SOURCE: Data from Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschênes (2000).
 
a
 
There were two treatment groups.  Members of the first treatment group had their
work search verified in addition to a number of other verifications of initial and con-
tinuing eligibility, while members of the second treatment group were subjected to
the additional verifications of eligibility but not the verification of work-search verifi-
cation.  The authors used differences between the two treatment groups to isolate the
impact of the work-search verification component.
 
b
 
Measured over the treatment and control groups.
 
c
 
In three of the four sites for which earnings data were available.  The rate equals the
average UI benefit entitlement/average earnings.
 
d
 
Derived from a comparison of mean outcomes of the first treatment group with the
second treatment group.  None of the impacts are statistically significant at the 10%
level or lower.
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Table 8.5 Summary of Findings from the Washington Alternative Work-
Search Experiment, 1986–1988
 
a
 
Variable
Treatment 
A
 
b
 
Treatment 
B
 
b
 
Treatment 
C
 
b
 
Treatment 
D
 
b
 
Sample size 2,246 1,964 2,533 2,871
Average weekly UI benefit ($) 147 145 147 145
Average replacement rate
 
c 
 
(%) 63 63 63 63
Services received 
(% of sample)
Eligibility review interview 0.4 24.6 33.2 19.3
Job-search workshop 0.0 0.1 0.1 15.2
Job referral 14.8 17.9 16.9 15.7
Job placement 5.7 6.8 7.2 6.0
Job counseling 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6
Impact relative to status quo 
(Treatment B)
 
d
 
Total UI benefits paid ($) 265** – 5 –68
Weeks of UI benefits 
received
3.34** – 0.17 –0.47*
Percent exhausting benefits 12.5** – 0.5 –0.3
Percent employed –0.9 – 1.7*** 1.3
Hours of work –6 – 2 22
Hourly wage rate
 
e
 
0.12 – –0.13 –0.01
Total earnings ($) –23 – –24 292
 
SOURCE: Data from Johnson and Klepinger (1994).
 
a
 
* = Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5%
level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
 
b
 
Treatment A: no work-search requirement;
Treatment B: status quo (at least three contacts per week);
Treatment C: Individualized requirements, Varying contracts per week (up to five); 
Treatment D: Intensive job-search assistance and employability development plan-
ning.
 
c
 
Average UI benefit/average earnings.
 
d
 
Impacts are regression-adjusted.  For UI variables, the impact is measured over the
full benefit year.  For the employment and earnings variables, the impacts are mea-
sured over the full two years after applying for benefits.
 
e
 
Hourly wage rate impacts are selectivity-corrected.
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tive, but this inference is based on a statistically insignificant reduction
of $68 in UI benefits paid.
 
Worker Profiling
 
Since the mid 1990s, in response to congressional legislation,
states have been implementing Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS) systems (see, e.g., Eberts and O’Leary 1996).  These
systems actively help UI recipients shorten time out of work by identi-
fying UI recipients who are most likely to exhaust benefits and refer-
ring them to required reemployment services.
Under the WPRS, UI recipients most likely to exhaust benefits are
identified using a statistical methodology that assigns a probability of
exhaustion to each UI recipient eligible for profiling.  The probabilities
are derived from a regression model that links the effects of personal
characteristics and economic factors to the probability of exhaustion.
O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1997) argued that worker profiling
can be used in a bonus program to potentially improve net benefits to
the UI system.  By restricting bonuses to claimants most likely to
exhaust benefits, they maintain that windfall bonuses will be lower and
impacts on UI benefit receipt rates and benefit amounts will be higher.
Although there is no experimental evidence demonstrating that there
would be an improvement in net benefits under a UI bonus program
with worker profiling, O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner simulated the
effects of worker profiling in the Pennsylvania and Washington UI
bonus experiments.
A summary of their simulation results is presented in Table 8.6.
They examine two types of profiling schemes.  One would limit bene-
fits to the top 50 percent of claimants most likely to exhaust benefits.
The other would limit benefits to the top 25 percent of claimants most
likely to exhaust benefits.  In both cases, UI benefits were reduced by
more in the profiled group.  In addition, despite higher bonus amounts
for the profiled group, net benefits to the UI system were higher.  Per-
haps surprisingly, the more restrictive profiling scheme (those limiting
the bonus to the top 25 percent of claimants most likely to exhaust ben-
efits) yielded lower net benefits than the less restrictive profiling
scheme (those limiting the bonus to the top 50 percent of claimants
most likely to exhaust benefits).   However, the differences between the
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two types of profiling schemes were small and the differences between
profiled and nonprofiled claimants in either scheme were not statisti-
cally significant.  The authors concluded that a low bonus amount (per-
haps three times the WBA) and a long qualification period (perhaps 12
weeks) targeted to the top half of claimants most likely to exhaust UI
benefits would be the most cost-effective type of bonus profiling
scheme.  They estimated that such a scheme would save the UI Trust
Fund about $50 per offer. 
While profiling appears to make a bonus program more cost-effec-
tive, the improvement is minimal.  Moreover, the existing results on
 
Table 8.6 Simulated Net Benefits under Worker Profiling,
Pennsylvania and Washington UI Experiments
 
a 
 
($)
 
Variable Pennsylvania Washington
Impact on UI benefits paid
 
b
 
Bottom 50% –70 31
Top 50% –172* –117*
Difference –102 –148
Bottom 75% –109 13
Top 25% –129 –118
Difference –20 –131
Average bonus paid
Bottom 50% 86 67
Top 50% 103 142
Difference 17 75
Bottom 75% 92 85
Top 25% 104 166
Difference 12 81
Net benefit per claimant from 
perspective of UI system
No worker profiling –13 –76
Worker profiling, top 50% 36 –28
Worker profiling, top 25% –8 –51
 
SOURCE: Data from O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1997).
 
a
 
* = Statistically significant at the 10% level.
 
b
 
For combined treatments using the authors’ profiling models.
 Summary and Policy Implications 269
 
profiled bonuses are based on nonexperimental simulations and may
not occur under an actual program.  In addition, the statistical models
used to predict exhaustion rates tend to have low explanatory power
and may not be accurately defining the optimal target group.  Finally,
in the presence of profiling, it is possible that claimants will alter their
behavior to be more likely to meet the criteria used to select bonus-eli-
gible claimants.  If this occurs, the profiling procedure will become an
even less accurate tool for identifying the group least likely to be
receiving windfall benefits from a bonus program.
 
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts
 
A more radical proposal to encourage reemployment among UI
recipients is the use of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts
(UISA).  As proposed by Feldstein and Altman (1998), all working per-
sons would be required to save a fraction of their wages (up to 4 per-
cent) in special government accounts.  The funds in these accounts
would earn the market rate of interest and could be drawn upon if the
people were to become unemployed.  In the event that the funds are
exhausted, the government would lend these people money, again at
the market rate of interest.  If the person retires or dies with a positive
balance in the account, it would be converted into retirement income or
bequeathed to heirs.  Negative balances would be forgiven.
By using personal wealth to subsidize unemployment, Feldstein
and Altman argued that reemployment would be encouraged.  Only
persons who expect to retire or die with negative balances would face
the same adverse reemployment incentives as under the present UI sys-
tem.
Using historical data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Feldstein and Altman simulated the performance of such a system.
They found that only 5 percent of employees would retire or die with
negative balances.  They also estimated that UISAs would save the UI
trust fund about half the benefits being paid under the current system.
They suggest the savings could be used to reduce payroll taxes.
While such a system has intuitive appeal, about half the benefits
would be paid to individuals with negative balances at retirement.  This
raises serious questions regarding the equity of such a system, although
the current system also raises questions of equity.  Furthermore, it is
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possible that the percentage of persons with negative balances at retire-
ment could be even larger than suggested by the historical data, if there
are adverse behavioral impacts (people borrowing money by increasing
unemployment to build up negative balances at retirement).  Without
an actual field test of system of UISAs, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions about its likely impacts.
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
The UI bonus experiments achieved their objective of providing
credible estimates of the likely impacts of a UI bonus system.  The
experimental results indicate that bonuses are unlikely to have major
impacts on unemployment and may only be marginally cost-effective.
The results are generally consistent across the experiments,
although the magnitude of impacts varied.  Impacts on benefit weeks
were remarkably similar across the experiments (ranging from –0.40 to
–0.65 week, excluding the FSC sample in Illinois), but the impacts on
earnings were quite different (ranging from $250 in Illinois to –$88 in
Washington).  The Illinois experiment had the most positive impacts,
leading to positive net benefits on all segments of society.  The Penn-
sylvania experiment also yielded positive net benefits, but they were
smaller than in Illinois.  The Washington experiment yielded negative
net benefits on all segments of society, although a few positive results
did emerge for specific treatments.  Despite the general similarity
across experiments in average bonus amounts and qualification peri-
ods, the differences in net benefits across experiments are somewhat
perplexing.  Davidson and Woodbury hypothesize in Chapter 6 that dif-
ferences in macroeconomic conditions across the three experimental
sites (namely differences in job separation rates and growth rates in
available jobs) could be responsible for the differences in net benefits
across the sites. 
The Illinois experiment had only one treatment and was not
designed to test the sensitivity of responses to different treatment lev-
els.  The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments had several treat-
ments and were specifically designed to test the sensitivity of responses
to different treatment levels.  However, the Pennsylvania and Washing-
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ton experiments were not entirely successful in measuring the sensitiv-
ity of responses to different treatment levels.  While the sample sizes
for the entire experiments were adequate to measure experimental-con-
trol differences, the sample sizes for the individual treatments were
probably not large enough to measure moderate differences in response
across treatments.
Nonetheless, the evidence appears conclusive that bonuses are not
the panacea originally envisioned.  Allowing for macro effects that
could not be measured by the experiments (higher UI take-up rate,
higher bonus take-up rate, and crowding out) makes the evidence even
less supportive of the bonus option.
Alternatives to bonuses have been proposed, but none appears to
yield more desirable effects.  Earnings supplements, tighter sanction-
ing, and increasing work-search requirements beyond their present lev-
els all appear to be ineffective reforms.  While some have suggested
that worker profiling would improve net benefits, the evidence so far
suggests that it is unlikely profiling would lead to consistently positive
net benefits, although subsequent refinement of this technique may
yield more positive results.  However, the ability to identify key target
groups is a difficult problem limiting the development of effective pro-
filing models.  Finally, the impacts of more radical reforms such as
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts are largely speculative
and may prove so inequitable that they would not be politically palat-
able.
The search for reform in the UI system is not as intense today as it
has been in the past, largely because the economy has been healthy and
unemployment has been much lower.  Nonetheless, the search contin-
ues because the adverse work incentives still exist within the system
and the economy might worsen in the future.  As new approaches are
developed, the evidence from this book strongly suggests that if at all
possible, randomized experimental evaluations of such approaches
should be undertaken.  I believe randomized experiments provide the
most effective way of gathering definitive evidence about the likely
effects of a particular programmatic change and should be favored over
non-experimental evaluation techniques.  However, the worst possible
action would be to adopt a new approach without any scientific evalua-
tion at all.
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Notes
 
1. There was a fourth UI bonus experiment conducted in New Jersey in 1986 and
1987.  The New Jersey experiment had three treatments: job-search assistance,
job-search assistance plus training or relocation, and job-search assistance plus a
reemployment bonus.  The New Jersey experiment is not considered in this book
because the bonus offers were made only after seven weeks of insured unemploy-
ment, and hence could not be replicated in a real national program where informa-
tion about the bonus would be available from the beginning of an insured
unemployment spell.  For details about the New Jersey experiment and its results,
see U.S. Department of Labor (1989) and Meyer (1995).
2. The dollar amounts reported in Table 8.1 and subsequent tables pertain to the
years in which the studies were conducted.  If the reader wishes to convert the
study year amounts to present-day dollars (say, for the year 2000), the study year
amounts would be multiplied by the ratio of a price index in the year 2000 to the
price index in the study year.  If the study was conducted over more than one year,
an average price index over the study years may be used as an approximation.
One commonly used price index is the Consumer Price Index, or CPI.  For exam-
ple, in the case of the Illinois experiment, the study period was 1984 to 1985.  The
CPI for the year 2000 (1982–1984 = 100) was 172.2.  The average CPI over the
years 1984 to 1985 was 105.7.  Thus the average weekly UI benefit in Illinois of
$135 reported in Table 8.1 would be the equivalent of $200 in year-2000 dollars
($135 
 
×
 
 172.2/105.7).  To convert Pennsylvania and Washington dollar amounts to
year-2000 dollars, one would use the year 2000 CPI and the average CPI in Penn-
sylvania over the years 1988 to 1990 (which was 124.3) and the average CPI in
Washington over the years 1988 to 1989 (which was 121.2).  Similar calculations
can be made for the other dollar amounts reported in this chapter.
3. As has been noted, Illinois also had a second experiment where bonuses were
offered to employers, but extremely low participation precluded it from having
any significant impacts.  The employer experiment was not considered in this
book because it differed from the experiments in Pennsylvania and Washington.
4. More than one treatment was tested in the Pennsylvania and Washington experi-
ments because the success of the Illinois experiment encouraged policymakers to
seek ways of finding the most cost-effective structure for a national bonus pro-
gram.  The Pennsylvania experiment tested a declining bonus offer (like in the
New Jersey experiment) but, because it cannot be easily compared to a fixed
bonus offer, it is not considered in this book.
5. The sample sizes for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments were not
determined on the basis of measuring differential impacts among the various
treatments but rather were determined on the basis of measuring treatment-control
impacts.  By a parameterized model, it is meant that a response surface is esti-
mated in which the treatments are quantified into a small number of continuous
variables (like bonus amount or qualification period) rather than by a series of dis-
crete dummy variables representing treatments.  Thus, it was implicitly assumed
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by the designers of the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments that differential
impacts among the treatments would be estimated using a parsimonious response
surface model.  See, for example, Table 4.3 in Chapter 4.
6. There was no attempt to vary the preemployment period, which was set at four
months in all three experiments.
7. See Lauzon (1995) for a discussion of the problem in Canada, Ross and Smith
(1993) for a discussion of the problem in the United States, and OECD (1990) for
a discussion of the problem in Europe.
8. The five cities were Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; Granby, Quebec; Winnipeg, Mani-
toba; Oshawa, Ontario; and Toronto, Ontario.
9. The information in this table was taken from Bloom et al. (1999).  It only pertains
to the program for displaced workers.
10. At an exchange rate of 0.75 Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar, the maximum sup-
plement in U.S. dollars would be about $187.50.
11. The low percentage of treatment group members receiving a supplement in ESP
may be due to the fact that UI recipients are unwilling to jeopardize long-run job
prospects by taking a short-term lower-paying job.  By taking a lower-paying job,
claimants would have to reduce job-search behavior and might miss out on find-
ing a new job more comparable to the predisplacement job.
12. The four experiments took place in Hartford, Connecticut; Worcester, Massachu-
setts; Nashville, Tennessee; and Falls Church, Virginia.
13. Other components of the treatment also did not have statistically significant
impacts.
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Glossary
 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TERMS
 
Benefit Year
 
A 12-month period, generally starting with the Sunday of the week in
which a claim is filed, during which time unemployment insurance (UI) bene-
fits are payable.  At the end of that period, a new benefit year must be estab-
lished by earning a sufficient income to reestablish UI benefit entitlement.
 
Compensable Duration
 
The number of weeks that benefits are payable during the benefit year.  In
some states, it is a fixed number of weeks (e.g., in Illinois, 26).  In other states,
it is a variable number of weeks determined by the claimant’s UI benefit enti-
tlement divided by his or her weekly benefit amount (WBA).  
 
Filing for Unemployment Insurance
 
The process by which an unemployed worker establishes a claim for pay-
ment of UI benefits.  A prospective claimant files a claim to establish a benefit
year.
 
Full Referral Union
 
A union that operates a hiring hall and takes full responsibility for placing
its members in jobs.  A claimant who is a member of such a union is work-
search exempt.
 
Monetary Eligibility
 
The determination on the part of the UI agency that the claimant has suffi-
cient earnings in the base period to be eligible to receive at least the minimum
benefits.  
 
Nonmonetary Eligibility
 
The determination on the part of the UI agency that the claimant is “able
and available for work,” a necessary condition for benefit payment, and does
not have a separation issue (i.e., did not voluntarily quit a job or was not fired
for cause).
 276
 
Registration with Employment Service
 
Claimants are required to register with the Employment Service (ES;
often called the Job Service) as part of the requirement that they must be seek-
ing work to draw benefits.  The Employment Service is the agency of the state
government responsible for monitoring work search requirements for UI and
in general providing a job-matching service for employers and job seekers. 
 
Standby
 
A claimant who has been temporarily laid off of a job and whose
employer has stated in writing that it is the intent to recall that claimant within
60 days of layoff.  A claimant on standby is work-search exempt.
 
UI Benefit Entitlement
 
The total benefits that a claimant could draw over his or her benefit year.
The entitlement is determined in each state as a specified fraction of the claim-
ant’s earnings during a given period, called the base period.
 
Waiting Week
 
Most states (including all three states that ran the experiments described
in this book) require that claimants forgo payment during the first week of the
benefit year, after which the period of compensable duration begins.  After
serving the waiting week and the first compensable week, the claimant files
for the first compensable week’s benefits.  
 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
 
The maximum benefit payable in a compensable week.  The WBA is set
as a fixed proportion of a claimant’s full-time weekly wage, with both mini-
mum and maximum amounts set by each state.  
 
Work-Search Exempt
 
A claimant status in which the claimant is eligible to receive UI benefit
payments without meeting the work-search requirements.
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BONUS EXPERIMENT TERMS
 
Assignment to the Experiment
 
A random process of allocating eligible members of a population to
experimental groups (called treatments).  It is usually accomplished by giving
each eligible member of the population a number, which has been selected by
a random process, and then allocating those numbers to the different experi-
mental groups, including the control group.  
 
Agreement to Participate
 
Used in Illinois only, it is the conscious decision to enroll in the experi-
ment, expressed by signing an agreement to participate. 
 
Bonus Voucher 
 
The form that the claimant submits to the administrating agency request-
ing payment of the bonus.  The form states that the claimant believes he or she
has met all the requirements for the bonus.  
 
Eligibility for the Bonus Program
 
Designation of a set of characteristics that define an individual who is eli-
gible to be enrolled in the experiment.  Some characteristics, such as filing an
initial claim for UI benefits, are universal across the three experiments.  Other
characteristics, such as registering with the ES or not being on standby, are
conditions of eligibility selected by some (but not all three) experiments.  
 
Notice of Hire (NOH)
 
A form submitted by the claimant stating that he or she had become fully
employed by the end of the qualification period and had met other conditions
for bonus eligibility, such as not being recalled to a previous job (in Pennsyl-
vania and Washington). 
 
Qualification Period
 
The length of time from the date of enrollment into the experiment to the
date by which the participating claimant must obtain a full-time job in order to
be eligible for a bonus. 
 
Reemployment Period
 
The length of time after obtaining a qualifying job that the participating
claimant must remain fully employed in order to receive a bonus.  
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